written by Mohammad Samir Hussain printable version send your friend

Saturday, 26 November 2011

Will the prospering strategic relationship between India and the United States have any implications on India’s relations with other major powers of the world such as Russia, China, Japan, and others? The strategic relationship between India and the United States is neither aligned nor aimed at any third country. India will continue to remain committed to the strategic autonomy of its foreign policy. India’s relationship with other major powers of the world will be decided based on New Delhi’s interest rather than dictated by U.S. interests, because the former is not subjugated to the latter’s. The relationship is for the mutual benefit of the two countries and India will cooperate only when treated as an equal and also where its own interests are directly involved.[1] The beauty of post-Cold War international relations is that any country can have a constructive engagement with more than one country at a time. This was very well highlighted by Ashley Tellis during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when he said that, “a strengthened bilateral relationship does not imply that India will become a treaty bound ally of the United States at some time in the future. It also does not imply that India will become a meek, complaint and uncritical collaborator of the U.S. in all its global endeavors. Rather India’s large size, its proud history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will always pursue its own interests—just like any other great powers.”[2]

The relationship with the U.S. should not at any level pose a problem to India’s relationship with other countries with whom it share interests such as Russia, Japan, or China. It will always be in the interests of India to seek having good relations with other countries. Really, this is important from the Indian point of view if it has to achieve major power status. From the Indian side, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee has said, “We are no longer bound by the Cold War paradigm where good relations with one power automatically entailed negative consequences with its rivals.” His comments reflect that India today stands poised at the threshold of having closer relations with all major powers that would strengthen India’s interests.

The growing India-U.S. multi-faceted relations will have no negative implications on the traditional India-Russia ties. If India has taken a step forward to expanding defense and security relations with the U.S., then it is not at the cost of any of its ties with other countries including Russia, China, or Japan. India has so far successfully managed to closely engage with both counties where today both the U.S. and Russia consider India to be their natural ally. India has a lot to gain out of the strengthening relationship with both the U.S. and Russia. Russia has no problem with India’s closer ties with the United States. It all depends on India and how it manages to handle the relationship.

India’s ties with the U.S. will in any case not circumscribe its long-standing and strategic partner Russia, which holds the key to India’s overall military and energy security and its quest for great power status. Unlike the U.S., Russia has been the major supplier of arms and equipment needs to India without any hesitation. Also, it accepts India’s pre-eminence in the region. It is very much keen on seeing India play a major power role in the world. Russia better understands the security challenges facing India from its neighboring countries, and has come out in full support of the much-needed successful conclusion of the civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Russia was eagerly waiting for such an opportunity, as it would strengthen the cooperation between the two countries. It was during the recent visit of Indian Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh to Russia, both countries signed as many as six agreements, the most important being a civilian nuclear energy agreement under which Russia will set up more nuclear reactors in India and transfer the entire range of nuclear energy technologies. How much Russia is committed to such cooperation is reflected by the fact that it has promised to supply nuclear fuel even after the deal is called off. Russians have also promised India enrichment and reprocessing rights.[3]

Unlike China, Russia is not very concerned about the depth of India-U.S. relations. In an interview with Hard News Magazine, Mr. Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov, Russian Ambassador to India, had said “Why should we fear close relations between New Delhi and Washington?” He further pointed out that Russia too had “considerably intensified” its cooperation with the U.S. in recent years even though their positions “do not coincide in all respects.” This move should no doubt make India feel better and secure in terms of expanding relations with both countries. The Russian response reflects the basic understanding that it shares with India, as it knows it is in the interests of India that it expands its relations with other major powers of the world.[4]

As far as Japan is concerned, unlike China, it enjoys a prosperous relationship with both the United States and India. As we all know, Japan is a strategic ally for United States. Japan’s engagement with the United States is much deeper and broader than India’s is. Therefore, there should not be any problem for Japan in the strengthening strategic ties between India and the United States. The growing role that India is expected to play in the twenty-first century world in terms of ensuring regional and global security, and in particular security in the Indian Ocean, should no doubt ease Japan’s reactions to the strategic relationship between India and the U.S. India has in recent years successfully dealt with the problem of piracy. Another reason is that Japan is very much aware of the fact that India’s relationship with China is almost unpredictable. Japan views India as having the capability to counter Chinese hegemony both in economic and military aspects.[5]

In his talk delivered at the United Service Institution (New Delhi), Mr. Masahiro Akiyama, Vice Minister of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, highlighted the need for India and Japan to keep on engaging with the U.S. His view reflects that there should not be any problem to Japan by the growing relationship between India and the United States.[6]

India and Japan have in recent years gained close understanding on the importance of maritime security, since both countries depend on the sea for trade. Security of the sea holds the key for their economic progress and development. It was during his address to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry in January 2003 that the Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Yoriko Kawaguchi stated “cooperative maintenance of the security of maritime traffic in the sea-lanes that stretch across the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca are among the security and defense issues, which deserve our increased attention.”[7] Both Tokyo and New Delhi have agreed to take up joint security measures including exercises between the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), military-to-military exchanges, and high-level dialogue.

With increasing energy security challenges and the need to sustain their economic growth, Tokyo and New Delhi may be compelled to cooperate and play a mutually beneficial role in the security of IOR. In this context, India is expanding its cooperation with countries such as the U.S., Japan, France, and others. This step is aimed at safeguarding the various gates to the Indian Ocean. India’s growing role in the Indian Ocean should not be perceived wrongly. India has demonstrated the positive role it can play when in 2003, the Indian Navy escorted U.S. ships carrying goods. Also during the tsunami incidents, India has demonstrated its search and rescue capabilities.[8]

The United States, India, and Japan have a keen interest in ensuring the stability of the Indian Ocean. The joint military exercises in the Indian Ocean should not pose any problem to Japanese security, since it is aimed at ensuring security in the region. It would be incorrect to say that the growing India-U.S. cooperation would destabilize the region through increasing the possibility of competition between India, China, and the Southeast Asian littoral states.[9] This is owing to the fact that India along with the United States, Japan, and other countries carried out joint naval exercises on September 2007. This exercise was aimed at maintaining good order at sea in the Indian Ocean region, rather than targeting any country which would result in creating instability in the region. It would help in increasing understanding among these countries on issues of mutual interest including providing security to sea lanes in the IOR (Indian Ocean region).[10] India also has a significant role to play in the protection of the sea lanes of communication.

The first decade since the turn of the twenty-first century was a memorable one for India and the major powers of the world as they have made significant strides in their bilateral partnerships, which has global significance. India’s search for global power ambitions demands that India have closer engagement with the major powers of the world. The high-profile visits in recent years from the P-5 countries such as Britain, the U.S., France, China, and Russia reflect the importance that is accorded to India in the international system. These high profile visits send a clear message to the international community about the role that India will be playing in the coming decades. Many high-profile visits have also witnessed the eagerness of these countries to have qualitatively stronger and more comprehensive relations with India.[11


*Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain is working as a Research Associate in the Yashwantro Chavan-National Center of International Security and Defence Analysis, University of Pune, India. He can be reached at samirkhullakpam@gmail.com   

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[1] Walter K. Andersen, “India and the United States: A Different Kind of Relationship”, Testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 25 June 2008, p. 2, available at <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/and062508.pdf>.  

[2] See Ashley J. Tellis, “U.S.-India Atomic Energy cooperation: Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications”, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 April 2006, p. 5.

[3] Ash Narain Roy, “Indo-US and India-Russia: Strategic Partners All”, Mainstream (New Delhi), vol. XLVIII(1), 26 December 2009, available at <http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1849.html>.  

[4] See, “Growing India-US Ties will not Impact Russia: Envoy”, available at <http://www.indiaenews.com/pdf/75271.pdf>.

[5] Satish Nambiar, “A Role for India in the Emerging World Order”, U.S.I Journal (New Delhi), vol. CXXXVI(565), July-September 2006, p. 346.

[6] Masahiro Akiyama, “Development of the Japan-US Alliance after 11 September 2001 and the War in Iraq”, U.S.I Journal, vol. CXXXIII(553), July-September 2003, pp. 352-61. 

[7] Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation”, Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol. 31(1), January-February 2007, pp. 140-41.

[8] Brahma Chellaney, Asian Juggerment: The Rise of China, India and Japan (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers in Joint Venture with the India Today Group, 2006), pp. 136-38.

[9] Mavara Inayat, “US-Indian Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond”, Regional Studies (Islamabad), vol. XXIV(2), Spring 2006, p. 48.

[10] Mahendra Ved, “Indian Navy’s Malabar and Other Exercises”, India Strategic (New Delhi), vol. 2(9), September 2007, pp. 10-12.

[11] Mohammad Samir Hussain, “India’s Emerging International Stature in the Twenty-First Century”, in Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, New Delhi, 26 July 2011,  available at <http://www.sspconline.org/IndiaEmergingInternationalStature_26072011>.