written by Arzu Turgut printable version send your friend

Thursday, 22 September 2011

The withdrawal of 150,000 NATO soldiers from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will likely precipitate a security vacuum in the region.  In this process, the United States pursues a policy of integrating the groups within the Taliban which seem relatively moderate and allowing for their reconciliation into the Afghan government. However, Uzbekistan, having been threatened by the Taliban from 1997 to 2001, is very cautious of any attempts to involve them in political and governmental affairs. The Uzbek government which implements very repressive policies in political, economic, and social spheres within the country remains very vulnerable to the security problems emanating from Afghanistan. At this point, Tashkent seems to grasp the reality that it cannot isolate itself from Afghanistan by merely protecting its borders. Is there any comprehensive, rational, and coherent Uzbek policy toward Afghanistan? In the face of the Afghanistan problem, can Uzbekistan turn the risk factors into opportunities as it did in the past?

Today, Uzbekistan’s perceptions of Afghanistan-related threats are mainly terror and problems associated with terrorism. Uzbekistan had to struggle with terrorism in Central Asia before the twin towers were destroyed in the United States. The Uzbek government had been badly affected by the Tashkent bomb attack in February 1999 and Batkent attack in August 1999. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), accused of being responsible for these attacks, was established in 1998 with an aim to overthrow Karimov and declare an Islamic state. It is known that IMU militants received education in the camps in Afghanistan and organized some attacks in cooperation with the Taliban. The IMU was fed by some local problems and grievances like the Taliban, and called the “Taliban of the Pamirs” for this reason. Although traditional Islam is widespread among Uzbek society and the tendency to participate in radical movements is low, the IMU continues to be consciously declared a significant security threat to the country’s stability by the Uzbek government. This security concern does not seem baseless since attacks by the IMU also continued during the 2000s. Actually, the problem is that “in an already volatile region, the IMU might be the last drop of water needed to make the glass spill.” [1]

Uzbekistan Is Laden with the Booty of the Afghanistan War

The Afghanistan War has offered Uzbekistan great opportunities to destroy IMU militants located in Afghanistan who cooperated with the Taliban. Above all, the U.S. added the IMU to its list of terrorist organizations and captured Juma Namangani, one of the prominent IMU leaders, dead in November 2001. Although many IMU camps located in Mazar-i-Sharif were damaged during the Afghanistan War, the IMU still continues to operate in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and the northern part of Pakistan.

Uzbekistan did not only benefit from the Afghanistan War by destroying the militants of the Taliban and IMU and weakening these organizations. The concept of the “War on Terror” produced by the U.S. after 9/11 has been used as a significant instrument by the Uzbek government to legitimize its very authoritarian policies within the country. The U.S. avoided seriously criticizing the Uzbek government so as not to lose its support in its cause. As a result of this support, Tashkent received huge financial support in the name of “security assistance.”

Thanks to the need of the U.S. and the West for support in the Afghanistan War, Tashkent took new opportunities in the international area. September 11 had brought prestige to Karimov who began to frequently host Western statesmen to discuss security issues in the following years. Furthermore, the concept of war against terrorism provided Karimov space for maneuver in foreign affairs. Uzbekistan, while cooperating with the U.S. in the Afghanistan War, also tried not to alienate Russia. Tashkent expanded its cooperation with the U.S. by offering the Khanabad military base to Washington. However, this base was closed since the U.S. began to place more emphasis on regime change and democracy after the Iraq War, supported the color revolutions, and criticized the human right violations of the Uzbek government in the Andijan incident. Therefore, Uzbekistan showed that it would never give up its authoritarian policies within the framework of realpolitik, which has preserved its importance in the region. The relations between the U.S. and Uzbekistan have gradually improved since the beginning of 2008. In January 2009, Uzbekistan accepted becoming a transit country in the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) which plays a vital role in the transportation of non-military supplies to Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Uzbekistan tries to attract the attention of international actors to the Afghanistan problem as a global issue. It has always asserted that a solution for the Afghanistan problem under the United Nations (UN) has been possible. In the NATO’s Bucharest Summit in 2008, Uzbekistan proposed that the negotiations be conducted on the basis of a 6+3 initiative, NATO alongside the six neighbors of Afghanistan, the U.S., and Russia. However, this proposal seems to put the necessity of regional initiative on the Afghanistan issue on the back burner. Uzbekistan avoids providing support to the regional security establishments such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for the struggle against terrorism. For instance, Uzbekistan hesitates to support the idea of increasing the capacity and widening the activity areas of the Collective Rapid Forces under the CSTO due to its concerns about the hidden agenda of Russia on the region. Regarding the Afghanistan issue, Uzbekistan has already cooperated with Russia as the most influential regional power in Central Asia within the international organizations. In addition, Tashkent does not believe that the weak Central Asian states having disagreements amongst themselves and different strategic priorities on Afghanistan can find a solution to the Afghanistan problem. Thus, Uzbekistan did not participate in the Astana Summit of the CSTO on August 12, 2011 where the Afghanistan issue was discussed as a regional problem among the member states. This shows that Tashkent is still investigating the efficiency of the organization in its area of responsibility.

New Benefits in the Reconstruction Process

After a four-year interval, on December 9, 2001, by opening the Hairatan Bridge which turned Termez into a base for humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan had gained sympathy from the West. Although this Soviet-made bridge also known as the “Friendship Bridge” has been unable to create sustainable trade between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan in technical and organizational terms, this attempt has been described as an important step for Afghanistan. Despite the security risks, Uzbekistan is trying to take a role in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan and aims to strengthen its relations with Kabul. The main reason for that is Uzbekistan’s endless desire to gain more benefits from the Afghanistan issue.

Afghanistan has great potential to become the focus point in the transportation of goods to Central Asia, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and Europe thanks to its location. For Uzbekistan, as a landlocked country, Afghanistan is a very important transit country. The Uzbek leader, Islam Karimov, was aware of this fact from the very beginning of the Afghanistan War. In a press conference organized just after the visit of the U.S. Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld on October 5, 2001, by saying that they could reach Karachi if stability in Afghanistan would be ensured, Karimov had emphasized the economic benefits that Uzbekistan could receive in the future.

In 2007, Uzbekistan completed the construction of the Tashguzar-Baysun-Kumkurgan railway link that facilitates the transportation of goods coming from Europe, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other regional states to Afghanistan. The Uzbek government also created a special economic zone and logistic center in Navoi in 2008. In August 2011, the opening of the railway between Uzbekistan’s border city Hairatan and Afghanistan’s northern city Mazar-i-Sharif indicated that Uzbekistan insistently pursues its own interests in Afghanistan. This railway as an important link serving to increase trade between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan will also provide a decrease in the cost of transportation and increase employment opportunities in the project area. Above all, this 75 km railway can be seen as the first step toward the construction of a wider railway network comprising of Herat, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. The railway of Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif can also encourage other states in the region to develop their relations with Afghanistan. In addition to that, it can be seen as a promising attempt to merge the societies of the region.

Uzbekistan contributes to the rehabilitation of the Afghan economy by investing in sectors such as road construction, mining, agriculture, irrigation, and education. Additionally, Tashkent continues to profit from exporting electricity to Afghanistan which is vital for a war weary and undeveloped country. Indeed, the industrial and economic development of Afghanistan in the future depends on the electricity imported from Uzbekistan.

During the decade long war, Uzbekistan has never given up its aim to search for more benefits for itself, both in the destruction and reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been placed on the priority list of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy not only due to the war, terrorism, and drug-trafficking, but also thanks to the great economic opportunities. However, since Uzbekistan has already gained the enmity of radical and fundamentalist movements, it should take cautious steps on political and diplomatic matters in the future. Only by placing more emphasis on political and diplomatic efforts can Tashkent pursue its own economic interests in the long run. Uzbekistan is still worried about the spread of terrorist attacks to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two important bordering countries of Afghanistan with dangerously lax security. Since the Uzbek regime has fought mercilessly with the moderate and radical elements so far, it seems it will be seriously threatened if the Taliban support Islamic opposition in Tajikistan. Therefore, Uzbekistan has to carefully evaluate the risks and opportunities in Afghanistan. Otherwise, all the benefits that Uzbekistan has gained so far can easily turn into forfeits.

At this point, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the region is an alarm that warns of the urgency in producing concrete strategies in political and economic areas. It is clear that Uzbekistan will remain face to face with all problems emanating from Afghanistan when Washington withdraws its troops. Uzbekistan, having historical, geographic, ethnic, and cultural links with Uzbekistan should develop a more comprehensive approach and redefine the Afghanistan problem within the framework of a coherent strategy. By only focusing on regime and border security, the containment policy toward Afghanistan will not yield effective results and will not bring a durable solution to the problem.


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Notes:

[1] W. Alejandro Sanchez (March 2007), “A Central Asian Security Paradigm: Russia and Uzbekistan”, Small Wars and Insurgents, Vol. 18, No.1, p. 114.