written by Bedrudin Brljavac printable version send your friend

Friday, 16 December 2011

“The first thing we need to do is to strengthen the pre-conditions for a healthy civil society in all three senses by attacking all forms of inequality and discrimination, giving people the means to be active citizens, reforming politics to encourage more participation, guaranteeing the independence of associations and the structures of public communication, and building a strong foundation for institutional partnerships, alliances and coalitions” (Edwards, Michael: 2004).


Despite the fact that more than 15 years passed from the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in December 1995 which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter Bosnia or BiH), the country has not still achieved sufficient economic progress, political stability, and genuine reconciliation between the three biggest ethnic communities in Bosnia, namely Bosnian Muslims or Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats. In addition, relevant economic data clearly displays that economic situation in the country is dramatic and harsh since unemployment level of its working population is between 40 and 50 percent. Also, around two thirds of young people want to leave the country in search of a better life (Sunje, 2011). Furthermore, over the past two decades the local politicians have not succeeded, or they simply have not wished, in reaching compromising agreement necessary for the country's integration process in the European Union (EU) and NATO. Also, 15 months passed from General elections in October 2010 and the country's ruling political elites could not agree on the future state government. Overall, as Freizer points out, Bosnia is today possibly the most unstable, unpredictable, and fragile country in the region of western Balkans (2011). Similarly, the European Commission asserts that Bosnia is still plagued by an "unstable political climate" and deep ethnic divisions (2011). Thus, there are a number of serious reasons for Bosnian ordinary citizens to protest against the country's political elites and its corrupt officials.

Although there have been numerous reasons for ordinary citizens and civil society organisations to demonstrate their discontent and uneasiness against a years-long status quo and stagnation, the vast majority of country's citizens is rather quite, uninvolved, and passive. Thus, according to the statistical data of Gallup from 2010 conducted in western Balkan countries, around 77.4 % of Bosnian citizens think that Bosnia is going in a bad direction. On the other hand, it is worrying fact that around 23.9 % of the BiH citizens chose rather not to confront with reality acting by the rule "what you do not see, it does not exist", so they decided not to pay attention to the current situation in the country (Simic and Mujkanovic, 2010). However, due to the fact that protests and demonstrations against 'unjust, corrupt, and authoritarian regimes', injustices, and inequalities have recently been held regularly in several places around the world the passiveness, apathy, and inertia of Bosnians is even more paradoxical, incomprehensible and enigmatic. Even the country's Europeanisation-related reforms that have been implemented since late 1990s have not contributed to making ordinary citizens, or civil society in general, stronger, dynamic and developed. In fact, the Europeanisation process in the country has aimed at strengthening and speeding up the country's democratic consolidation and emergence of stronger and more dynamic civil society. As that has not happened so far it is of crucial importance to understand the reasons why the European integration process in the country has not contributed to a “Bosnian Spring”, referring to recent street protests in Arab world known as 'Arab Spring'.

Due to a extensive political deadlock and social sclerosis Bosnia has been going through serious and worrying anarchic situation and deep institutional paralysis. Moreover, even 15 years of democratic transformation process has passed, in which reconciliation, stability, and trust were to be rebuilt, still there is a deep gap and polarisation between the three ethnic communities in the country. Despite a few positive examples of dialogue and tolerance there have been widespread a massive mistrust and prejudices among these national groups. There can be several causes further deepening ethnic polarisation between Bosnian citizens. For instance, many see Bosnian ethnic politicians' inflammatory nationalist discourse as a predominant cause of substantial ethnic hatreds. Hence, the Council of Europe in its Second Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina released in February 2011 pointed out that ethnic politicians in Bosnia largely use virulent nationalist rhetoric fostering divisions between the constituent peoples and ethnic groups living in the country (CoE, 2011). In fact, if ethnic politicians in Bosnia have not further deepened ethnic segregation in the country then it is without doubt that they have not contributed to renaissance of dialogue and deliberation between the three ethnic communities. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to explore a potential of civil society as the alternative governance model in the process of building stable and democratic Bosnia. Can and to what extent a civil society in Bosnia, as important milestone of democratic, contribute to the process of inter-ethnic reconciliation, peace-building and stable democracy? Is it indeed true that civil society in Bosnia is powerless and marginalised?

Without any doubt a civil society is inescapable and inevitable part of any democratic community. In other words, the institution of a civil society stands for one of the most urgent motor forces in the process of building democratic and open society. Also, without stable, coherent and pro-active civil society which is directly engaged in the decision-making processes it would be naïve to talk about democratic consolidation of any post-socialist country. In addition, democratic societies are characterised by harmonious co-existence of three equally important sectors: public sector (state), private sector (trade) and citizens (civil society). Thus, civil society refers to ordinary citizens who are, or they should, actively and freely engaged in each domain of public and social life. For instance, Larry Diamond points out that “Civil society actors should watch how state officials use their powers.  They should raise public concern about any abuse of power.  They should lobby for access to information, including freedom of information laws, and rules and institutions to control corruption” (2004). In stable democratic communities a civil society is perceived and accepted as inevitable and necessary platform through which ordinary citizens express their interests, expectations, and needs so public officials consider these while making public policies. That is, countries having a developed civil society are politically stable, not least because civic organisations train citizens to be tolerant, cooperative and reciprocal (Tusalem 2007: 379–80). Still, there are many different definitions and approaches about the role and importance of civil society for democratic community.

For instance, referring to Ernst Gellner who claims that civil society is a set of different non-governmental organizations strong enough to become counterbalance to state, Esad Zgodic points out that crucial role of civil organizations in democratic country and open society is in displaying civic initiatives, aspirations, and needs, with the central purpose of influencing political decisions and policy-making processes (2001). Furthermore, prominent scholar Alexis de Tocqueville in his book about a democracy in America describes civil society in terms of a spirit of collectivness and harmony which was a rule of the game at the time, making it visible through active social involvement of numerous organizations, communities, and diverse voluntary movements among ordinary citizens (1969). Thus, organizations of civil society are also known as voluntary, autonomous, non-profit, non-governmental, or a third sector. Also, Adam Seligman calls civil society the “new analytic key that will unlock the mysteries of the social order”, Jeremy Rifkin calls it “our last, best hope”, the UN and the World Bank see it as the key to ‘good governance’ and poverty-reducing growth (Edwards, 2004). Further, since 1980s definitions about civil society increasingly focus on ideas of freedom of organizing, self-organizing of free citizens, social capital and mutual interaction between citizens. Thus, in many societies civic organizations are seen as last chance to reach and influence public officials who are often unjust, corrupt, and insensitive to citizens' needs.

In the post-war Bosnia a role of civil society is not clear and it is still rather unexplored enough. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has been going through thorough democratization or a Europeanisation processes more than 15 years the institution of civil society or civic movements are rather underdeveloped, weak, and institutionally marginalized. In other words, as Brownell points out Bosnia remains rigidly divided along ethnic lines and therefore its civil society too has remained largely polarised and fragmented (2007). In spite of the fact that number of non-governmental organizations has risen in the post-war period reaching nearly 10 000, in a qualitative sense there has not been sufficient development. For instance, just a small number of those registered organizations has been actively engaged in the process of shaping public policies. Also, a significant number of those NGOs registers only for short-term interests to gain an access to financial means for their projects. Thus, public perception about potential, capabilities, and role of a civil society have not been sufficiently developed among the citizens of all the three ethnic communities. Furthermore, a large number of NGOs work on projects which do not reflect interests and urgent needs of ordinary citizens, although it should be one of the main goal of each civic initiative. Put differently, Nuhanovic claims that such activities only have an impact within the civil sector itself, as they merely involve civil society actors and their limited public (Nuhanovic, 2002: 92).

Furthermore, there are even NGOs whose members and activists openly promote and support fascist, racist and ultra-nationalist projects. Due to their financial dependence to certain political parties a significant number of NGOs rather boost certain political doctrine excluding any possibility of participation of members from other ethnic communities. Moreover, it often happens that ruling political elites view a civil society as something dangerous, threatening, and even unnecessary. Thus, Savic (2003) asserts that multi-ethnic programmes run by the civil sector and based on citizens’ interests and civic initiatives are incompatible with the mono-dimensional ethno-politics pursued by state actors and institutions. According to Savic, there is no understanding of, or scope for, partnerships with the civil society actors. In general, a vast majority of Bosnian citizens, regardless of their ethnic background, behave indifferently and passively regarding the country's political and economic matters which actually influence a whole society. As Omer Korjenic argues: “What best characterizes Bosnian citizen in current socio-political circumstances and economic situation, is underdevelopment of civic political culture that is  equivalent to the overall state of civil society. Better to say, he/she is a citizen without essential substances, an incomplete zoon politikon, who is still  not aware that he /she is the holder of sovereignty, autonomous individual whom belongs political subjectivity and that he/she expresses interests and aspirations at elections, using right to vote thus electing one/s who will represent him/her” (2006). Indeed, most of people in Bosnia see themselves as too weak and powerless to effect public policies.

In other words, in the post-war period in Bosnia a concept of citizen, as it is understood in developed democracies, has been institutionally “erased” and its role in expressing the interests and expectations within the policy-making processes has been minimized having only a formal role such as going to ballot box periodically. In addition, almost immediately after the outbreak of war, both citizens and their state of BiH have lost their political identities (Mujkic, 2010: 128). Moreover, there is no unique Bosnian nation; even in the Constitution and formal state arrangements, there is no such thing as “Bosnian and Herzegovinian” specified (Pasic, 2011). It can perhaps be said that democracy in Bosnia lasts only during the day of elections. That is, the largest part of the public discourse is filled up with a substantial presence of only a few political leaders who see it as their right to make decisions and negotiate on the behalf of the rest of almost four million citizens in Bosnia. Without doubt, a political practice is that political elites play very important and decisive role in a first years within democratic transition processes in almost every post-communist country. However, it is unacceptable and unbearable that nearly 20 years of the democratic transition Bosnian political elites and a bunch of leaders are central figures which hold monopolistic power over the country's governance. As a result, ethno-nationalist elites maintain zero-sum views of political process and politicians are elected as members of their respective ethnic communities and not as representatives of citizens, and have no incentive to make any cross-ethnic appeals (Belloni 2009, 360).

Put differently, so far almost each attempt of democratic reform process in Bosnia has been built on a governance model and decision-making process better known as a 'top-down approach' in which political elites make key decisions and try to make agreements thus to a large extent shaping all basic political, economic, and social affairs. In other words, Becirovic points out that in the past 20 years since the democratic changes in BiH have started on the scene are the same political elites which actually 'tailor the fate of citizens in Bosnia' thus holding them in hostage' (2010). Bearing in mind the fact that under such an approach the democratic transition in Bosnia has not been furitful and successful it is of critical importance to implement alternative model or a system of governance known in literature as a bottom-up approach in which citizens have increasing and dominant role in terms of lunching pro-active initiatives which are then channeled to political representatives. Katarina Rogan-Gorup claims that the bottom-up approach to a large extent promotes values such as: active involvement of local community in the decision-making, development of a new ideas, support to civic initiatives and civil activities, participation of ordinary citizens in policy making processes and delegation of authority to a local level (2003). Simply put, the bottom up process is when something is initiated or measured from the point of view of ordinary people (Rose, 2008: 2). Thus, this system substantially intensifies activism of citizens in main decision-making processes.

Yet, for the bottom-up approach to be successfully implemented it is of utmost importance to slowly start a change of mentality of both ordinary citizens and political representatives as well, in terms of accepting active and dynamic citizenship as the imperative for democratic stability and peace in the country. Even though Bosnian ruling politicians would not easily accept such a democratic initiative they ought to understand that every authoritarian, repressive, and limiting regime leads to its self-destruction and disintegration of a whole society. Simply put, without an active, conscious, and informed citizens it is hard to expect successful democracy and long-term peace. Therefore, after a years of democratic transformation the Bosnian society needs more than ever a social capital which is a precondition of every stable and long-term progress of community, in economic, political and social sense. That is, social capital is considered one of the most important ingredients in achieving both democratic development and a successful economy in a society (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995). In that regard, Putnam emphasizes the density and intensity of face-to-face contacts and daily interactions. He defines social capital as generalised trust, reciprocity and networks (Putnam, 1993). According to Ahmet Alibasic, social capital is a binding material, the glue which helps people to utilize all their financial, physical and human capital, that enable them to improve the common good, and as such it is to some extent a precondition for sustainable social development (2005).

However, social capital in Bosnia has been very unacceptable, deficient, and undeveloped due to largely heterogeneous social context and the previous war which to a large extent has increased mistrust and hatreds between the country's different ethnic communities. Thus, the institute of social capital under today's circumstances is almost non-existent, or it is fragmented strictly along the ethnic-nationalist lines. In that regard, Hakansson and Sjoholm argue that there exist serious reasons to believe that trust is low and difficult to regain in Bosnia, considering the country’s turbulent and bloody past (2005: 2). Furthermore, UNDP asserts that social trust seems to have actually weakened in recent years, in contrast to hopes for a gradual increase as the conflict recedes into the past. Recent research finds that social trust is ‘virtually non-existent’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the social fabric in the country is characterized by an ‘absolute weakness of social bonds of trust, reciprocity, and solidarity’ (2010). Moreover, current ethnic polarization and a kind of ethnic apartheid, both in physical and psychological terms, certainly increase the possibility of new tensions and even of an open conflict among the three ethnic communities. Therefore, it is of critical importance for the country's peace and long-term democratic discourse to establish a new model of a democratic governance for complex and problematic multi-national social context in Bosnia. Thus, increased daily communication and strengthened social capital among members of all the three ethnic groups are the imperative and alternative model of organizing Bosnian society and state as well. In fact, each and every investment in terms of strengthening the social capital should not be perceived as a betrayal of a national identity but rather it is the best possible investment for enabling and securing the long-term peace and coexistence for future generations.

In other words, activeness in civic organizations is a kind of civilizational richness which can help heterogeneous societies such as Bosnia to learn more about each other. That is, strengthened and intensified activities of a civil society, whose fundamental objective is more pro-active monitoring and control over initatives and policies of public institutions from local to national level, can be achieved without a fear of being perceived as heretic by his/her ethnic group. In Bosnia, very often participation in common and multi-ethnic initiatives is perceived as a big threat and a danger to the survival and integrity of a national identity. Moreover, through active involvement in civil or civic programmes members of all the three ethnic communities can more clearly and directly know about different cultures, traditions, and worldviews, and thus enrich their horizons and view on the future of Bosnia. It is normal that citizens of different ethnic groups may have different views about the country but civil society may enable them to further cooperation and exchange of ideas with each other. That is, civil society enables a voluntary associations to play a role of a gene carriers of the good society – microclimates, if you will, for developing values like tolerance and cooperation, and the skills required for living a democratic life (Edwards, 2005). Active communication and physical interaction with members of different nations and religions is one of the most effective ways to get rid of hatreds and prejudices. In contrast, the ethno-nationalist isolation or building of ethnic ghettos lead to increasing hatreds and mistrust towards other ethnic and religious communities. As a result, the separated areas, or ethnically pure “ghettos” have developed (Flottau and Kraske, 2005).

Still, feelings of hatreds and mistrust between the people of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia are not so insurmountable except for periodical cases in pre-election periods and an occasional moments when the idea of a nation is clearly manipulated by certain ultra-nationalist groups within all three national groups. That is, mistrust, hatreds, and fear of other ethnic groups rapidly increase at a time of election campaigns when majority of politicians pragmatically use the nation, and even a religion, in order to achieve their personal interests of acquiring political power. What's more, for the general elections in 2010 some observers argued that elections could actually further entrench ethnic divisions as many candidates have put nationalist slogans at the heart of their electoral campaigns (RFE, 2010). However it is interesting that most of those politicians, from all the three ethnic groups, who during election campaigns openly build their political promises upon the idea of fear of other ethnic groups, after coming to power they usually have excellent relations with each other. Therefore, each civic initiative in Bosnia should be based upon the criteria of efficiency and a common vision rather than putting emphasis on national or religious background of a citizen. Indeed, frequent inter-ethnic cooperation in post-war Bosnia can contribute to social network theory by demonstrating the importance of venues that allow individuals to establish bridging ties of intimacy that vary from weak to moderate (Pickering, 2006: 97). By intensifying their daily interactions and civic initiatives the members of different ethnic communities can build new and alternative bridges of peace and stability.

To sum up, although there have been numerous and serious reasons for Bosnian ordinary citizens to express their discontent against the country's political representatives they have been quiet and rather passive. Their passivity and indifference are even more worrying and puzzling if it is known that recently in many places in the world ordinary people are protesting against unjust and corrupt political and economic leaders. For instance, while ordinary Arabs have been rising against their authoritarian and repressive governments Bosnian citizens rather use to remain passive in spite of widespread corruption and injustices in the country. Their passivity can to some extent be understood perhaps due to monopolistic rule of political elites which are the main actors in the country's economic, political, and social affairs. Thus, over the previous 20 years political elites have been dominant forces which are making critical decision and are negotiating on behalf of nearly four million citizens in Bosnia. As a result, a principle of sovereignty has passed from the hands of ordinary citizens to the hands of few politicians who are a kind of 'untouchables' in political sense. However, it is puzzling that more than a decade of a Europeanisation process that the country has been going through the political elites are still dominant force in Bosnia rather than ordinary citizens. Civil society in Bosnia is still weak and undeveloped. It is probably due to mainly technocratic character of a Europeanisaton process which is incomprehensible for ordinary citizens!?


References
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About the Author
Bedrudin Brljavac received his B.A. in Political Science and Public Administration at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. He completed the Master Programme in European Affairs (MEA) at Lund University in Sweden as the scholarship holder of the Swedish Institute. Since September 2011 he is the PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo. His doctoral project is titled “The European Union as a Global Civilian Power (GCP): An Impact on the Transformation of Modus Operandi of the International Relations”. He has regularly written columns for national and international magazines and daily newspapers such as Dnevni avaz, Novi horizonti, Turkish Weekly, and Open Democracy. Also, he has published a number of academic articles in international journals such as Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Evrodijalog, Analytical, Political Thought, Perspective politice, etc. Meanwhile he has worked on a number of national and international research projects. His research interests are Transnational Relations, Multilateralism, Soft Power, Europeanization, EU Enlargement Policy, Democratization Theory, International Organizations, Transatlantic relations, and Western Balkans Politics.