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Bush's Latest Blunder |
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Thursday, 22 March 2007The Bush administration is once again committing a major policy blunder in the Middle East by actively supporting the Israeli government in its refusal to recognize a Palestinian unity government that includes Hamas. This precludes any progress toward a peace settlement at a time when progress on the Palestinian problem could help avert conflagration in the greater Middle East.
The US and Israel seek to deal only with the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. They hope that new elections would deny Hamas the majority it now has in the Palestinian Legislative Council. This is a hopeless strategy, because Hamas would boycott early elections, and even if their outcome would result in Hamas's exclusion from the government, no peace agreement would hold without Hamas support.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is pursing a different path. In a February summit in Mecca between Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal, the Saudi government worked out an agreement between Hamas and Fatah, which have been clashing violently, to form a national unity government. According to the Mecca accord, Hamas agreed "to respect international resolutions and the agreements [with Israel] signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization," including the Oslo Accords. The Saudis view this accord as the prelude to the offer of a peace settlement with Israel, to be guaranteed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. But no progress is possible as long as the Bush administration and Ehud Olmert's Israeli government persist in refusing to recognize a unity government that includes Hamas.
Many of the causes of the current impasse go back to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip unilaterally, without negotiating with the then-Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. This strengthened Hamas, contributing to Hamas's electoral victory. Then Israel, with strong US backing, refused to recognize the democratically elected Hamas government and withheld payment of the millions in taxes collected by the Israelis on its behalf. This caused economic hardship and undermined the government's ability to function. But it did not reduce support for Hamas among Palestinians, and it reinforced the position of Islamic and other extremists who oppose negotiations with Israel. The situation deteriorated to the point where Palestine no longer had an authority with whom Israel could negotiate.
This is a blunder, because Hamas is not monolithic. Its inner structure is little known to outsiders, but, according to some reports, it has a military wing, largely directed from Damascus and beholden to its Syrian and Iranian sponsors, and a political wing that is more responsive to the needs of the Palestinian population that elected it. If Israel had accepted the results of the election, that might have strengthened the more moderate political wing. Unfortunately, the ideology of the "war on terror" does not permit such subtle distinctions. Nevertheless, subsequent events provided some ground for believing that Hamas has been divided between its different tendencies.
No sooner had Hamas agreed to enter into a government of national unity than the military wing engineered the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, which prevented such a government from being formed by provoking a heavy-handed Israeli military response. Hezbollah then used the opportunity to stage an incursion from Lebanon, kidnapping several more Israeli soldiers. Despite a disproportionate response by Israel, Hezbollah was able to stand its ground, gaining the admiration of the Arab masses, whether Sunni or Shia. It was this dangerous state of affairs ÔÇöincluding the breakdown of government
in Palestine and fighting between Fatah and HamasÔÇöthat prompted the Saudi initiative.
Defenders of the current policy argue that Israel cannot afford to negotiate from a position of weakness. But Israel's position is unlikely to improve as long as it pursues its current course. Military escalation ÔÇô not just an eye for an eye but roughly ten Palestinian lives for every Israeli one ÔÇô has reached its limit. After the Israel Defense Forces' retaliation against Lebanon's road system, airport, and other infrastructure one must wonder what could be the next step for the Israeli forces. Iran poses a more potent danger to Israel than either Hamas or Hezbollah, which are Iran's clients. There is the growing danger of a regional conflagration in which Israel and the US could well be on the losing side. With the ability of Hezbollah to withstand the Israeli onslaught and the rise of Iran as a prospective nuclear power, Israel's existence is more endangered than at any time since its birth.
Both Israel and the United States seem to be frozen in their unwillingness to negotiate with a Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas. The sticking point is Hamas's unwillingness to recognize the existence of Israel; but that could be made a condition for an eventual settlement rather than a precondition for negotiations. Merely demonstrating military superiority is not sufficient as a policy for dealing with the Palestinian problem. There is now the chance for a political solution with Hamas brought on board by Saudi Arabia. It would be tragic to miss out on that prospect because the Bush administration is mired in the ideology of the War on Terror. By George Soros
22 March 2007
Project-Syndicate |
Thursday, 22 March 2007
US
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