Saturday, 20 February 2010
At first sight, the crisis between Swiss-Libyan relations seems like a minor political issue between two small power countries, however, there are much deeper implications. The issue shows how the behavior of strong, self-confident leaders of authoritarian regimes can pressure a democratic country, while on the other hand proves an inconsistency and the internal problem of part-integration and coexistence of its different form in the same area.
This story began rather prosaic. In July 2008, a Libyan Supreme Leader’s son, Hannibal Gadafi, and his wife were charged in Switzerland of overthrowing two hotel staff members. After a Libyan protest, the couple was remanded on bail. It was not the first outburst of Col. Gadafi, notorious for violence towards women and legal problems in Paris (2004, 2005). Despite Switzerland’s attempts to appease the Libyan leader, things had gone wrong and in revenge Libya has closed Swiss businesses, arrested Swiss nationals residing in Libya and withdrawn assets worth nearly 4 billion dollars from Swiss banks. As a result the Swiss President, Hans-Rudolf Merz, issued in an apology in 2009 and said that he was sorry for the "unjust arrest of Libyan diplomats by Geneva police."
The Libyan answer was nothing more than a power show. While restricting Swiss companies, it also arrested Swiss nationals doing business in Libya. Moreover, when news agencies reported on a list of 188 Libyan officials banned by Switzerland, Libya refused to issue any new visas to nationals of any Schengen countries (Switzerland is not a part of the EU but is in a Schengen zone). It was also followed by an attempt to stop all visas already issued and to put them on hold.
It is not the case to blame the Libyan regime or its unpredictable leaders here. However, that kind of reprisal does not stick to international law and the rules of common state behavior yet, the results of it are interesting. Violating the principle of equal reprisal, Libya put all the Schengen and the EU members on center stage. What can be read from these actions?
First of all, it is still the individual behavior and short-run aims that shape the policy. While the first apologies by the Swiss president faced wide criticism (the press described it as bowing in front of totalitarians), it faced an increased reaction in regards to the national interests. The Italian Foreign Minister, Franco Frattini, charged on Monday (15.02), that Switzerland is holding the Schengen zone members as hostages in its conflict with Libya.
It is understandable that the situation is complicated, especially for Italy who is massively involved in business with Libya. It is, however, not an explanation. Although the rule of solidarity in the Schengen zone restricts an issue of any new Schengen visa to the banned individuals, it is still possible for a country to issue a national one, valid only on its territory. While accusing Switzerland in this manner, Franco Frattini weakens the position of the whole group of Schengen members.
The situation also draws attention to the risk of coming together with an idea of multi-speed integrations. While Switzerland is not in the EU, it can affect the whole Union policy. Italy, a founding member itself, can behave as totally separate from the rest of the countries. France, with its strong opinion during the Hannibal Gadafi issue in Geneva, can then turn to the much milder position and try to appease Gadafi.
On the other hand, it shows how such achievement there has been in integration as free movement zones need to be supported by the political development among engaged parties. While everything goes smoothly, there is much debate about the common interests and values. Facing the crises, the European Union still behaves as a class of children that can be bought with a few sweets. The Italians, in spite of the visa ban, were allowed by Libya to come on Wednesday. At the same time, a group of Maltase professionals were sent back home directly from the airport.
It is not the first time Libya is playing one country against the other. Moreover, it is not the only one doing so with the EU members, considering the Russian attempts to win Germany over the heads of its Eastern and Southern neighbors with the North Stream and gas supplies. Therefore, if the EU learns from that lesson correctly, some internal changes are needed. They should be much deeper than the recently approved Lisbon Treaty to strengthen and tie the members together. The need to rethink and redesign the European Neighborhood Policy is also a must.
The assistance in administration and other internal developments are visibly not attractive enough to prevent Libya from such behavior while in the process of negotiations to access the ENP. The framework itself is also not prepared for facing external crisis, with no tools to organize or include cooperation with part-integrated states as Switzerland in this case. As is visible, the complexity of today’s EU related issues make it unmanageable with further development.
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