The Manawan melee in March is hardly of its maiden kind in Pakistan’s Punjab province. First, it should be seen that jihadist attacks on police recruits are regular here. We have seen a string of attacks on police training and recruiting centres in Iraq and Afghanistan, among other countries, and we have also seen them before in Pakistan. On July 15, 2007, a suicide bomber attacked a police recruitment centre in Dera Ismail Khan – one of the 24 districts in the North West Frontier Province -- killing 26 people and wounding 35. The victims were at the centre to take medical and written tests for entering the police force.
A training academy like the one in Manawan makes available an unusually colossal concentration of shooting galleries. The more than 800 cadets at the centre were a far bigger bunch of police than is frequently found in the police stations scattered throughout the country. The training centre was also a far softer scapegoat than a traditional police station, where all the officers are armed. From media reports, it appears there were only seven armed guards on duty at the academy at the time of the dirty dozen’s attack. The instructors allegedly were armed only with lathis -- long canes commonly used by police in India and Pakistan. The academy’s adamant training schedule also signalled a highly predictable target, as the attackers knew the cadets would be on the parade field every day.
With so many potential targets on the parade field and in the barracks -- including the suicide attack on the capital’s FC Barrack on April 4 -- and with so many wolf-pack style attacks, it is amazing there were only eight people killed in this attack -- one-fourth the death toll of the April 2007 Virginia Tech shooting spree. This is an indication that the Manawan terror men were hardly nearly as well trained in marksmanship as their counterparts that carried out the November Mumbai massacre. The machinegun-totting Manawan men scarcely succeeded in killing one victim each in a situation akin to shooting fish in a barrel.
From an army angle, such a formation of massed people in the open would have been far more effectively targeted using mortars and crew-served machine guns, so it appears the attack was poorly planned and the wild bunch badly equipped to cause collateral damage. Even so, it is quite strange the attackers armed with assault rifles and grenades scarcely shot one victim apiece.
Of course, one thing that helped contain the carnage was the response of Pakistani security personnel and their efforts to evacuate the wounded under fire. While barely precisely practising what are known in America as “active shooter procedures”, the Elite Force men managed promptly to engage the gunmen and pin them down until more firepower could be brought to bear. The force also did a fairly efficient job of clearing the barracks of attackers, ensuring the event would hardly drag on like that in Mumbai. The force went in hard and hastily, and seemingly with little regard for the hostages being held, yet their decisive action proved to be very effective.
Perhaps the most prominent thing to watch going forward will be the response of the Pakistani public to these attacks. In his claim of responsibility, the Bannu-born Baitullah Mehsud said the attack was in direct response to the accelerating American Predator campaign in Pakistan. He then threatened there would be more of the same recipe in Pakistan and America if the drones dragged on. Clearly, the Taliban chief is feeling the heat from these attacks, and although he claims he is ready to be martyred, his bravado is belied by the fact that he is taking such strange steps to stop the drones. Apparently, his fears stem from the Predators, not only for what they can do to him but for what they can do to degrade his dwindling organisation.
Although the attack aimed to demoralise the security forces, it might just as well have boomeranged. The bravery and dedication displayed by the police and soldiers may instead serve to steel their will and pass on professional pride. Mehsud’s recent threats, with the attacks, may also work to alienate him from the very people who had been supportive of – or, at least, ambivalent towards -- him and the jihadists.
The nuke-state has simply lacked the will, for a host of reasons. It will be interesting to watch and see if Mehsud’s holy war serves to give the public, and the authorities, the will they need to finally take more serious steps to tackle it. The government continues to face serious challenges. But if the tide of public support begins to turn against the jihadists, those challenges will become far more manageable. But before that transpires, Pakistan will witness more bloodshed such as those in the past.
Cyrus G. Robati
c_robati@yahoo.co.uk
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