The emergence of Al Qa’ida in Turkey and the associated violence is a major cause for concern, not only emotionally but for strategic considerations.
Turkish society, unlike modern Arab societies, seems to have found an accommodation between the military establishment of the state and political Islamic activism. Radical Turkish secularism appears to be more forgiving in this respect than its neighbouring Arab secular states, perhaps because of the spread of Sufism in Turkish society and its propensity towards compromise and the avoidance of conflict with the state. Turkey, therefore, does not appear to be a natural breading ground for Al Qa’ida or a place where Al Qa’ida’s ideas could take hold or flourish.
Furthermore, Al Qa’ida’s demands of standing firm in the face of Israeli intransigence, refusal to accept the American occupation of Iraq, a show of self-respect on the part of Muslim political leaders and their ability to exercise political independence are all things that the present Turkish Government has demonstrated in the past and continues to demonstrate today with increasing vigour, bearing in mind that it is not always possible to achieve all that you want nor is it politically wise to put everything you can into practice. Patience is needed to deal with a deeply rooted hostile political heritage that will require time to overcome.
So, what new excuses will Al Qa’ida add to its long list of excuses every time it wants to open a new front? Why this desire to embarrass Turkey and threaten its security? Why force Turkey to open a new internal front at the very time she is trying to resolve a number of internal conflicts that have been a drain on its human and financial resources for many decades, and at a time when Turkey is working hard to establish its place in the region and the wider world?
The surfacing of Al Qa’ida, traditionally through violent outrages and the consequent loss of security leading to the total collapse of the state, is of particular concern in Anatolia. An example of what could happen is provided by Yemen. This south Arabian state straddling the entrance to the Red see is now faced with collapse, threatening strategic Arab waterways and putting the whole of the Eastern Arab world and its resources and exports under a logistic stranglehold. Al Qa’ida threatens all political structures in the area with disintegration, leaving a vacuum in which political reform is not possible and their year zero projects can flourish. This deeply worrying scenario appears to be relatively easy to implement and duplicate at any time and place of their choosing, and with minimal resources.
There are concerns about new strategic alliances between Islamic movements and incompatible political forces, and concerns about the possible abortion of a political example not yet fully shaped or established. The example is that of the Turkish political, social and economic experiment which many hope will breathe new life into the dying politics of a region ravaged by sectarianism and dictatorship. The region in its entirety is nervous about the possible destabilisation of the state that appears with every passing day to be the last remaining peg securing our tent in the face of the storm.
Observers of the Turkish scene who follow the various attempts by the Generals to bring down the present Turkish Government and de-stabilise the security and political situation in the country (including bomb attacks on historical mosques in Istanbul to create a pretext for military intervention and the construction of an armed confrontation with Greece to then blame the Government for the failure to protect the Fatherland) will know only too well how delicate the political situation is and how it only needs a spark from somewhere to ignite the country and destroy the efforts of 8 years of reforms; to turn Turkey once more into the paralysed state it used to be 15 years ago. Just one Al Qa’ida operation would be enough to provide such a spark. Turkey itself will then be lost and not just its political system.
It is difficult to be sure of the reasons behind the timing of the emergence of Al Qa’ida in Turkey. It is possible that the decision was taken centrally by Al Qa’ida’s leadership. It is also possible that independent groups aligned with Al Qa’ida are behind these activities, forming pragmatic alliances with other Groups with whom they often have ideological enmities (sometimes falling under the influence of such Groups, as is the case with Iran and Al Qa’ida in Iraq). A more likely scenario for Turkey would be a mirroring of the position in Yemen with the separatist Kurdish Workers Party taking the role of the Ja’feri Houthis and the Communists, especially in the South East of the country in the boarder areas with unstable Iraq where the Turkish security authorities have already announced a number of Al Qa’ida related arrests. This scenario is more easily implemented and would have a better chance of success if the Turkish Government were to be headed by a political party other than the Justice and Development Party with its close relationship with the Muslim masses.
It is easy to affirm, however, that many parties would benefit from an inward looking, economically weak Turkey, pre-occupied with its own internal problems, isolated from its neighbours, bereft of any regional ambitions and governed by a succession of weak coalition governments. First among those would be Israel who has had to suffer a number of blows, from a confident Turkey assured in its role as a regional power, following the uncovering of the Mossad’s activities in Northern Iraq. Others include traditional regional rivals like Iran, unhappy about the growing political and economic influence enjoyed by Turkey and the strategic cultural blending with its neighbouring Arab populations.
Other groups unhappy with an increasing regional role for Turkey are Kurdish separatist movements who view Turkish influence as a negative development and a significant difficulty on the road to independence, Turkish secular politicians rejected by the voters who are finding it difficult to return to power via traditional, tried and trusted means and various religious minorities who seek to redefine the role of religion in society and naturally follow a sectarian agenda and do not wish to see a strong central Government aligned with the needs and aspirations of the majority population.
All these Groups have their concerns with regard to the rising regional profile of Turkey. In fact, Turkey, with its identity, cultural heritage and historical role has no friends, with whom she enjoys a common history and a common destiny, apart from us Arabs.
For Turkey, the coming days and years are pregnant with events and Turks are rightly concerned with how to protect their recent achievements. Enemies of Turkish-Arab friendship who stand to loose from the emergence of such an alliance will not find a better agent of sabotage than Al Qa’ida. They will be only too eager to point out that Arabs who in the past had helped bring down the Ottoman rule are now attacking Turkey on the home front.
This is happening at a time when the wounds of the past are still bleeding, making it judicious to declare Anatolia a Qa’ida free zone to deny any possible foe the opportunity to muddy the waters.
Turkish anti democratic forces need only to take advantage of any confusion about the path ahead for their project to succeed. There is therefore an imperative need for a strategic vision to spare the people of the region the tragedies of such an outcome. Care must be exercised when responding to movements that might appear to have a similar outlook but in fact aspire to very different ends.
It is difficult not to be pessimistic when learning of the emergence of Al Qa’ida in Anatolia. Turkey is the last country in the region where the law and the institutions of the state are still respected and is the good tree that we hope will give its fruits to all the peoples of the region. The creation of a security crisis in Turkey is a strategic catastrophe for the entire region that had repeatedly depended on a strong Turkish presence in the region to lift it from the mire of factionalism and feudal politics, going back to the times of the Ottomans and even the Seljuks. The loss of Iraq has no doubt inflicted a strategic blow to the Arab region. The loss of Turkey, however, would cause serious damage to the structure of the entire Muslim world and it is difficult to see how we can recover from such a calamity.
The discussion of the dangers facing Turkey is not an exercise in intellectual scare mongering. Recent events in Yemen have shown how easy it is for a state to be destabilised. It is not that difficult to imagine how the scenario could be repeated in Turkey if we are not up to the challenge.
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