Browsing through European newspapers on May 8 could give a compelling impression that the European Union’s Eastern Partnership summit of May 7 was not quite a stunning success. After all, among all the EU leaders that the Czech presidency invited to Prague, only German Chancellor Angela Merkel showed up at the meeting, while other Heads of States sent lower-level representatives to fill in for their absences.

Some politicians – like British Prime Minister Gordon Brown – boycotted the summit in order to show their disapproval for renewing talks with Alexander Lukashenka’s Belarus, popularly dubbed “Europe’s last dictatorship”, invited to the Partnership along Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Others, like French President Nicolas Sarkozy, underlined their indifference towards Czech eurosceptic President Vaclav Klaus, who refuses to ratify the Lisbon Treaty.

The Eastern Partnership, designed by Poland and Sweden, did not draw much of Europe’s attention, at the moment devoted mainly to the struggle against economic crisis, what aroused fears that the project would share the fate of the France-proposed Union of the Mediterranean, dusting in the EU’s closet of inapt initiatives. But does it mean that the Partnership was born already dead?

Not necessarily. The crisis refers not only to Europe, but also to those countries who wish to pull away the EU from their so-called “area of influence”, frankly speaking – Russia. Russian economy’s performance during the crisis is rather poor, an image that could not be changed even by shelling out 40 million euros ($56 million) on this year’s Eurovision contest in Moscow. The deep crisis that Russia faces now means that buying support in the “Near Abroad” countries with petrorubles will now be much harder for Kremlin. 

Therefore, as in Chinese, where the word “danger” equally means “opportunity” – the timing of expanding Europe’s soft power over Eastern European and Caucasian countries could not be better. 600 million euros ($834 million) that the EU intends to spend on the Eastern Partnership project perhaps is not a breath-taking sum, but in the times of crisis it is something to start with. Turkey, though not a European Union member, could also profit from the Partnership, as Ankara shares a significant part of the EU’s objectives towards Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Prague declaration, signed by the EU’s 27 member states and six Eastern countries, mentions democratization, administrative reforms, economic and energetic cooperation  as the Partnership’s main objectives. The latter one mainly consists of developing the envisaged Nabucco pipeline, meant to provide Central Europe with Azeri, Turkmen and Iranian gas, passing via Turkey and bypassing unreliable Russian energy routes. Enforcing European relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia – the latter one being, since the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008, designated as the possible transit country between Turkey and Azerbaijan – is good news for Turkey, recently struggling to improve its relations with Erewan while not losing Baku at the same time. But if the EU wants to achieve something beyond just temporal benefits of an energy deal, it must not forget about other aspects of the Partnership, most importantly – its democratization and regional stability features. What progress is there to be done?

First of all, even though it was Alexander Lukashenka’s hand that the European leaders were not eager to shake in front of the cameras, other Partnership’s countries are not doing much better in the field of democracy. According to the Freedom House organisation, esteeming political rights and civil liberties prevalence worldwide on a 7 point scale (where 1 stands for maximum value, and 7 for minimum), Armenia was awarded 6 and 4 points, respectively, what gave it a “partly free” country status, while Azerbaijan was given 6 and 5 points in the same fields, thus resulting in the “not free” status. Belarus, on the other hand, scored 7 and 6 points, making it a “not free” country, too. The gap between Belarus and Azerbaijan is, apparently, not that wide.

The Aliyev family regime’s stability and richness in natural resources have for a long time determined Europe’s tolerant stance towards it, but selling democracy for gas is not in accord with the principles that the Europeans believe in. True, the EU cannot afford to openly challenge Azerbaijan’s government, and besides, such radical moves would not do any good for the Azeri people. It does not mean, however, that Europe has to rest idle. A step-by-step democratization, pushing the Azeri government to tolerate independent think-tanks, enlarge the space for opposition parties and reduce the level of corruption, superior even to this known from Russia – such “salami” tactic of enduring democracy would definitely improve the living conditions of the Azeri people. For Turkish companies, largely operating within the Azeri market, it would also mean lowering the blockade of corruption and providing a much-needed stability for their businesses.

Secondly, the EU designed the system of spending the Partnership’s funds in a way that promotes financing international projects over individual spending. And that means a possibility of bilateral Azeri-Armenian projects being implemented in the near future, approaching the two countries that are crucial for Turkey.

After an unfortunate false start, the Eastern Partnership still has a chance of fulfilling strategic aims of both the EU and Turkey in the Caucasus. Contributing to the region’s democratization, development and stabilization may very likely turn out to be profitable for everyone.

Jaroslaw Adamowski

ajaroslaw@gmail.com