An interview with Dr. Arzu Celalifer-Ekinci on the recent developments in the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Q. Can you explain the recent developments in the Iranian nuclear crisis regarding the IAEA's "swap" proposal and its Vienna resolution?

There are some alarming issues that persist because the 5+1, and especially the Western countries, are arguing and discussing the new, harder sanctions regarding Iran. But we are better to remember that for the first time ever, on 1 October 2009, there was a light of hope for the Iranian nuclear crisis. A solution was submitted by the IAEA and the Iranian government was warm to that opinion. It accepted the swap model, in which Iran would transfer its low enriched uranium and receive the nuclear fuel in return.

But after a while, one month, we saw that the Iranian government was challenged in Iran. The challenge arose not because of an idea of a solution to the nuclear crisis, but it was something that the reformist wing used to challenge the government. Reformists did not want the Ahmadinejad government to gain anything regarding the relations with the West or solutions to the nuclear crisis that could strengthen its hand in the internal policies. This was why they challenged the proposal, arguing that it would be a betrayal to the national interests of Iran - how could the government do this, throw away the many years' success of Iranian scientists. How could the government endanger Iranian nuclear activities when they were not sure that the Western countries would deliver the nuclear fuel in return? These were the arguments of the reformist wing, but actually it was not that they were opposed to the IAEA's proposal, of course they wanted a solution to the nuclear crisis, but this was something they wanted to use to challenge the Ahmadinejad government. Many conservatives are also opposed to the proposal because they do not trust the West and see the plan as a trap.

Later on the IAEA resolution came up and the timing was so good because it was at the time when Turkey and Iran were negotiating the proposal by El Baradei (the former director of the IAEA) that if Iran doesn't trust Russia or France, maybe Turkey could be the center for the swap. Since Iran and Turkey have good relations at the moment, maybe Iran would be more comfortable with Turkey. Turkey accepted the idea, and Turkey and Iran began to negotiate. We knew that the officials were not so supportive of this deal and the inclusion of Turkey. They didn't oppose it but they weren't so in favor of the idea.

The timing of the IAEA's Vienna resolution was not good due to the fact that the negotiations were ongoing, and this resolution just heated the crisis. The Iranian government then declared its decision to build 10 more centrifuges. Fortunately, Iran later proposed another idea that perhaps the swaps could be made in parts instead of all at once. This was in response to the critics of the original swap plan, who argued that the West would not give Iran nuclear fuel in return for handing over its enriched uranium. When there are no guarantees, how could Iran be expected to hand over all of its uranium? This was Iran's proposal in response to the IAEA's proposal: we can do it in parts through Turkey, Japan, Brazil, and Kish Island off of Iran (a free trade zone). Iran stated that it would wait until the end of January for a response. Otherwise, it would pursue its own activities.

Q. Regarding the Iranian government's deadline for the West, do you think that is a mockery of the West always giving Iran deadlines?

Yes, exactly. This is a vicious circle, like a football game. The players are passing the ball back and forth. Now Iran has passed the ball to the West. We will see what happens next. I am not sure that a decision can be made by the Security Council before the end of the month because China, one of the Security Council members with veto power, made a declaration last week saying that diplomatic relations are still open and this is not a time for harder sanctions. But maybe they can make a symbolic decision, give notice.

Q. Does the reformists' side have much room to negotiate their position regarding the nuclear crisis? If the government or the more conservative parties in Iran see them as being in line with Western policies, would they then be accused of being pawns of the US or the EU?

Actually still they are drawing criticism but not regarding the nuclear crisis. I'm sure they are not in favor of the West's course of action and they are in favor of Iran's peaceful nuclear program. It was surprising that there was opposition to an idea that could put an end to the long-lasting crisis. But they just wanted to challenge the Ahmadinejad government and to prevent his government from taking credit for solving the problem or establishing good relations with the West. This is not something that they are opposing.

Q. Do you think they will agree to Iran's proposal to do it in parts?

Well it sounds like a fair idea, and the IAEA is in favor of this. But there are two different ideas in the West. One side says, "No we will not permit Iran to pursue its activities and Iran first needs to establish transparency and give guarantees." The other side says, "We should give something in return for asking for guarantees from Iran."

Russia and China have had good trade relations with Iran during recent years, and the other members of the Security Council have for years had to convince Russia and China to agree to the resolutions by removing provisions that would harm their trade relations, etc. When we look at the UN Security Council resolutions, we see that some restrictions were placed on arms and nuclear technology that could lead to the nuclear weapons program, but these bans did not prevent Iran from further developing its program. At the beginning of the nuclear crisis Iran had 164 centrifuges, but today it has more than 6000. So we see that the sanctions actually do not work as they are intended to. The other point is that the military threat, mostly from Israeli officials, also has repercussions. Russia, China, the whole world is aware of that. Nobody is in favor of another war gate in the Middle East, especially after the Iraq disaster.

We know that Obama is much more in favor of dialogue and a policy of engagement with Iran, but he has his own dilemmas and restrictions now. The Iranian issue is a headache for him at the moment because the neocons and some Iranian dissidents are challenging him and trying to force him to take some coercive measures regarding Iran, to say something regarding the things going on in Iran. But I think that his wait and see policy, trying not to interfere in Iranian internal affairs and trying to establish his own policy, is really hard for him.

I'm not sure what the next step for the Obama Administration will be, because Iranian-American relations since the Islamic Revolution have been based on enmity. The ultraconservatives in both countries feed their policies regarding each other with slogans and negative propaganda, and good relations with each other doesn't serve those wings' aims. So this is a difficult situation. And now, when we take into consideration the uprisings in Iran, we see that many people are asking Obama to take some steps, make some explanations regarding the human rights violations. But although the US has made some statements, they have tried to be so diplomatic so as not to serve the ultraconservatives' aims in Iran, because they are waiting for this to say, "See, the US is feeding the uprisings in Iran." The ultraconservatives are waiting for some steps from the US because this will strengthen their argument of foreign intervention in Iran and provide them the grounds to be tougher about the things going on. I think Obama is pursuing the right policy at the moment. He is careful not to give any advantage to the ultraconservatives in Iran and allows Iran to solve its own problems. Taking the wrong steps could reverse the things going on in Iran now.

Q. Do you think Turkey will continue its mediation efforts in the nuclear crisis?

Turkey, in light of its new foreign policy, is more active than before, especially in the issues happening in the Middle East. In regards to the Iranian nuclear crisis, Turkey has mentioned at every opportunity that it is ready to do anything that the sides ask or expect from it.

I think that Turkey will play a conciliatory role better than a mediating role, though, because the Iranian nuclear crisis is bigger than something Turkey can mediate. But Turkey can be conciliatory in this and can be a good ground for the sides to come together at the same negotiating table, if Turkey can convince them to do this. Turkey can also transmit messages from one side to another because Turkey, as a Western ally and as a country that has good relations with Iran, can understand both sides and can transmit the messages in a way so that both sides can understand it. I think that Turkey can do this job well, and if the swap proposal is one day realized, Turkey can be a destination for this, and Turkey is ready to do this. But, as I always say, Turkey can only play its conciliation role, mediation role, to the limit that the sides allow. No more than this. The issue is bigger than just the Iranian nuclear crisis, there are many factors involved, and the main problem is the friction between the US and Iran. Planned dialogue is the first step for this, and I think that Turkey here can just be conciliatory.

Q. If the Iranian opposition does end up in power, do you think there would be any resentment towards Turkey for having continued a relationship with the Ahmadinejad government?

No, I don't think so. Because if we are talking about Mousavi, Khatami, or the other opposition leaders, if one day they come to power they will have the same good relations with Turkey. They were leaders at one time, and they also had good relations with Turkey. They also know that Turkish-Iranian relations are important for Iran and serve the national interests of both sides. It is a fact that Turkey is a neighbor and cannot intervene in the internal affairs of Iran just as Iran cannot intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey. Turkey has many problems today, and Iran cannot, and does not want to be, a part of this.

Interview by Kaitlin MacKenzie