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Noordin Top: JI Operations Leader in Southeast Asia and the Recent Siege
written by
Andrin Raj

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Tuesday, 18 August 2009

















The Jakarta bombings in July of this year broke the four-year gap in terror strikes in Indonesia.  This clearly indicates the re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah and its new wave of attacks in Indonesia. The capture of Mas Selamat in Malaysia after an initial one year escape is also a major factor in the re-emergence of JI within the region. The Indonesia authorities are now scrambling on a “wild goose chase” as security concerns have been elevated to the highest level as more threats are foreseeable. The “complaisance” of the Indonesian authorities has taken a toll on the Republic. This can be assessed by the recent attacks in Jakarta where the authorities did not foresee any “unthinkable” threats on the Ritz Carlton or the Marriot Hotel, nor did they have any information on the bombings that took place in July.

The raid on Noordin Top’s hideout came after Barack Obama’s chief counter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan, said the US President is replacing the "global war on terror" with a new US strategy more narrowly focused on Al Qaeda and relying more on a broader effort to engage the Muslim world. It may seem that the US is beginning to take a softer approach in its fight on terrorism in Southeast Asia. As such, the authorities in the region are also beginning to work within their homeland security efforts rather than sharing information on the “war on terror“in regional cooperation.

Mas Selamat’s capture in Malaysia is a vital source of information that can be directed to the current bombings in Jakarta and future planned attacks. In Indonesia the national police chief, General Bambang Danuri, quoted that a raid in the outskirts of Jakarta in a home two weeks prior to the raid on Noordin Top last weekend, had explosives made ready for a near future suicide attack. The raid that took place in a village near the town of Temanggung by the Detachment 88 on August the 7th, an anti-terror unit in Indonesia, believed that mastermind Noordin Top was within the vicinity. But to their surprise the mastermind bomb maker was no where to be found within the dead after the operations ended early Saturday morning.

Noordin Top is an intelligent, talented and respected religious figure in Indonesia by JI members. He has many informants and sources to assist him in his whereabouts and to evade local authorities in a fraction of a time. It must be understood that the local people who live within the surrounding of Noordin Top in the Java province are protecting him from the authorities. This makes it much more difficult for the authorities to capture him. The political religious ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah and its fight for a religious autonomous region is rooted deep within the growing organization. As much as Noordin Top has been associated with a splinter group, we must note that the origins of JI are still a fundamental authority in this area.  Noordin Top is still the leader of JI operations and until such time we can only speculate on the issues pertaining to his allegiance.

The Indonesian authorities were overconfident in their capture of Noordin Top last Saturday. Sources derived from intelligence may not have been accurate enough on the whereabouts of Noordin himself. The raid seems to be an easy approach for the Indonesian authorities as they did exactly what any anti –terror unit would have done. They proceeded to the vicinity with the given notification and they cordoned off the entire area and had the place surrounded by the anti-terror personnel. All precautions were taken into consideration signaling that the anti-terror unit was prepared for a raid based on intelligence provided. Basic rules of engagement, based on close quarter battle (CQB) techniques were engaged in the raid around the cordoned off area. A prolonged gun battle took place and it went on till Saturday ending the ambush on Noordin Top’s suspected hideout where four people were found dead.

We must be aware that Noordin Top would not have had the house easily ambushed by the authorities, without having his own intelligence  and would have placed explosives around the house or having the house booby trapped  with explosives. Based on jihadist principles, Noordin Top would have committed “martyrdom suicide” and exploded the house rather than to give himself up to the authorities. This is clearly off a “run around” effort by the Indonesian authorities in trying to capture Noordin Top as they are well informed of his “modus operandi”. He has been able to evade the authorities on a number of incidents in Indonesia during the last seven years of being a fugitive.

The fact that Noordin Top was not in the house where the raid took place signals more of new attacks to come in the near future. We must also note that the capture or killing of Noordin Top is not going to dismantle the terrorist organization that he currently operates.  JI or other splinter groups that exist in Indonesia as well as other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda operating around the world does not depend on the command structure of a normal organization. The command structure is not “Top-Bottom” but “Bottom-Top” literally and this is harder to address in dismantling any terror organizations.

 

Andrin Raj (andrin.raj@stratad.net) is Director/Security and Terrorism Analyst for Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre (SAPSC) and Director for Chapter-SEA for the International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals. He is a Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) 2008-09.He is also one of the founding members of the Turkish Think Tank Dialogue (TOD TURKEY) of the Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies (TASAM) based in Istanbul, Turkey. The views expressed are of his own and does not reflect those of SAPSC, IACSP, TOD TURKEY, TASAM or JIIA.



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Noordin Top: JI Operations Leader in Southeast Asia and the Recent Siege  Noordin Top: JI Operations Leader in Southeast Asia and the Recent Siege  Noordin Top: JI Operations Leader in Southeast Asia and the Recent Siege  Noordin Top: JI Operations Leader in Southeast Asia and the Recent Siege  
Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW)
USAK House,
Ayten Sok. No:21
Mebusevleri, Tandogan, Ankara, Turkey