written by Jaroslaw Adamowski printable version send your friend

Friday, 10 April 2009

Back in 1709, Central Europe was at the heart of the then Ottoman Turkey’s foreign policy. The country had a border with Poland, Budapest was one of Empire’s major cities only ten years earlier, and Vienna, twenty years after Ottoman Turkey’s last attempt to conquer the jewel of Habsburg Austria’s crown, was still just by the border.  300 years later, Turkey’s been pushed back from Central Europe not only in terms of geopolitics, but also diplomacy. Once active and powerful, today it chooses not to participate in the political life of the region. What turned out to be Ankara’s only major initiative on the Central European scene in decades, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, withered in silence due to Turkish-Greek disputes. „The rest is silence” – a quotation from Shakespeare’s Hamlet seems very accurate.

Turkey’s diplomatic agenda was for a long time adapted to a pre-1989 Europe, divided between the Western and Soviet blocs. However, since 1989 the reality has changed and a dozen of independent countries, freed from Soviet influence,  emerged in Europe. In order to integrate with the West, they had to overcome their archaic social, political and economic structure – just like Turkey in the 1920’s and 30’s. Most of them joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, nevertheless, the region still isn’t getting any more attention from Turkey than before 1989, what hardly improves Turkey’s relations with Central European countries. The bottom line is that today, those countries – among them especially Poland, Slovenia and Hungary, respectively – are Turkey’s most fervent supporters in its struggle to join the EU, according to European Commision’s Eurobarometer  public opinion surveys. The suport for further EU’s enlargement averages 68% in 12 ‘new’ member states, while in the ‘old’ EU’s 15 member states only 43% of citizens are now pro-enlargement [1]. Now, is there a way for Turkey to profit from the endorsment of the first group of countries and make them convince the rest of the European Union in favor of Turkey’s bid? The first step in making Central Europe its ally in the EU would be assessing the region’s vital needs.

For Central European countries, no issue seems more urgent than energy security. Since Russia’s Gazprom began to use natural gas resources as a political weapon, what caused this year’s suspension of gas flow via Ukraine, the need for diversifying Central Europe’s sources of energy is more pressing than ever. What began as a dispute between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz over an alleged debt of the latter one, diminished or even halted gas supply to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and other Central European countries. Eventually, the crisis has ended after 3 weeks of negotiations, but the bad taste remained. Gazprom is no longer seen as a solid supplier by any country whatsoever, what helped convince the EU of a need to break Russia’s gas supply monopoly. Needless to say, the only way to accomplish it is to obtain a direct access to Central Asian – mainly Azerbaijan’s and Turkmenistan’s – and perhaps also Iranian natural gas resources via Nabucco – i.e. across Turkey’s territory. 

According to the Warsaw-based Center for Eastern Studies’ analysis[2], four Central European countries’ – Poland’s, Slovakia’s, Czech Republic’s and Hungary’s, respectively -  dependency on Gazprom’s supplies reached an overwhelming 79% of their overall gas imports in 2006. Ironically, Austria, the EU’s most Turkey-sceptic member, is also dependent on the Russian uncertain natural gas supplier in 70% of its expenditure, and as such it is also threatened by its politically-motivated gas cutoffs. One can assume that if the current trend does continue, and Gazprom’s reliability will continue to decline, the evolution of Europe’s stance towards the Russian gas exporter may also lead to a change in Austria’s approach to Turkey’s EU membership.

Recently-made members of the EU support Turkey’s European aspirations in their own interest, conscious that it would make Ankara more favourable of securing Central Europe’s energy needs as a result of the principle of Eurosolidarity. The formerly dismissed Czech government of Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek, too, wanted to advance negotiations with Turkey, using his country’s current Presidency of the Council of the European Union, but due to a vote of distrust its mission has ended earlier than anticipated. The next occasion when a Central European country will hold the presidency will occur in 2011, during which the first six months of the year will be presided by Hungary, and the other six – by Poland. This unprecedented situation constitutes a great opportunity for Turkey and may allow to significantly progress its membership talks with the EU.

Until then, Ankara should at least consider paying more attention to what’s happening in Central European capitals. In the search for an entrance to the European Union, there’s nothing to be ashamed of in knocking on different neighbours’ doors.

Jaroslaw Adamowski

ajaroslaw@gmail.com

Freelance journalist based in Warsaw, Poland