written by Dan Lieberman printable version send your friend

Thursday, 15 December 2011

Previously regarded as only a geographical bridge between continents, the nation of Turkey now serves as a political, strategic and economic bridge. Its location, Muslim identity, independent policies, and continued economic growth provoke the inquisitive.  Turkey is being watched and scrutinized for its actions and policies.      

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan successfully emerged his nation from a severe economic crisis and its runaway inflation. One accepted reason – he diverged from the post-Ottoman laicist, authoritative, and nationalist philosophy of the Republic’s founder, Kemal Ataturk, and steered Turkey in a direction more consistent with western democratic philosophy.  What enables this nation to operate independently and with sustained growth? Can it reject Kemalism without military interference? These are only three of many questions concerning Turkey’s foreign, economic and social policies, all of which contain contradictions, doubts, and problems. A trip through Turkey, sponsored by the Washington-based Rumi Forum, an interfaith and peace group, featured meetings with parliamentarians, journalists, academics and businessmen, and provided insight into Turkey’s ability to confront its problems and be able to continue an independent path,  Few leaders have received as much worldwide admiration as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His open manner, sincerity and moral challenges contrast with the covert, duplicitous and self-subscribing attitudes of most world leaders.

Nevertheless, despite its intended policy of zero problems with neighbors, many claim the policy has morphed into zero neighbors without problems. This failure is partly due to the AKP’s independent foreign policies.  PM Erdogan’s commendable moral imperative, which identifies friendship with moral agendas rather than with what one nation can do for the other, creates misperceptions and misconceptions.

Misperception of the moral imperative solicits charges of arbitrary judgment of others and a calculated intention to establish a neo-Ottoman agenda. Erdogan has a misconception that these policies can succeed in a world of mistrust and self-interest. Disturbing actions by neighbors have triggered hostile responses and created conflicts.

Trespassing on Iraqi sovereignty by engaging in military attacks on Kurds in northern Iraq, requesting the resignation of Syria’s President Bashar Assad, demanding Israel apologize for the killing of Turkish citizens during an attempt to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza, installing NATO missile radar detection equipment to deter Iran, and refusing to pay compensation to Bulgaria for the leaving of Bulgarians in eastern Thrace during the Ottoman era, are only a few examples of Turkey’s conflicts with neighbors.

Although the Prime Minister’s policies are out of step with most nations, they indicate that in the present global environment an independent course is a route to success.

Europe and America’s economies falter. Turkey continues with rapid growth.

Nations split apart from nationalism. Turkey enhances national identities.

Western nations sanction Iran. Turkey increases trade with the Islamic state.

Military control increases in most nations. Military control is constrained in Turkey.

China and other fast-growing nations pursue statist polices. Turkey eschews statism. As in most nations, continued governance by the AKP depends upon the continued success of its economic policies. Since the AKP gained power, GDP and exports have tripled, while the inflation rate has fallen from 30 percent to 7.5 percent. Unemployment, which had been 14 percent in January 2010, has dropped to 9.5 percent. A GDP of 735 billion dollars places Turkey 17th in the world and 7th in Europe, excluding the Russian federation. An export-driven economy has increased exports to 135 billion dollars. All the statistics are moving in proper directions, and although the inflation rate, interest rate (6%) and unemployment are high by western standards, they are acceptable by Turkish standards. Actually, the real interest rate (interest rate minus inflation) is negative, and this unexplained deflationary anomaly could hinder investment. Another more major concern is the monotonically increasing negative trade balance, which was 42 billion dollars in 2010.  If a fall in the European economy intensifies the negative trade balance, negative real interest rate, and relatively high unemployment rate, Turkey’s growth could come to a screeching halt. Or will it? Is it possible that Erdogan’s pragmatism will lead Turkey to realign allegiances and markets and shift them to Iran and Russia, trading finished products for energy supplies?  Turkey seems to be in the driver’s seat. But not entirely. The AKP needs prosperity to advance democracy, which will enhance civil and human rights and prevent the electorate from considering Kemalism as an antidote for Turkey’s problems.

After Kemal Ataturk died in 1938, almost any government that threatened the principal tenets, the six arrows of Kemalism, triggered a military coup.



Republicanism--a broadly-based republican system,

Nationalism--a distinctly Turkish identity, 

Populism--a more classless society,

Revolutionism--wholesale, rather than gradual, change,

Laicism—cancellation of the power of religion in the state, and

Statism--state-led development of the economy and society  were inviolate until the AKP gained power. Surprisingly, Prime Minister Erdogan’s instant and bold challenge in 2003 to the tenets of Kemalism did not provoke a military coup. An alleged coup, originally planned during 2007, was not uncovered until 2009.


Why did Erdogan proceed so boldly and why was it difficult for the military to instantly respond to the AKP’s removal of several of the six arrows of Kemalism from its quiver?

A director of a strategic institute summarized the situation in a strategic context: “The shift of the population to urban areas created an expanding middle class with new social demands. The population requested an allocation of resources, a new identity and a new constitution. The ideological state (Kemalism) with its stress on Turkic identity and secularism created problems.”

Kemal Attaurk’s framed portraits still adorn walls behind desks in the public sector. Gigantic banners and posters of his image are noticeable. Prime Minister Erdogan has wisely retained the reverence to Turkey’s George Washington but abruptly replaced Ataturk’s nationalist and statist policies with an agenda more compatible with the global system and more in harmony with democratic dictates.

Nevertheless, the AKP, despite its widespread support, still has severe antagonists. The charge of an ongoing coup against the government, which has resulted in mass arrests of well known public figures, has divided the National Assembly and disturbed leaders from several sectors of society. In mid-November 2011, after several judicial reviews and hearings, a 264-page indictment accuses 143 suspects, 66 of them in pre-trial detention, with an attempt to overthrow the government.

The indictments have provoked a question: Is Erdoagan using tactics similar to those of the military forces, exaggerating threats to squash opposition?  Will the trial of civilians and officers associated with Operation Sledgehammer destabilize the stable nation?

Kemalism is either past history or a spoke in the cycles of history. As the wheel turns, will Kemal Ataturk’s visions and policies return and challenge another Turkish Republic?  The verdict is still not rendered.

 


*Dan Lieberman is the editor of Alternative Insight, a web-based opinion magazine.