Barack Obama was against the Iraq War from the beginning and made statements emphasizing this position during the 2008 presidential election campaigns. One of his pledges for foreign policy was withdrawal from Iraq in 16 months. Since his election, the economy has dominated the agenda and subordinated the Iraq issue. Yet eventually the Iraq case will be on his desk, and Barack Obama as the Commander in Chief is expected to decide the future of the US troops in the region. However, whether he will fulfill this promise remains in question. In this study, we will examine the diverse aspects of the issue.
Historical Practices and Signals for Future
The historical record indicates that foreign policy preferences in such cases are formed according to the issue’s own dynamics with the president’s personal preferences, not public opinion. Richard Nixon, following the notorious Johnson administration during the Vietnam War, did not withdraw from Vietnam immediately. The US public’s strong opposition to the troops’ presence in Vietnam did not change his decision. Nixon wanted to end the war, but waited for a more appropriate withdrawal that would not hurt the US’ reputation. He first attempted to win the war and then tried to withdraw in a more honorable way. Recently, in Iraq, the number of casualties has substantially declined. According to John Mueller, regarding the public opinion on troops on a foreign mission, “If they are not killed, it scarcely matters whether the troops are in Macedonia or in Kansas.”[i] These parameters may be applied to the Iraq issue. The major decline in insurgencies after 2006 encourages an attempt to withdraw as a success, and an immediate withdrawal may be portrayed as a failure. Therefore, Obama will probably seek a smooth withdrawal with a successful image or at least without the image of failure.
The choice of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense is an important signal. Not only is this a message to the republicans for a bipartisan team, it signals the choice of a smooth withdrawal instead of an immediate one. Obama is not reiterating a withdrawal in 16 months lately, and Robert Gates stated his reservations about announcing a timetable for withdrawal, so the timetable may be more flexible. This appointment is a wise choice which will probably prevent tensions between the military officers and the president. There is potential tension between the military establishment, with its more conservative tendencies in the US, and liberal presidents that have different perspectives on military issues. Despite Bill Clinton’s moderate position, there was much tension between the military and the White House, and Les Aspin as the Secretary of Defense could not resolve the matter.[ii] On the other hand, Robert Gates has the potential to prevent or buffer such tensions.
The Dynamics of Iraq
US officials are hopeful for a successful withdrawal. They are amazed by the elections despite the lower voter turnout in some regions. Actually, the primary objective of the US officials for the elections was not the results or the turnout, but the security of the election and a working process. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq have been working since 2005 to construct such capable local administrations to deal with security, management, and economy issues. On the other side, the vast majority of Iraqi people want the withdrawal of the US forces from the country. Yet, as a guarantee they want a limited number of US troops to stay in order to intervene in a possible conflict.
The 31 January elections are a sign that the Iraqi officials can at least manage the process without direct US military or political intervention. Primarily, the Iraqi security forces were able to provide security of a major event, such as an election. The Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police are both trained by the US. The Iraq elections were an important test for the Iraqi security forces and with a quite secure atmosphere they seem to have passed. On the other hand, there are some problems with the Iraqi Army and the local Iraqi Police, based on the sectarian differences and federal structure. With different groups in power in the federal administration and local administration, the tension rises, even reaching the point of confrontation.
The US soldiers themselves are actually not so enthusiastic about a withdrawal, contrary to popular belief. It seems a certain number of troops will remain in Iraq even after the withdrawal, and others will be transferred to Afghanistan. Besides, there is a rotation system that is free from withdrawal. Some soldiers are returning without a decision of withdrawal. Therefore, the soldiers individually may be the ones that returning to home before a major withdrawal or they may be the ones that stay in Iraq after the withdrawal. Secondly, as we mentioned above, US soldiers are often more conservative and in line with the Republican party, and are therefore more inclined to agree with the party’s policy to remain in Iraq.
The US troops in Iraq serve certain purposes. There are certain goods and services needed for the existence of the military in Iraq, and therefore many companies make money from the troops’ presence in Iraq who will probably not be happy with the idea of withdrawal and will lobby for staying in Iraq. There are also some concerns about the US economy. Some analysts believe that the existence of troops in Iraq is not a burden for the US economy but stimulates it with new jobs and the increased consumption in the region. Lastly, it is necessary to include the probability of a shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, which may obviate these concerns.
In conclusion, the general practices and the dynamics of the issue propose that the US will probably remain in Iraq, at least with residual forces. The dynamics in Iraq indicate that, except for a limited number of troops, the US may withdraw or shift its forces from Iraq in an honorable way. Nevertheless, the time for this withdrawal is uncertain. The experiences and signals indicate that the timetable may be more flexible than the 16-month period.
Mehmet Yegin
(JTW)
yegin.m@gmail.com
[i] Mueller John (2002). American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in a New Era. In Norrander, B & Wilcox, C. (Eds). Understanding Public Opinion. (pp. 149-173). CQ Press: Washington DC
[ii] Herspring, Dale R. (2005). The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush. Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
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