The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) leader Milorad Dodik, Party of Democratic Action (SDA) leader Sulejman Tihic, and Croatian Democratic Community leader Dragan Covic said in a joint declaration that they reached an agreement on the basic principles of the new constitutional regulations.[2] The agreement is about the most controversial issues -division of state property, status of Brcko district, constitutional changes and taking a census- demanded by the EU to be solved urgently for the sake of country’s EU membership.[3] Although it is cited as an agreement, it is uncertain that on what three leaders agree. But one thing is certain: There will be four territorial and administrative units in the country, contrary to the Dayton Accords, which had three. This decision draws wide criticism from many groups, especially Bosniacs, on the ground that this decentralization will lead to the separation of the country. The ambiguity of the agreement is also criticized strongly by the opposition parties.  

This agreement is not the first step of reform process in the country. In fact, the starting point is the constitutional reforms of 2005 which failed in the Parliament in 2006 spring. These reforms named as ‘April Package’, which were pledged by the three parties of BiH in the 10th Anniversary of Dayton Peace Agreement. Three leaders explained that they decided on a series of reforms to strengthen the authority of the central government and to resolve the problematic issues of the country. Negotiations about these reforms continued whole year and by spring 2006, a consensus was reached on few points like reduction of the power of tripartite presidency, creation of two new ministries –agriculture and technology- at state level, increase of decision-making power of the Council of Ministers, increase of members of House of Representatives. The ‘April Package’ failed in the House of Representatives because the required 2/3 majority could not be secured. This situation caused the use of nationalist rhetoric in the election campaigns for October elections of the same year.[4] The dangerous increase of ethnic expressions worried the EU leaders and representatives in the country. Since 2006, the EU has frequently warn the party leaders of BiH about nationalist rhetoric,[5] deadlocked decision making process, inefficient and complex administrative structure, and cumbersome constitution. The EU has stated each time that with such a dysfunctional state BiH cannot make much progress on the EU path, so constitutional reforms are vital both for its integration to the EU and for closure of Office of High Representatives - OHR. The 2008 Progress Report published on 5 November[6] criticized the political situation in BiH and the leaders of the country because of the little progress about reforms. Constitution, parliament, government and public administration were mentioned under the title of ‘Political Criteria’ in this report. The Constitution of the country was criticized as it “establishes a complex institutional architecture” and “prevents swift decision-making and hinders reform”. The Parliament was criticized because of its legislative work “affected by the intransigent and ethnically oriented position of the country’s political leaders”. Limited progress on the most problematic issues was the main criticism of the report. Only three days after the Brussels’ warnings on 5 November[7] about rising nationalism and problematic political situation, the three party leaders of BiH compromised on the framework of future constitutional reforms. On 8 November, they agreed to put reforms at the top of the agenda, especially to make amendments in the constitution and hold a census in 2011[8]. This agreement signed in Odzak town and called Prud or Odzak Agreement[9] was welcomed by the EU leaders, and considered as a “positive signal”[10] and “a step in the right direction”[11]. However, EU politicians strongly emphasized that this framework agreement must be implemented by further concrete steps.[12] This ‘concrete step’ was eventuated by the agreement signed on 26 January. Actually, the main and maybe the only driving force for this compromise to make constitutional reforms is that it is sine qua non condition for the EU for both the progress of BiH in its EU bid and the closure of the OHR and its transformation to the EU Special Representative (EUSR). It does not seem that there is a decrease in the national rhetoric as hoped by the EU, on the contrary, there is too much nationalist criticism after this agreement was announced, and high tension increases in the country. As mentioned before, the ambiguity over the agreement and the new division of the administrative units caused discussions among Bosniac, Croat and Serb politicians of the country. Moreover, the contradictory statements of three leaders after the agreement leave a question mark over minds. While SDA leader Tihic said that the division of four new units will be based on geographical, historical and economic criteria, SNSD leader Dodik talked about the ethnic division and the continuation of Republika Srpska. The reactions against three leaders continue to create tense atmosphere in BiH. In addition, on 23 January, Miroslav Lajcak, EU Special Representative and High Representative to BiH, declared that he would quit his job in BiH because he will be the new Foreign Minister of Slovakia. Then, he said on a TV show that he does “not want to be the rider on the dead horse” referring the “instruments which the international community was using in the country.”[13] Both his explanations about the current situation and coming departure cause new debates.  

The agreement reached on 26 January created optimism early on. However, feel-good factor disappears rapidly, and now there is again ethnic and political polarization in the country. Thus, the approval of this agreement seems a remote possibility because these three parties do not have required majority in the Parliament.  

It is obvious and a long-standing general opinion that the Constitution of BiH based on the Dayton Peace Agreement is dysfunctional and inefficient, and it causes political deadlock in the country. The current governmental setup of the BiH prevents the legislation process. Although it is essential to make a series of reforms, it is doubtful that the compromise reached on 26 January is really a compromise on problematic issues. This step does not sound sincere; rather it seems as if it is a show to hoodwink the EU. On the other hand, even the three leaders do not know on what they agree. All of them have different perception about the agreement and, their contradictory explanations after the meeting[14] and uncertainty of details mark that actual issues still remain knotty. Above all, it is not surprising that the EU who always wants member states which have strong central governments repeats this expectation also for BiH in many instances but this decentralization agreement of 26 January causes the exact opposite situation in the country. It is really interesting that the EU hopes the ethnic motives of the leaders of BiH won’t be obstacles for the implementation of such an agreement. Decentralization may be the best solution for the country but how does the EU expect that an ethnically divided country governed by the principles of decentralization to “speak with one voice?”[15] Responses after this agreement on constitutional amendments prove once more that changing a cumbersome constitution is nothing when comparing to touch the heart of people who share a history, which is full of hostile and bloody memoirs.