The decision to close the military air base in Manas has serious repercussions for the US. The base, set up in 2001, has played an important role in the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan. The US also had agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to receive logistic support for its operations in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Uzbekistani Karshi-Khanabad base was a strategic asset for the US, as it allowed the American troops ready access to the Afghan border. However, following the Andijan uprising in 2005, relations between Washington and Tashkent deteriorated to a point of no return and resulted in the US forces being driven out of the base. Since then, Manas has been the only U.S. base in Central Asia.

Most experts believed that the US supported the Tulip Revolution that led Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power in 2005. However, it was soon understood that this view did not reflect the complex web of relations. Bakiyev gradually turned the country’s face to Russia and began to follow a pro-Russian foreign policy. Indeed, not long after the March revolution, Bakiyev signed the final declaration at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in July which included an article requiring all SCO member countries to close their US military bases. Bakiyev expressed his dissatisfaction with the terms of renting the Manas air base, and demanded a hundred-fold increase in rent from $2 million to $200 million in 2006. After negotiations the US agreed to pay over $150 million per year.

The United States has also experienced serious problems in public relations with Kyrgyz nationals, as well as in the Greater Middle East in general. Increasing the gravity of the situation was a situation in which US forces killed a Kyrgyz truck driver in December 2006. The incident gave rise to anti-American sentiments within the Kyrgyz society. The pro-Russian tendency of the Kyrgyz media of course did not help as it adversely influenced public perceptions of the American-run politics in the Middle East, hence the vox populi became rather anti-American.

Bakiev had actually long been searching for the right time to close the Manas base due to domestic tension, as well as pressure from Russia, and the SCO. Bakiev used the closure decision as a tool to bargain with Moscow. Therefore, his announcement came during a working visit to Moscow on February the 3^rd when he secured the promise of a Russian package including a $2 billion credit and $150 million in financial aid.

Washington would like to maintain its connections with Kyrgyzstan and is carrying out last minute negotiations in an attempt to convince the Kyrgyz government to overturn its decision or at least allow the US limited use of the base.

While trying to persuade Kyrgyz authorities to reverse their decision, the US also sent two senior diplomats to Moscow. Henceforth, the Russian leadership appears to have tried to distance itself from the whole affair and insisted that the decision was entirely an internal Kyrgyz matter.

The significance of the Manas closure for the US may be set against Washington’s decision to withdraw its forces from Iraq and re-route them to Afghanistan.  The US currently has 32,000 troops in Afghanistan while 30,000 more are planned to join them within a year. Closure of the Manas base complicates the transfer of troops, and as a result the US is looking for ways to prevent its Afghan plans from falling into oblivion.

At this point in time, some experts are suggesting that the US may start talking to the Uzbeks again even though relations between the two countries were frozen for a period of time. The chance of that happening appears to be slim, as there are yet open doors to be tested. Other alternatives for the US are Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. With regards to Turkmenistan, Washington needs to realize that the country is still officially proclaiming ‘neutrality', a condition which would make it almost impossible for the Turkmen leadership to let any country open a military base on its land. Herein, to some observers, Tajikistan seems a better alternative since its relations with Russia have recently gotten worse due to water and energy issues. As a matter of fact, with the pressing economic problems facing the country, Tajikistan has been giving positive signals to the US, thus making it a viable option for and asset to the US. There are also other options, albeit partial solution to the problem, for logistical support for the US operations in Afghanistan apart from opening a new military base in the region. All regional leaders agreed to provide their airspace for the transportation of non-military NATO supplies to Afghanistan.

The US has not yet recovered from the initial shock. The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s decision to set up a rapid reaction force showed that Russia would further its strategic maneuvering in the region. At a CSTO meeting in Moscow on February 4, member states agreed to form a joint military force against new threats. The 15,000 strong collective forces are intended to be stationed in Russia permanently. There are serious concerns that member countries which are mostly run by authoritarian regimes may use these forces to crack down on opposition movements and thus maintain the security of the authoritarian regimes.

As some analysts suggest, considering the CSTO to be a new Warsaw Pact in opposition to NATO would be an exaggeration. In the post-Soviet era, Russia’s goal to form a military organization covering mainly ex-Soviet lands has yet to produce a significant outcome. Despite becoming a permanent organization in 2002, with the participation of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the CSTO remained an elusive treaty until 2006, when Uzbekistan agreed to join, and the organization decided to hold some common military exercises. The limitations of the organization have also been revealed by the turn of recent events, as Russia did not receive the support it had expected from the CSTO member countries during the Georgia crisis. Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and worked hard diplomatically to ensure similar decisions from member states. All that, though, has turned out to be in vain, as Russia failed to generate any significant positive result. Moreover, giving the current regional balance of power in the region, it seems quite difficult for the organization to turn into a new Warsaw Pact.

The recent decisions to close the Manas air base and to form a rapid reaction force within the CSTO are sufficient testaments to Russia’s relative hegemony over the other states in the region. At this time, Russia’s short-term goal may construed as undermining the US’ influence in the region and reminding other countries of Moscow determination to retain its sphere of regional influence. Both decisions may also be interpreted as a warning to the US in view of Washington’s alleged aggressive policy which has begun to materialize around the issues of the US missile shield in Poland, and Georgia and Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

E-mail: turgutdem@yahoo.co.uk

Assistant Prof. Dr. M. Turgut Demirtepe is an expert on Central Asia at the Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO)/(USAK) and lecturer at Aksaray University.