written by Nath Aldalala’a printable version send your friend

Friday, 23 September 2011

Whereas the Arab Spring is seen as a new beginning for the people of the region, paradoxically it signals the end of a unified Yemen. Sitting at the edge of the Arabian Peninsula, it is the poorest and least developed country in the Arab world. Unemployment stands at over 40%, and the economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues, which are predicted to have been depleted by 2017. Yemen also is distinct in being heavily governed by a military mentality both at the level of the regime and of the people. The nature of its society is tribal with a history of shifting loyalties.  Thus, a combination of poverty coupled with such shifting loyalties amongst the tribes in Yemen could be deadly and this is exactly what is happening in Yemen.

One of Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh’s key strategies for maintaining his power base was to use money from the oil revenues to pay off the opposition, in other words to buy their allegiance. This corrupted both the practice and mentality amongst many of the tribes. Loyalties, thus, were naturally neither to Saleh himself nor to Yemen, but to the lucrative revenues that came from the state coffers. This mode of corruption can be distinguished from other forms of financial fraud, as it corrupted the sense of collectivity in the country, and most importantly it deprived the society of its natural course. A corrupt leader succeeded in corrupting his opposition: Nothing can be worse than this for national wellbeing.

Saleh’s rule came nowhere near any recognised political model. He was the head of the country, and also the head of its army; his son was head of Special Forces; his nephews and other members of his family remain in key positions; and the biggest ‘political’ party in the country is the one associated with his tribe. Furthermore, a quick glance across all the parties that make up the political landscape reveals that they exist in name only. To reiterate the point, the largest party in the country is the General People Congress, which is the party of the president- no further explanation is required! The second party is the Socialist Party. Its base is the south of Yemen, and after unification in 1990, it became merely a name and devoid of any political clout. Then there is the Nasserite Unionist party, which adheres to Nasserite nationalist thought – many of its members are so removed from both historical and current political realities that they seem to still believe Jamal Abdul Nasser is alive.

There is also the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, or Al-Islah Party, which is linked to the al-Ahmar tribe. The leader of this ‘party’ is Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the man who brought the situation in Yemen to its present climax. In brief, the family al-Ahmar is part of Hashid, which form the biggest tribes in the country. These tribes have played a major role in carving out the recent history of Yemen. Their support remains crucial to whoever is willing to take up the mantle of steering the future of the nation. In May, after Saleh procrastinated over signing a deal which was brokered by the GCC, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar announced his support for the protestors. This led to clashes between the armed supporters of al-Ahmar and the security forces of Saleh. In the event, Saleh was injured and since then has fled the country to take up residence in a hospital bed in Saudi Arabia. 

My argument is that the manner in which Saleh governed Yemen was actually the only possible way of maintaining the unification of the country over time, given the mentalities and inclinations of its tribal society. It is with that in mind, I predict that Saleh is going to be the last single leader of a united Yemen. There is not going to be an individual who will have the necessary power base to rule Yemen unless he follows the course of Saleh. As a leader, he did not so much determine the system of governance, but was more a functionary within it. He perpetuated and maintained an existing system of interaction between the various tribes and their leadership. Therefore, the problem in Yemen is not Saleh, but the very nature of Yemeni inter-relationships. The interaction is grounded on primitive principles which in turn influence understandings about the concept of the state or the role of political institutions. It is a form of chaos that governs the country, and this ‘system’ of chaos that has become the natural order, and much enhanced by Saleh’s leadership. Bernard Haykel, maintained that one “tactic of Saleh has been to leverage the potential chaos of Yemen, which he has himself fostered, to get money and support from outside governments, like the Saudis or the United States. He would threaten that if he’s not around, the tribes will take over and Yemen will have a civil war like Somalia. He has claimed that Iran is involved in supporting some of his local enemies as a way of getting the Saudis to pay for him to crush these “local enemies.” Strategically, he has most frequently used the al-Qaeda threat in this respect. In the 1990s, when there was a huge democracy wave, he pretended that there was a democracy movement in Yemen and held elections – most of which were rigged – just to get support from the West.

Accordingly, while chaos remains today’s dictating force, the future of Yemen is bleak; the country has neither economic nor political means to sustain a positive future for itself as a united nation with a central government capable of overseeing the ‘spring’ the protestors wish for. My perception is that the Yemeni protestors were either oblivious to the miserable economic situation, or if they knew they remain unaware of the consequences. Whichever the case, protests in Yemen were both premature and immature. And in fact, these protests have accelerated the end for Yemen as a united country, and more worryingly have put the safety and security of ordinary Yemenis in jeopardy.

Now, many months since the protests began, the situation seems to be veering towards civil war. Saleh was correct in his impulse to remain in charge until a smooth transition of power could take place, but the euphoria evoked by the toppling of regimes across the region bypassed rationale thought. It is now inevitable that Yemen will become a hub for fighting and conflict. You have people with guns, qat, and no rule of law. Yemen, as Christopher Boucek put it, is the “poorest country in the Arab world, with an annual per capita income of under $900 per year and nearly half the population earning less than $2 per day. The population growth rate, which exceeds 3 percent per year, is among the highest in the world. In the next two decades, the population is expected to double to over 40 million. More than 5 million Yemenis go hungry each day and the country’s childhood malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world.” These statistics are accompanied by political turmoil, and compounded by the fact that al-Qaeda is now in the process of building, not only its terrorist networks, but also consolidating its image of intimidation. A situation almost guaranteed to erode any trust amongst local communities. This is a very important factor, because should al-Qaeda have a strong hold in Yemen, it will not only determine how external forces deal with the country, but also, it will cause further unease and tension within the populace. This disquiet can generate a complex web of accusation and counter-accusation about affiliations with al-Qaeda. If not checked this will create a rich soil on which to nurture a long and bloody conflict in the country.

A plotting of Yemen’s recent history indicates the government in Sana’a never had full control of the country, as certain pockets remained rebellious. At the local level there have always been degrees of independence from the control of central government. Yet, if a relatively effective government could be installed in the near future and survive the current unrest, such a government will soon be undermined by other economic and security factors. This will cause a civil war which is likely to draw in all Yemenis. Therefore the best outlook for Yemen is to speed up its division into at least three separate self-rule systems that would guarantee a peaceful and legitimate demarcation between the regions. In any case, Yemen is bound to become submerged in conflict and propelled into further chaos. If a situation of self-rule and recognised boundaries is brought to bear, this would help to minimise the number of warring parties, it will make the coming crisis in the country manageable, and more importantly it is a short-cut response to inevitable changes unfolding in the country.