Wednesday, 7 January 2009
By Mostafa Zein
Following its war in Lebanon, Israel intensified its military trainings, upgraded its army's weapons, changed its commanders, and chose war-savvy Ehud Barak as minister of defense. It applied the lessons it learnt in July 2006. Its soldiers rushed to commit the ugliest of war crimes. Their commanders stayed away from the media. The event is covered under tight censorship. But Israel failed to learn the most important lesson: Just like Hezbollah, Hamas is not a group of gunmen it can kill in a blitz prior to dictating its own terms. Hamas is a popular movement that was forged over tens of years by wars, defeats, and carnages - let alone Arab and international policies that perceived the Palestinians as mere passers-by in the Jewish Land, tools to achieve their own political goals.
The New Yorker published extracts of the interview Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had early last month with Yedioth Ahronoth. In it, Olmert summarized the lessons he learnt from the war on Lebanon, his vision for Israel's future as well as the talks with Syria and the Palestinians.
He said, "The Lebanon war will go down in history as the first war in which the military leadership understood that classic warfare has become obsolete. Only narrow-minded Bogie Yaalon could believe that had we entered Lebanon with the entire army things would have ended differently… But the true lesson is that in contemporary wars the home front is the front, the home front is engaged in battle."
He continued, "But this was the only war that ended with a political resolution. Since then there hasn't been a single shot fired in that area. If we knew how to create such an arrangement in the south today [i.e., in Gaza], our fighting forces would certainly support it."
So this is what Israel is seeking through the Gaza slaughter: an agreement that would stop Hamas rockets, as well as arrangements that would ensure international protection, such as the one offered by the international forces in South Lebanon. For the first time since 1948, the rockets have turned the settlements and the cities into a front - after Israel was reassured that its citizens were safe in the face of an enemy that lacks the means to move the battle inside Israel. Israel will try to secure such arrangements with the help of its friends and the support of the United States. The latter gave it the go-ahead, offering it financial and moral support to commit its carnages in Lebanon and Gaza.
This is Israel's declared objective. Most important, however, are this war's repercussions on the Palestinian and Arab internal scene. On the Palestinian level, the conflict will intensify further between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. The movement that controls the rockets and the decision to stop them will become more stringent. It will impose difficult power-sharing terms. Described as a "terrorist" movement, it will run across an American and Israeli veto. President Abbas and the supportive factions will be entrusted with handling the situation. In other words, the Palestinian president will find himself in a position similar to that of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in his confrontation with Hezbollah. The hope is that all parties will avoid a civil war that was only postponed by Israel's latest foolishness.
On the Arab level, the conflict will be aggravated further between the moderate and defiant camps. A wider gap will separate them from their people. Of the numerous signs appear the failure to hold an urgent summit, the demonstrations staged in many cities and capitals around the world, and the authorities' readiness to face "emergencies." This may perhaps stand out as Israel's most important achievement. The Jewish state will continue to build settlements, annex lands and Judaize Jerusalem over the corpses of Palestinians. To reinforce its achievements, Israel will rely on inter-Arab conflicts in the face of Hamas rockets, Hezbollah and all advocates of the Palestinian cause.
|
Wednesday, 7 January 2009
Al-Hayat
|
|
