The problems of security in the South Caucasus and especially in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are entering new, most pressing and dynamically debate stage later of the Turkish President Gul’s Baku and Russian President Medvedyev’s Yerevan visits. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance deal during President Abdullah Gül’s visit to Azerbaijan, on 17 August. This came just days before, agreement on extending Moscow’s lease on 102nd Gyumri military base’s rights by 34 years, during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Armenia. The agreement is a Russian memorandum to the West that it will not move back from its policy to toughen its position in the South Caucasus for long time
Unsurprisingly, Moscow is using its full array of modern international relations and security tools to achieve its goals in South Caucasus: from public diplomacy to the weapons sales. Thus, emplacing Russian S-300’s in the breakaway Georgian republic of Abkhazia and extending Russian military presence in Armenia till 2044 shows the Kremlin view on the region. For the reason of political and economic factors, Armenia prefers to remain in the Russian sphere of influence. It is therefore clear that Armenia will remain Russia’s geo-strategic ally and the latter will benefit from using this pawn against Azerbaijan.
As far as Armenia is concerned, Azerbaijan might try to re-take its lost land by military force, most likely if Ankara will support it. Former Armenian national security adviser Gerard Libaridian claimed that Russia will certainly defend Armenia only if the latter is attacked by Turkey. The Russian position is clear-cut. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev declared in Yerevan that in case of crisis Moscow would act in accordance to its commitments undertaken as an ally within Moscow-led security bloc, known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The majority of Armenian politicians pleased and believe that proposed lease extension another attempt by Russia to uphold balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan, by sending a "special message to Turkey and Azerbaijan." Eduard Sharmazanov, the spokesman for the ruling party, confirmed that Armenia is reinforcing its military alliance with Russia in response to Azerbaijan’s ongoing military build-up and regular war threats. Contrary of the some Armenian political scientist’s xenophobia and military hysteria, Turkish-Azerbaijan strategic partnership cannot be considered a political response to the Russian-Armenian military agreement. The weight of this strategic alliance is superior and cannot to seek to be in a low leverage as a "quick response" to the Russian-Armenian military agreement. Such type of contracts officialising the strategic alliance laid the responsibility on the participating states to carry out from common position, not pursuing a policy contrary to one another.
Obviously, Russia’s support to Armenia and its supply of weapons to the former has permanent effect on the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, which should to solve Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and wants to restore its territorial integrity. Moscow has evidently determined its stance in this aspect and will, of course, support Armenia. It would be na’”ve to expect Moscow to just hand over control of Armenia after extending so much effort and resources there. Perhaps even more disastrously, the recent developments fatally damage Moscow’s reputation as an honest broker in Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and would remove the constraining brake of the peace process from a highly dangerous arms race. This would raise tensions on the ground and give further weight to Azerbaijani defence forces who argue that Azerbaijan’s military is sufficient, and that Baku should strike now to liberate the occupied territories. This conundrum poses a serious challenge and threats for the United States, as well as for European Powers. Washington’s policies of seeking common ground with Russia can be out rightly damaging to its own interests. America should strengthen its commitment to the internationalization of the peacekeeping and mediation structures in the "frozen conflicts." The Russian domination over the peacekeeping and mediation of these conflicts is obsolete, reflecting the geopolitical situation of the early 1990s, when the West had few stated interests in this region.
Finally, for the time being, Azerbaijan maintains silence over this issue. Local media speculates that the military base agreement between Baku and Ankara is achieved. Some suggested Azerbaijan might serve as a backup to Turkish bases. At the moment, recommendations are: on the one hand Georgia and Azerbaijan might to develop political, military relations under GUAM, which might increase effectiveness after the Turkey’s possible consideration of joining to this organization. On the other hand, significantly needs to re-emerge of a Platform for Security and Stability in the Caucasus, still in the process of definition but one that he has indicated will be open to all countries in the region. Otherwise, Russia will introduce proper to the South Caucasus’ "chess game".
Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, Azerbaijan. He can be contacted at zaur.shiriyev@gmail.com.
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