Main issues in the Turkish-Iraqi relations
Regarding Turkish-Iraqi relations, the Turkish perspective has focused on the territorial integrity of Iraq after the US occupation. For years many terrorist attacks against Turkish territories occurred near the border between Iraq and Turkey and terror and security issues have been the primary agenda for Turkish officials. Following the October 2007 Daglica attacks on a Turkish patrol in northern Iraq, the general opinion was that Iraqi-Turkish relations would plummet. However, the new Turkish perspective preferred a style of shuttle diplomacy by visiting other neighboring countries of Iraq as well as various actors within Iraq such as Sunnis and Shiite groups.
If we look at the process, after 2007 in particular, we see that relations between the two sides had begun to recover. In late 2007 Turkey invited these other countries to the Expanded Ministerial Conference of the Neighbouring Countries of Iraq on combating terrorism and restructuring Iraq together. In the last two years a significant improvement between the two sides has been observed. Mutual visits by high-level officials and Turkey’s contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq increased the trust, and security issues have been the common aim for the two countries. Security concerns were replaced by opportunities for cooperation. Today we are talking about the economic, social and cultural integration of Iraq, Turkey and Syria. In light of the Syria experiment in the 1990s, Turkey is aware of the possibility that the same improvement of relations may be extended to other neighboring countries. Besides, Turkey is Iraq’s largest export partner and Iraq comes in as the fourth largest partner for Turkey. The High Level Strategic Council between Iraq and Turkey was formed in 2008 for the co-action of ministries between the two countries, including the Water Ministry of Iraq. This rapprochement between the two countries will enable Turkey to cooperate on terrorism and energy issues. For example, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki was present at the ceremony for the Nabucco pipeline, which might well be taken to mean that he also wants to be a part of this project, though this possibility has not been concluded yet.
Another issue concerns Turkey’s dialogue with different groups in Iraq. Some representatives of those groups visited Turkey recently and it is believed that those visits will increase before the upcoming elections in Iraq. The important point here is the provision of stability in Iraq; if the groups create disputes after the January elections Turkey will be unable to reap the benefits of the cooperation in an unstable environment in Iraq.
Water Issue Discussions and Its Affects on Relations
There are three basins in the Middle East: the Nile basin, the Jordan River basin and the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The Euphrates and Tigris both originate in eastern Turkey. The Euphrates flows to Syria and later to Iraq, but Iraq does not contribute to Euphrates. The Tigris follows a short route of about 40 km along the Syria-Turkey border, and then goes to Iraq, which contributes 60 percent of the Tigris’ total water within the country. Both rivers form the Shatt Al-Arab, which flows to the Persian Gulf. The main problem regarding the riparian countries of the Euphrates and Tigris has been the construction of dams by countries up river, since this decreases the amount of water available for the use of countries down river. Begun in the 1960s, construction of the Keban dam on the Euphrates was finished in 1975, and Syria constructed Tabkha Dam in the same period. Syrian-Iraqi relations were strained because Syria held water in Tabkha Dam and Turkey held water in Keban Dam in the mid-70s. While Syria and Iraq were blaming each other for political reasons and water issues in those years, the construction of Ataturk Dam in the 1980s united both countries against Turkey. Since the construction of the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project) in the 1980s, Turkey’s hydroelectric dam projects led to complaints from Iraq and Syria, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. In May 1990 Saddam Hussein demanded that Turkey increase water flow to 700 m3/sc, which was not accepted by then-Turkish President Yildirim Aktuna. Thanks to the disagreement, the Security Protocol between the two countries was not renewed that year. But after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the water issue was postponed by Iraq. In the 1990s Syria and Iraq appealed to the Arab League several times to warn Turkey about the waterissue, and they called for Turkey to stop the GAP. Turkey refused these demands.
For Iraq, the Tigris issue cannot be evaluated in the same context as the Euphrates. Iraq doesn’t want to discuss the issue. Similarly, Syria does not want to discuss the issue of the Asi River, while Turkey wants to discuss all in the same context. Yet in these days a dam construction project on the Asi river is likely by Turkey on Syrian territory.
During President Ozal’s term, Turkey introduced the ‘Peace Water Project’, but it was not accepted by other countries in the region as they thought Turkey would use it as a political bargaining tool. Turkey signed an agreement titled ‘Economic Cooperation Protocol’ with Syria in 1987 and promised to release at least 500 m3/sc from Euphrates to Syria. However Turkey is reluctant to use the term ‘watercourse’ for its rivers; it wants to use the term ‘cross-boundary waters’ for the Euphrates and Tigris. This explains why Turkey is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997. Turkey does not want to be bound by a permanent agreement on the water issue.
In the 1990s Iraq claimed that it had a “historical right” to use the water of the Euphrates because it constructed projects to use that water in the first place, and Turkey did not have a right to decrease the water of the river with its projects. Iraq insisted that Turkey must share half of the river. This meant an ‘equal’ share of water, but Turkey embraced the principle of ‘realistic, optimum and equity usage of water’ and ‘adopting water policies that do not damage bordering countries’. This perspective is convergent with the definition of UN International Law Commission’s “contiguous” and “successive” waters definition. According to this, while contiguous waters must be shared equally, for successive waters, the important point is countries’ needs according to their socio-economic conditions. Turkey also stands by the ‘sovereign state over water’ principle, as the waters’ origin is in Turkey, and its domestic water needs are its first priority. Another principle Turkey has adopted is to evaluate the Tigris and Euphrates as one basin for bordering countries. This means that the total amount of water released will be evaluated for the downstream countries, and Turkey argues that the total amount of the water is enough for these countries. Actually, the main problem for Iraq is not the amount of water but the quality, because of the high salt content, which makes its usage more difficult. Turkey had also advised a plan to construct irrigation and agricultural projects for Syria and Iraq, but the plan was refused by these countries.
There are some treaties to solve the water problem among the countries, but no international law can be invoked to compromise all cross-boundary waters. Therefore, we can say that the water issue largely depends on mutual relations; if there is any disagreement, the countries will use diplomatic means to determine the share as they do today. For instance, last year Turkish Prime Minister called Bashar Asad about the water issue because Turkey was in need of water due to drought in its eastern region, and Syria accepted this. We could not imagine this happening ten years ago. Diplomatic means are the most preferable. If the issue cannot be resolved diplomatically, the sides can go to the International Court of Justice as long as Turkey consents.
Iraq uses water mostly for agriculture, rather than energy production. Following the drop of half of the Tigris’ water this year, Iraq called for an urgent meeting with Turkey and Syria. Turkey increased the flow of the Euphrates’ water to 570 cubic meters per second in June. In September, Iraq and Turkey talked about the issue again at the meeting of the High Level Strategic Council, and Turkey promised to release more water to Iraq for its drought problem, but in the future, Turkey’s perspective is to find permanent tripartite technical projects to use the water in an optimal way within those countries. Today, Iraq loses about 40 percent of its water due to the water usage methods, lack of drainage systems and high evaporation. Sharing information is also urgently needed to measure the flow of the water in these three countries. For the future, it is thought that while the Euphrates may not meet Iraqi needs, the Tigris will be more than enough, and Turkey may attempt to find ways to increase the Tigris’ flow to Iraq.
Serpil Acikalin
USAK Centre for Middle Eastern Studies
Turkey-Japan Relations: The Need to Think Beyond Trade
