written by Kamal Makili-Aliyev printable version send your friend

Friday, 23 December 2011

The “Mediterranean Knot” is closely linked to the recent events that have taken place in the North African states of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. This article is focused on Egyptian and Libyan issues, Italian and Moroccan outlooks, and linked with other major players that influence the region such as the EU, U.S., Israel, Turkey, and Iran.

In the Egyptian case, the main reasons for revolution proved to be the youth as a driving power, socio-economic factors as motivators, and foreign influence as ignition. Though throughout the last decade, Egypt has demonstrated impressive GDP and economic growth as well as unemployment of only nine percent, but the actual socio-economic situation proved to hold forty percent of the total population of Egypt in poverty. At the same time, the youth which proved to be the major part of the population were dissatisfied with low salaries, a monopoly on all the areas of socio-economical life, marginalization, visible corruption on a grand scale, and the constant brutality of the security forces. Those factors led to the mobilization of forces by the youth that used mobile technology factors and social networks to unite. The reduction of the socio-security mechanism and common dissatisfaction of the people with Egyptian foreign policy only strengthened the resistance. All of these factors have led to the situation in Tahrir Square. The current situation in Egypt proves to be largely dependent on the military council. The military played one of the key roles in the denunciation of Mubarak’s rule. Political transition was facilitated by the masses, however, instigated by the military. A lot of the same power groups are still in the country’s political sphere and it seems that the military has no intention to transfer the power to civilian structures. From the beginning of the tensions, the Egypt military was prepared to stir the process in any direction it needed. Egypt has seen the rise of old and the creation of new political parties. The general mood of the population proves to be flexible. The masses have not decided what they really want yet, but a conservative mood prevails at the moment. The domestic situation is not grave these days, however if identity politics prevail, the escalation of hostilities might arise. Non-traditional security threats are on the rise and will influence the region, even if they have not originated exclusively in Egypt. The main goal of the current authorities in Egypt right now is to deal with the root causes of instability. At the same time, it is evident that tensions between religious groups cover the whole political sector in Egypt. Tensions do not escalate to conflict, thus Islamists are not likely to be antagonists to the democratic processes if they will be represented largely in power, which does not include the scenario of radical Islam prevailing in the political sphere.

Turkish foreign policy in the Mediterranean proved to be of average, though direct, involvement and produces a lot of criticism. At the same time, Turkey’s position shows that it was trying to create favorable environments for the processes to be peaceful in nature. In reality, it seems Turkey was trying to fill power vacuums left in the wake of the “Arab Spring.” Israel-Turkey relations are experiencing the after-shocks of such a geopolitical game. Turkish foreign policy it seems was not prepared for the “Arab Spring” at first. Turkey had to balance its Tunisia and Egypt approach with quite different situations in Libya and Syria. In the case of Syria, Turkey was very careful not to make fast and rash decisions as did many other regional states. The best bid of Turkey was in the prevention of militarization of the issues when at that point Israel was considered by Turkey a rational actor. For the same reason, Turkey argued against any sanctions toward Libya and Syria. Turkey’s strength in its position was that it previously concentrated on increasing its economic stability to enlarge its political influence. In addition, Turkey has adopted the view that the only source of legitimacy is to meet the public demands and concerns. That decision came from s realization that the only way for Turkey to compete with Iran in the region is to prove that Turkey can be a role model in a liberal democratic manner. Many Turkish authors also agree that Turkey’s strive for the Western international community which would accept Turkey when it met certain criteria created a balance between regional problems and its internal democratic orientation. Thus Turkey was able to adopt the position of the EU and use it to extend its influence in the region. The rise of other key political actors in the region was also recalculated by Turkey after revolts in Arab world. At the same time, the rise of Turkish influence provoked a corresponding opposition. Turkey’s attempts to depolarize the political environment in the Middle East right now depend on its ability to solve its crisis with Israel. The current Turkish foreign policy sometimes might seem neo-imperialistic in its nature, however Turkey is trying to play on self-authority rather than hard power. Such a position is evident in Turkish attempts at mediation in the Syrian crisis. Such mediation was basically based on European values and pressure mechanisms. A general lack of success on the part of Turkey in such mediation was due to a large number of other strong actors involved in the process. Many analysts agree that Turkey is currently trying to adopt EU policy: “If you want a good relationship with us, go through the internal transformation to adapt to our certain values”.

The outlook on the processes from Morocco reflects certain interesting geopolitical points and stresses that some of the North African states are stuck in a “cold war.” Disputes still linger between countries. States thus do not evolve politically, rather they concentrate on evolving economically. Border issues are the root of most problems in the North African region. Immigration, terrorism, and drug trafficking are among the main problems. The root of the crisis that struck the southern part of Mediterranean region is seen in the sole concentration on foreign policy and large disregard toward domestic issues. However, the key to shifting the focus inward to the domestic problems is seen nowadays as largely dependent on solving the external tensions first. The relationship between the north and south of the Mediterranean is again hampered by border disputes while the attempts at integrating the Mediterranean region are failing. Most of the problems arise due to the different political situations of the states in the region. Internal reforms are a very important factor for stability in the troubled states of the region. Morocco for example was very slow on reforms due to stagnation in the “cold war,” as it was trying to balance its policy between all regional and international key actors. Nowadays, the priorities in Morocco are domestic affairs and reforms. And the recent shift in the foreign policy of Morocco is evident in that it was selected to the U.N. Security Council without the participation of African states.

EU foreign policy got struck on the Arab world uprising, in that most of the countries of the Mediterranean region at the same time as the EU were hit by economic crises. The weak leadership and strategic planning of the EU’s Mediterranean policy were reflected in the Libyan crisis. The Libya crisis stressed all weaknesses in the military and political sphere of the EU. The Union itself was largely divided when dealing with the Libyan crisis, which resulted in intervention under the NATO banner. Germany and Poland were among the leading states opposing the intervention. EU foreign security policy suffered from such divisions gravely. The EU generally lacks teeth to successfully enforce its political will due to internal disagreements and a conflict of interests. That misbalance led to the NATO participation on one side of the civil war. Moreover, Libya might become a precedent for the future security strategy of the EU. The economic crisis in the EU still hampers its military policy. Aside from that, the U.S. in its turn is not generally happy with the EU’s inability to act on its own. The EU military spending cut threatens its contributions to global security. The EU needs better resource management and strategic thinking and planning when it comes to situations of armed crisis. Libya was in many respects a success story of EU engagement in a foreign geopolitical game, at the same time it was large indicator of EU faults. The EU needs to revolutionize its geostrategic vision and strive for leadership in neighboring regions. The EU should avoid migration issues and focus more on its foreign policy and partnership programs. The EU can cooperate with Turkey to establish joint foreign policy projects and advance toward the Arab world. At first, the EU was only actively involved in the Mediterranean region when it came to economic cooperation, not the development of its democratization policy. Hence the Arab Spring was a surprise for the EU. The Union was very slow to react on the ignition of the Arab world. A lack of swiftness in action was due to the EU’s concentration on a lot of economic and security matters, not on democratization processes. The transformation of the balance of power occurred after the Arab Spring resulting in the diminishing of Western influence in the region, thus empowering Iran. Changes in the whole system in the Mediterranean region can result in a rise of new threats for the EU. The Union itself is deeply dependent on oil from countries in the Middle East. The EU strategy should be adjusted to answer new situations and assist democratic transitions in the Mediterranean region. Today, the Union has started to adopt an incentives-based approach and engage in political modernization of the region. Scenarios for the future transitions from the EU perspective can involve radicalism, militaries, democratization, and civil wars or failed states. rise of Islamic radicalism is very probable, especially if the economic transitions that are very important for democratization processes and at the same time are very hard and time consuming, will be taken into account.

The Italian perspective on the Mediterranean states consumed by the uprising crisis was most conflicting. Italy has a lot of interests in the region as well as its EU concerns. These interests largely overlap. At the same time, its colonial past obliges Italy with a certain degree of responsibility toward, for example, Libya. Libya in its turn plays a critical role in Italian energy policy. Immigration policies tie Italy to Libya and other countries in the Mediterranean region as well. Berlusconi’s ties with Gadhafi were to such extent that they have been criticized even in Italy. Energy and liberation were the two main issues of Italy in the Libyan crisis. Oil thus was a serious factor in the Gadhafi regime’s demise. The Libyan crisis in its turn contributed to Italian fears of geopolitical marginalization. Italy was almost politically forced to support Libyan intervention. The current position of Italy is seemingly that Libya requires a national reconciliation process that can be facilitated with help of the EU and Italy. Some Italian authors argue that the main challenges for Libya will be the reconstruction of its economy as well as domestic political situation while establishing legitimacy.

U.S. imperatives in the Mediterranean are quite open. The preservation of Israeli and Egyptian peace is one of the main objectives. At the same time countering Iran, which has an interest in taking pressure off Libya through influencing Egypt, is one of the secondary objectives. Israelis on their part have ambitions to become a major power substituting Egypt after it fell to the disarray. Military handling of the political transition in Egypt is vital in U.S. strategic planning. The U.S. sees Egypt as a security guarantee for the region. Opposition in Egypt right now is much divided and the military is overbearing. Many forces would like to use today’s moment of uncertainty in Egypt to their respective advantages. Hamas wants to weaken the military regime, to then use Egypt against Israel. The Egyptian political scene sees the Israel-Palestinian card as a bid to use in the process of gaining power. The Muslim Brotherhood opposes Hamas, preventing it from taking over in a crisis. The U.S. is interested in securing and stabilizing the Suez Canal region, and will take into account the Egyptian military factor. At the same time, the U.S. does not disregard the influence of Turkey in the region and will use it when balancing pressure on the region with Israel, though Israeli policy needs to be revised in respect of the current changes.

All in all it seems that the “Mediterranean Knot” is still to be untied in the scale of geopolitical events that the future will bring us. However, the situation can only be aggravated with the escalation of violence and destabilization of the region. Only time will show the result. 　 　

*Dr. Kamal Makili-Aliyev is Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.