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Aras: ÔÇIIsrael likely to lose Turkey if Armenian resolution passes’ |
22 October 2007[MONDAY TALK]
ÔÇÝIsrael likely to lose Turkey if Armenian resolution passes'
Expert on Turkish foreign policy B+-lent Aras said Israel might be further isolated in the Middle East if abandoned by Turkey following a possible passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress.
"Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria and Iran, but Turkey hasn't been on Israel's side on that. Still, Israel doesn't have a problem with being isolated. The Israeli state builds walls around itself," said Aras, who currently teaches at Işık University in İstanbul.
With Turkish Parliament granting permission last week to the government to send the military into northern Iraq to crush the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Turkish foreign policy debate has grown heated, and foreign policy questions like Turkey's response to PKK terrorism and its relation to the Armenian genocide resolution have come to the table again.
"The situation in northern Iraq has already been an area of friction, and a new crisis such as the genocide resolution hasn't been helpful. Turkish people don't believe that the United States supports Turkey in Iraq, plus the United States confronts Turkey regarding the Armenian resolution," Aras said.
For Monday Talk, he explained how these different areas of concern, although not linked at first glance, are actually interconnected.
Should we expect an incursion into northern Iraq any time soon?
The authorization of Parliament means that the government is politically ready for an incursion and the legal ground has been established. However, there is still need for the operation decision by the political leadership and preparations on the military side. When considering an operation, there are other factors such as weather conditions, the readiness and the number of troops, etc., [to take into consideration]. There are also different types of cross-border operations. It may involve only air strikes or ground forces or both. Depending on how it's going to be conducted, it will lead to different results. In addition, there is a picture of Turkey as a threatening country and the opposite view at the same time.
What kind of contradictions do you mean?
When you look at Turkey from Iraq, you see two different images. One is Turkey getting ready for an incursion, ready to confront with Iraqi forces or even American forces in the region. The other is the Turkey that is providing 70 percent of the logistical support for American troops in Iraq, supporting the building up of Iraq in regards to the many construction projects going on, and a Turkey in relationships with many different ethnic groups in Iraq, trying to help their inclusion in the political system. For example, a Sunni leader, Tareq al-Hashemi, has become Iraqi vice president with the help of Turkey. He has been integrated into the system even though he had a potential to become a powerful resistance figure. Turkey also helped a lot in the writing of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005. Turkey also brought together the neighboring countries to prevent any destabilizing factors.
Which image of Turkey do you think is going to prevail?
Maybe we'll see that in the next period, especially after the authorization of Parliament for an incursion.
How would the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress play into all that?
We see that Turkish foreign and domestic policies have been interacting greatly in recent years. Foreign policy issues have been discussed as domestic policy matters. And foreign policy has been hostage to domestic policy matters. There has been almost no distinction between foreign and domestic policy. And Turkey shows a weakness of relating some domestic policy issues to foreign policy matters, like we relate the Kirkuk problem to the PKK problem, and northern Iraq with the Armenian resolution problem in the US. This attitude weakens Turkey's arguments in the foreign policy arena.
So do you think Turkey is overemphasizing the problems related to the Armenian genocide resolution in the US?
It's the first time that such a resolution has approached being passed. That's an important factor for Turkey that gives the issue more emphasis. Another factor is the present tension in US-Turkish relations. I think the basis of Turkish-American relations, which had been a strategic partnership since the years of the Cold War, has to be changed according to the new challenges in the region and the world. In this process of establishing a new base, we'll have some ups and downs in relations. The situation in northern Iraq has already been an area of friction, and a new crisis, such as the genocide resolution, hasn't been helpful. Turkish people don't believe that the United States supports Turkey in Iraq, plus the United States is confronting Turkey with regards the Armenian resolution.
Is Turkey's reaction to be expected then?
It's to be expected but the reaction has been doubled since other problems in relations wait to be resolved.
Do you expect the resolution to pass?
Although there are some setbacks in the House, there is still a high probability that it may pass.
Did the US-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL) support for the resolution help it?
Two diaspora have collaborated.
Is the ADL's support related to the policies of Israel?
There is a perception of such in Turkey, but I don't agree with it. Israel's official policy is not to support the passage of the resolution. Plus the Jewish diaspora can act independently of Israel.
In that specific case, do you think the Jewish diaspora has been acting independently of Israel?
The perception is that Turkey has been punished by the resolution because of its policies regarding Israel. I don't have facts to support relations between the ADL's actions and Israel's policies in that case, but we have to evaluate them separately. There are different types of Jewish diaspora in the US including the ones supporting Turkey.
But the ADL is an important one.
The ADL did not support Turkey in that case.
Right or wrong, since there is a perception by the Turks that Israel might be behind the ADL's support for the resolution, how do you think Turkish-Israeli relations would be influenced if the resolution passes in the US Congress?
In the 1990s, when Turkish-Israel relations were being fostered, the idea behind their relations was that the Jewish lobby would support Turkey in the US. Plus the Jewish lobby's help was seen as important in arming the Turkish military. Apparently, the lobby doesn't side with Turkey on the resolution issue, which is a most emotional one for Turkey. So the reason behind their relations has been disappearing. The relations have been questioned already.
Do you expect a breaking up?
The level of the relations has still been balanced. Turkey has been in a position to constructively criticize Israel's policies. And a lot of Turkey's criticisms of Israel have been heard there. At the end the two countries neither break up nor come closer.
Could Israel be further isolated in the region?
Israel has already been isolated in the region. Israel forms tactical, diplomatic relations in the region not based on peace. It's been trying to develop relations with non-Arab Muslim states to break its isolation. Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria and Iran, but Turkey hasn't been on Israel's side on that. Still, Israel doesn't have a problem with being isolated. The Israeli state builds walls around itself.
And Turkey has been following a ÔÇÝzero problems with neighbors' policy. Would it be able to follow that policy with an incursion into northern Iraq?
The idea behind the no problems with neighbors policy is to have a European-like approach toward countries around Turkey so you can continue with the democratic reform process and concentrate on increasing standards of living. If your agenda is dominated by security concerns and ethnic nationalism, you cannot deal with concerns related to democracy. If you've watched the discussions in Parliament during the meeting for the authorization of an incursion into northern Iraq, you'd have seen that parliamentarians have become either doves or hawks, and the debate had nothing to do with the country's problems. Plus, the Turkish military presence in the Middle East has always been problematic.
You mean the Middle Eastern states don't like to see Turkish troops in their territory?
Even Turkey's peace corps in Lebanon hasn't been well received by some Lebanese groups. Since the Middle Eastern region was dominated by the Ottoman Empire, there is a historical reason they don't want to see the Turkish military in the region. Now Turkey has a respected civilian and economic presence in the region. You can see Turkish products all around. You can shop using Turkish lira in Syria, Egypt and even in northern Iraq. Turkey's image has been further strengthened in the Middle East when Turkey did not authorize the transit of the US troops into Iraq on March 1, 2003.
Do you think the PKK might be trying to drag the Turkish military into the region?
The image of Turkey that the PKK wants to portray is a Turkey that is aggressive and willing to use military power at the first opportunity. The PKK doesn't like Turkey's economic and civilian presence in the region.
Does Turkey rightly perceive a threat if an independent Kurdish state is formed in northern Iraq?
Iraq's territorial integrity is important for Turkey and other countries that have an interest in the region. Iraq's disintegration is neither good for Turkey, nor the other Middle Eastern countries, the US or the European Union. The EU does not want a threatening state close to its borders. Iraq's disintegration would automatically threaten the American soldiers in the country. Syria, Iran and Turkey wouldn't like rising pan-Kurdish nationalism. Iraq's reconciliation process should be supported by all. Still, Turkey cannot ignore that there is an ongoing process in northern Iraq, which is the building up of a Kurdish nation.
How in that case can Massoud Barzani (the head of the regional Kurdish authority) support Turkey against the PKK?
Nobody, especially Barzani, would want to be in a position to mistreat the people in that region. In the short run, Barzani wouldn't take Turkey's side against the PKK, at least not by his own will. Additionally, Kurds want to have an independent state even though the present situation doesn't allow it. So Barzani would like to act as the leader of emerging Kurdish nation. He considers the PKK to be part of the Kurdish nation and would not want to be in the position of punishing his relatives in this sensitive process. However, Barzani is important to any effort that targets the PKK. There is an urgent need for a two-track policy and there should be a win-win situation for the both sides. First Ankara needs to increase its leverage in Iraqi politics in a way that central administration can limit the Kurdish groups not vice versa. Second, Ankara should engage with Barzani in a constructive manner, which would help him to understand the meaning of a responsible politician in this sensitive region. Both carrot and stick may work here.
Would talking to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani help?
In that regard Abdullah G+-l's presidency is a positive development because he would probably have a meeting with Talabani. Communication channels should be open to other secular groups in Iraq including Sunni groups other than already engaged and Shia groups, in particular secular ones like Iyad Allawi, etc.
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[PROFILE]
B+-lent Aras
A professor at the International Relations Department of Işık University in İstanbul, B+-lent Aras was a visiting scholar in 1998 at the University of Indiana's Department of Central Eurasian Studies. He was a guest researcher in 2003 at Oxford University's St. Antony's College and a senior researcher in 2004 at the European Union Institute of Security Studies in Paris. Among his 13 books are "Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and Turkey" (1998), "New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position" (2002) and "Turkey and the Greater Middle East" (2004). His academic articles, which have been translated into Persian, Arabic and Russian, have been published in periodicals such as Middle East Policy, the Journal of Third World Studies, the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Futures, the Journal of Southern Europe and Balkans, Mediterranean Quarterly and East European Quarterly.
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Correction
An interview published last Monday with Deniz +£lke Arıboğan, the president of Bah+ðeşehir University, read: "When you speak about terrorism as in Turkey that has mass support, you will see that extensive methods to fight it should be developed." The quote should have read: "In Turkey when you speak about [PKK] terrorism, which has [a degree of] mass support [in parts of society], you will see that comprehensive methods to fight it should be developed." We regret any confusion this may have caused.
22.10.2007
YONCA POYRAZ DOĞAN, TZ
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22 October 2007
Armenian Issue
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