written by Andrin Raj printable version send your friend

Monday, 22 March 2010

The Southern Thailand dispute dates back to decades of historical unrest of what was known as the occupation. In reality there were many disputes within the region where states were developing their economic and military might. Siam (Thailand) was considered a strong regional power in Southeast Asia during the early centuries after the fall of the Sri Vijaya Empire and grew to become a military power. Southern Thailand was part of the Siamese region and hence only took rightfully what was theirs when the time came. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 drew the boundary of Malaysia and Thailand. The Malay Pattani region, dominated by Muslims from the Malay Sultanate period stayed within the Siamese control and Kedah came under the British control.

The Muslim minority, who came from predominately from the Malay Sultanate and the surrounding SEA region, were foraging for better settlements and eventually over the centuries crossed into the Siamese region of what is now called the Pattani region, which includes Naratiwat and the Yala provinces. Over the period the disputes became obvious and were not related to political violence as such, but mainly to the cultural and economic imperialism of the Thais rather than an occupation and to the 1960s resettlement issues of northeastern Thais in Southern Thailand. These were disputes based on economic and cultural grounds relating to a number of issues within the Muslim community. Disputes of these issues are still prevalent in the SEA region and some extents are still occurring in relatively stable democracies.

The separatist groups engaged in the struggle, the main one being the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP), have decided to join forces in July of 2009 incorporating the Pattani Liberation Army (PLO) to build its militant force. The Barisan Revolusi National-Coordinate (BRN-C), the largest and best organized of the separatist groups, are also part of the separatist struggle in the South. A splinter group that has also emerged in the late 80s is the Bersatu group, a coalition between the PULO and BRN.

The insurgency is not caused by a lack of political representation among the Pattani Muslim community, as during the Taksins Administration Muslims were holding unprecedented senior posts in Thai politics. There were more than 10 Members of Parliament and several Senators representing provincial legislative assemblies in the broader provinces and mayors in the municipalities. Muslims were able to voice out their political grievances openly and enjoyed greater degree of religious freedom. However, this changed during the second Taksins Administration, where political rivalries within the administration started to dismantle the southern administration organization and causing political instability in Thailand. This created a major discontentment with the Pattani Muslim community and led to the growing violence
since 2004.

The Southern Thailands insurgencies in reality took a turning effect after the 2001 World Trade attacks in New York by Al Qaeda. The separatist campaign, as it is now known, intensified in 2004 as a result of the Southeast Asian regional terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, penetrating and taking advantage of the separatist campaign against the Thais. This was a direct objective of JIs pan-Islamic regional propaganda. Al Qaedas international support for Jemaah Islamiyah prompted Jihadist militants to emerge within the Pattani region and this included the Yala and the Narithiwat regions. In respect to the economic suppression in the region, JI supported the rural poor Pattanis in handing those alms and winning their hearts and minds. The Pattanis who sympathized with JI collaborated in their pan-Islamic struggle in the hope of having Pattanis independence and achieving an Islamic state of their own.

Jemaah Islamiyah went about to set up training camps and provided militant trainings to the Pattani Jihadists and equipped them with arms to fight the Thai authorities and to carry out terror attacks within the region. Along these came recruitment and training facilities for the Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistans plight to send foreign Jihadists from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Southern Philippines to fight the West. It is also known that other foreign terrorist organizations are also operating in the Southern Thailand region. These are of Chechen and Lebanese terrorist groups besides others. One of the earliest attacks in the Southern Thailand incidents was of Chechen terrorist modus operandi. During the same period, the Russian Embassy in Malaysia had a bomb thrown into the Embassy gates, but no one was hurt as the bomb was detonated by the Malaysian authorities. This was in relation to a protest to Putins visit to Chechnya in 2001.

An autonomy for Southern Thailand is not the answer to the current settlement as this will only give strength to other groups operating within the SEA region seeking autonomy, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Moro International Liberation Front, the Free Aceh Movement (autonomy granted) and others fighting for autonomy and independence. This will further fuel Jemaah Islamiyahs role in the region and it will be a major threat to the SEA region. Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah will be able to strengthen their operations in autonomy granted regions. The structural operations such as Mantiqi 1, that covers Southern Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, will be able to plan and organize future attacks without the fear of being intercepted by the authorities. JI will eventually have control over these autonomy regions and carry out its planned pan-Islamic struggle.

The SEA region is very volatile and can be a flash point for political violence if it does not address these issues collectively. Al Qaeda will not stop supporting JI and other terrorist groups with the aim of dominating the SEA region as a pan-Islamic controlled region. Recently in February of 2010, the Indonesian authorities captured a number of terrorist operatives and seized a large amount of weapons from the Free Aceh Movement in an attempt to plan attacks in the Straits of Malacca. Intelligence sources states, that a maritime attack has been unfolded and that it had alerted the littoral states as well as the Asean government on the findings. This clearly proves that terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia are capable of a maritime attack as previously unknown.

The Thai government, with its new administration and led by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, is more sensitive than the last two administrations. Abhisit, who hails from a family of senior politicians and diplomats in Thailand and from an elite family background, is regarded highly by the Royal family. Abhisit clearly understands the crisis and his administration is paying more attention to come to a solution for the South, but autonomy will not be the basis of resolving the crisis, especially when the current stakes are based on JI and other terrorist groups operating in the region waiting for the right time to carry out their operations. The Thai authorities know very well that any autonomy would be a major threat to its sovereignty in the future.

There are other minority groups, such as the Chinese in Bangkoks Chinatown and the Lao of the northeast who have been living in the state with no problems and are living in a harmonious co-existence. I do not see the reason for giving any autonomy to the Pattani region as most of them are migrants from around the region and should accept the legitimacy of a constitution that has prevailed in the country. The Thai government should consider a dialogue and to kick start some form of assurance so the South can propel and develop within the Thai dominance. But first it has to act on the brutalities inflicted on the South and to come clean on its position so it can move forward in addressing the issues. The Thai government and the Muslim south should however bring forth some very concerned issues such as the Pattani people and their place in Thai society and their membership of the Thai state.

As poverty and economic issues have been cited as the factor of the uprising in Southern Thailands insurgency, the economy of the South actually improved tremendously during 1983 and 2003. The average per capita income of the Pattani grew while that of the Yala and Narathiwat also increased. However, minorities of the Pattani region had lower levels of educational attainment and as such did not get the best jobs available to them. The other factor was the education system that is in the Thai language and the Muslim minority are resenting towards the system and pulling their children out of these schools. These and other issues are the current state of affairs occurring in the Southern Thailand insurgency and the Thai authorities should consider more economic growth, best educational means and solutions in ending the violence. A near solution is not foreseen, but by addressing some of the issues and moving gradually will eventually end the violence and put a stop to the current influence of JIs operations in Southern Thailand.

Some of needed immediate implementations for the South are to engage in confidence-building measures, which should culminate in a package for the South. This should also include the reinstatement of Muslim representation in the local administrative structure working closely with the Thai administration. The government must address areas of education, past injustice and economic development to sphere the South. The United States can play a major role in working with the Thai authorities to resolve the conflict as well as working with the ASEAN nations to strengthen civil societies and improve democratic reform, human rights issues and to stimulate growth and jobs in the South.

Efforts such as cultural and religious approaches, institutional capacity-building, followed by a balanced national development that does not create social jealousy should be an area of focus. Finally, the avenues to combat terrorism are to increase surveillance of radical groups in their forms and manifestations. A legal and operational control mechanism should be set up to monitor such groups and increase regional co-operation through intelligence information exchange. There is a need also to enforce extradition treaties and offer lawful solutions. The Pattani people should also consider their place in the Thai society as part of the state and to work together in resolving the conflict. It takes two to tango and both sides should clearly work towards a solution.

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Andrin Raj (andrin.raj@stratad.net) is Director for Centre for Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre (SAPSC)-Counter Terrorism & Security Analyst and Director for Chapter-SEA Regional HQ for the International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) 2008-09.He is also one of the founding members of the Turkish Think Tank Dialogue (TOD TURKEY) of the Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies (TASAM) and part of the Think Tank Forum of the Organization of Islamic Countries based in Istanbul, Turkey. He is a Visiting Lecturer at the Institute for Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia and also lectures at the Monash University, Malaysia campus. He has currently been appointed the Deputy Head of the Defense and Security Committee of the European Union Malaysia Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Malaysia. The views expressed are of his own and does not reflect those of SAPSC, IACSP, TOD TURKEY, IDFR, MONASH UNI., TASAM, JIIA or the EUMCI.


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