written by Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain printable version send your friend

Thursday, 13 October 2011

Ashley Tellis participated in one of the recent RAND studies in which he pointed out that, “The Mumbai attack demonstrates that jihadist organizations based in Pakistan are able to plan and launch ambitious terrorist operations, at least in neighboring countries such as India. Put in the context of previous terrorist attacks in India by Pakistani-based or local jihadist groups, it suggests a continuing, perhaps escalating, terrorist campaign in South Asia. Beyond India, the Mumbai attack reveals a strategic terrorist culture that thoughtfully identified strategic goals and ways to achieve them and that analyzed counterterrorist measures and developed ways to obviate them to produce a 9/11-quality attack. For sixty hours, the terrorists brought a city of twenty million people to a standstill while the world looked on. The attack put into actual practice LeT’s previous rhetoric about making the Kashmir dispute part of the international jihad. In so doing, LeT has emerged, not as a subsidiary of al-Qaeda, but as an independent constellation in the global jihad galaxy. Indeed, with al-Qaeda central operational capabilities reduced, the Mumbai attack makes LeT a global contender on its own.”[1] His point reflects the seriousness and the need to tackle the problem comprehensively and for cooperation among the like-minded nations.

From both the Indian and American perspectives, the events of 11/26 really brought urgency to the need to tackle the issue of terrorism at the global level. Both New Delhi and Washington stand to gain considerably from improving their counterterrorism cooperation, owing to the fact that unlike Pakistan, India is very much eager and sincere to root out terrorism that would increasingly pose problems for the international community. However, this would require removing the lingering distrust that stems largely from U.S. reluctance to include terrorist organizations based in Pakistan that have been the main concerns for India’s security. The events provided a golden opportunity for both countries to wipe away the past understanding and look forward to closely working to strengthening counter-terrorism cooperation that includes sharing of intelligence,[2] cyber-terrorism, etc. The question that needs to be asked to the American officials is whether the time has come for Washington to come out strongly in ensuring that terrorism is not used to advance its foreign policy goals. India would look forward to receiving strong commitment from the United States in meeting the challenges posed by the terrorist violence abetted by Pakistan. This is not to say that the United States should stop engaging close relations with Pakistan, which according to the United States holds the key to achieving the objectives of eradicating terrorism from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[3]

In a bid to strengthen India’s bilateral partnership with the U.S. in the field of counter-terrorism, Indian Home Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram visited the U.S. on September 2009. The visit was aimed at identifying areas for mutual cooperation with a focus on the procurement of advanced technology, sharing of information, and the best practices in the investigation and prevention of terrorist attacks.[4] Really, the seriousness in tackling the issue of terrorism and its related activities has improved significantly between India and the United States in recent times.

U.S. Af-Pak Strategy

U.S. President Barack Obama, after sixty days of inter-agency review, had announced a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that aimed to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The strategy reflects two aspects, the first being that there is seriousness in dealing with the issue before it escalates into a bigger one that poses significant challenges to the international community and United States in particular. Second, it reflects the close links between terrorist organizations residing in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[5]

The Af-Pak strategy launched in March 2009 was to be comprised of both military and civilian approaches. When larger numbers of military forces will be dispatched for this purpose, at the same time there will be an increase in more civilian-oriented funding based on the assumption that such objectives cannot be achieved by military force alone.[6]

Many commentators have raised the arguments in this context that coercive action must be taken against terrorists residing in Afghanistan. This would require pressuring Pakistan to act sincerely against terrorists residing on the Af-Pak border. What is quite challenging for United States is ensuring Pakistan that combating terrorism is also in the interests of Pakistan. This is because of the fact that there is a clash of interests between the U.S. and Pakistan. The latter doesn’t seriously consider combating terrorism as a key to their progress, development, and survival. It is very important that the U.S. pressure Pakistan to come out with full commitment vis-à-vis the violent insurgency in Baluchistan, North Western Frontier Province, and FATA. The situation in Pakistan has reached a level beyond ignorance from which there is always a possibility of moving toward a failed state or rogue state.[7]

Unlike in the past, this time the U.S. administration under the leadership of Barack Obama has put a condition to the money that will be transferred to Pakistan. The money transferred will be based on results. To ensure accountability, the U.S. administration has argued for transparency about where and how the money is utilized.[8]

However, the success of the U.S. Af-Pak strategy is most likely to be delayed given the fact that Pakistan, which is a key ally in the fight against terrorism, seeks a strong Taliban in Afghanistan to offset the rising Indian influence there. Pakistan has not given up the hope of creating an anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan for their interests. Pakistan does not want to see India expanding its influence in Afghanistan, which according to Islamabad, would help the Kashmir issue turn in India’s favor. This is the missing link between the United States and Pakistan, which has only favored Pakistan and a setback for India. It was during the visit to Islamabad by the U.S. Director of Intelligence Mr. Mike McConnell in 2008, a Pakistani general had said, “we must support the Taliban so that there is a government friendly to Pakistan in Kabul. Otherwise India will reign.” With such a stand, it is less likely that Pakistan would take sincere steps to dismantle the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Based on this, Pakistan has criticized India for its involvement in Afghanistan.[9] It is up to the U.S. administration whether it comes under the pressure of Pakistan to stop India playing a key role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, or pressuring Islamabad to take stringent action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

U.S. Pressuring Pakistan                                                                                                  

In one of the recent developments, U.S. President Barack Obama put the Pakistani President in a dilemma. In his letter to Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, U.S. President Barack Obama had sent a clear and stringent message to Pakistan that either they continue to use insurgents as a tool, or receive military and economic assistance from the U.S. This is in response to the growing seriousness of the security situation in and around Pakistan and Afghanistan. From the Indian point of view, it is good to learn that the U.S. has continued to pressuring Pakistan to ensure that it no longer pursues a policy of supporting terrorism as a foreign policy tool. 

U.S. President Obama has called upon Pakistan to be stringent and remain committed in its dealing with terrorist organizations operating in and around Pakistan. The list includes al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistani Taliban, and others. This is further emphasized by the interaction between U.S. National Security Advisor James Jones with the Pakistan officials. During his interaction, James Jones has made it clear to Pakistan that if Pakistan cannot deliver, the U.S. may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan’s western and southern borders with Afghanistan.[10] He further added that no matter how many troops the President commits to Afghanistan, the strategy will flounder unless the safe haven inside Pakistan is dealt with.[11]

U.S. President Barack Obama is seriously concerned about the threat posed by the growing extremist activities in and around the Af-Pak region. Eradicating the menace of terrorism in this region has been the utmost priority of the U.S. President for some time now. This is reflected by him having said that, “This is no idle danger…no hypothetical threat…In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. The danger will only grow if the region slides backwards and al-Qaeda can operate with impunity…And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan because we know that al-Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.” It seems that U.S. President Barack Obama is convinced that the success of eradicating the menace of terrorism lies in pressuring Pakistan to act with full commitment. It was during his speech at the U.S. military academy at West Point that U.S. President Barack Obama had said, “We will act with full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We are in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But the same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That is why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.” That is why U.S. President Barack Obama is keen on pursuing a policy of pressuring Pakistan to act against terror on the one hand, and extend every sort of help to Pakistan on the other so as to ensure that the main objective is achieved.[12] India shall not be annoyed by this development because it is not the intention of India for the United States to totally ignore Pakistan, but it shall be in the interests of India that the United States keeps itself engaged with Pakistan, and at the same time, ensures that Pakistan stops using the extremists as foreign policy tools against India.


*Dr. Mohammad Samir Hussain is a Research Associate in the Yashwantrao Chavan National Centre of International Security and Defence Analysis, University of Pune, Pune. He can be reached at samirkhullakpam@gmail.com. 

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[1] Ashley J. Tellis, “Lessons From Mumbai”, Testimony presented before Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 28 January 2009, p. 9, available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0128_tellis_mumbai_testimony1.pdf>.

[2] Lisa Curtis, “After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen U.S.–India Counterterrorism Cooperation”, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2217, December 9, 2008, p. 1, available at <cbi.nic.in/newsarticles/newsreport/backgrounder.pdf>.

[3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] Annual Report 2009-2010, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 94.  

[5] Hilary Synnott, Transforming Pakistan: Ways Out of Instability (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 116.

[6] Ibid., pp. 162-63.

[7] Ibid., pp.166-68.

[8] Ibid., p. 175.

[9] Selig Harrison, “From Kabul to Kashmir”, Indian Express (Pune), 20 November 2009 and Fareed Zakaria, “The Prize is India”, Indian Express (Pune), 23 November 2009.

[10] Karen Deyoung, “Stop Using Lashkar, Insurgenst for Policy Goals, Obama Warns Pak”, Indian Express (Pune), 1 December 2009.

[11] David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistan: What Obama Left Unsaid”, The Hindu (Hyderabad),  3 December 2009.

[12] K. Subrahmanyam, “The Speech within the Speech”, Indian Express (Pune), 3 December 2009.