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Japan: A Black Spot in the Red Sun |
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written by
Cyrus G. Robati |
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Japanese, torn between post-modernity and deep-rooted tradition, are traditionally one of the biggest backers of the global non-proliferation regime, persistently promising to negate nuclear weapons. That could change, nevertheless.
With the evolving events in Northeast Asia, particularly Pyongyang’s push-button war-games and Beijing’s bold military modernisation, have fuelled fresh questions about Tokyo’s touchiness to conceivable challengers and, therefore, a taste for fashioning an independent nuclear deterrent.
The former forbidden thing within the isle’s political community of even contemplating a nuclear weapons capability looks like to have been broken, since several officials and opinion leaders have harped on an open talk on the taboo topic. Despite these factors, a crushing consensus -- both in Japan and amidst Japanese watchers – seems to show that they will never ever engage in the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term.
But the prospects for pursuing a nuclear weapons capability – even if Tokyo ever thinks of one under the existing technical infrastructure of her huge civilian nuclear energy programme, she would have to tackle to transform her present programme into a military programme. Presently, she seems to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence programme to protect and conceal assets, and sites for testing.
Apart from that, a range of legal and political restraints on the isle’s development of nuclear weapons, including ill-disposed public and elite opinion, hampering home laws and practices, and the negative diplomatic consequences of calling off her traditional approach is analysed. Any reconsideration or shift of her policy of nuclear non-participation would have immense implications for American policy in East Asia.
Globally, with walking out on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Tokyo would warp the world’s most long-lasting non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Tokyo “going nuclear” could cause an arms race with Beijing, Seoul and Taipei. New Delhi and Islamabad, or any one of them, may then feel forced to further magnify or modernise their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Bilaterally, assuming that Tokyo took the decision without Washington’s warrant, the step should show a lack of trust in the latter’s commitment to care for the former. A weathering in the Washington-Tokyo coalition could cause detriment to the geopolitical balance in East Asia -- a shift that should bolster Beijing’s stance as a surging hegemonic power. All of these ramifications would likely be deeply destabilising for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.
Ironically, the cash crunch has tickled Tokyo too since she is good at producing things like cars, computers and cameras that other countries care to buy, or rather wanted to buy. Exports are ebbing at a staggering 47 percent on last year, which is devastating for her cash counting on them. Moscow is no exception either. But what is Moscow hunting for after agreeing to cement the civilian nuclear covenant with Tokyo in May?
Russia’s step should scarcely spring a surprise. First, Russia is decidedly dependent on her energy sector surge to square with that of her overall economy. After the 1998 crisis, Russia has somewhat resurged owing on the whole to the early positive development in the oil and gas prices. At present, Russia is eyeing to expand her nuclear energy sector, too, and establish herself as an energy mogul.
She sees the energy sector as one of the industrial sectors that hold a strategic importance and a central role in the re-ascendance to great power status. It is doubtful whether this will eventually turn out as the Russians relish for it. Dependence on natural resources exports is unlikely to ram Russia amidst the richest in the world. And this is a highly-probable possibility realising Russia holds horribly restricted refining and processing capability.
Unless Russia opens her energy sector to significant foreign investment -- currently she scarcely allow any such an investment in the sector she sees having strategic importance for national security -- she is pretty much doomed to be dependent on natural resources exports. Investment is indispensable for her further development of the sector and her overall economic growth. As a consequence, her interests in inviting Japanese credits and investments are relatively rational -- specifically since Japan is perceived as less a threat than potential European or American weapons of mass investment.
Russian eager to exploit oil and gas reserves in Siberia is highly paramount particularly since over the past four-to-five years her oil and gas production has stood still -- a true trail of troubles ahead, especially with the expansion of home consumption. Investment in increasing production capacity has slightly speeded in the past months, but the cash comes mostly from home investors and they are limited both in number and resources. This is why Japanese funds in the energy sector are more than welcomed. But investors are increasingly concerned with the Russian state’s surging role in the sector, as well as with the substantial spread of corruption continue to be impeding investment flows.
Secondly, the search for nuclear material is momentous for Moscow’s own national security. Russia remains unconvinced about the American aims in central Europe and her former Soviet states. That is why Moscow may attempt to accelerate her nuclear arsenal as a manner to make up for her susceptibility. Former defence minister Sergei Ivanov has revealed Russia is switching tactics regarding the priorities in military rebuilding towards hi-tech weapons and military equipment.
The nuclear honeymoon, stretching since the late 1990s, should set up a more deep-seated strategic partnership in the future, turning it into a titanic nuclear sector worldwide. Yet the danger is still clear and imminent igniting fears that the hot content could end up in an unstoppable race – or at the worst – a nuclear soup sucking the entire Asia Pacific.
c_robati@yahoo.co.uk
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Saturday, 4 April 2009
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The Analysis of the European Parliament’s Recent Draft Resolution on Turkey
