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Interview with Bakyt Beshimov on US-Russia Rivalry and Security Dilemma in Central Asia |
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Thursday, 15 December 2011By Ryskeldi Satke
Ex-MP and former leader of the Social Democratic political faction in the parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, Mr. Bakyt Beshimov shared his opinion with the Journal of Turkish Weekly looking at future development in the region of Central Asia. Currently, Mr. Beshimov is a professor of government at Suffolk University, visiting scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University and visiting researcher at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Q: The government of Kyrgyzstan recently announced the end date of the Manas U.S.-NATO airbase operations in Bishkek. Newly elected President Atambayev publicly, in a "Kyrgyz" style manner, expressed concern over the possible risk posed by the American base in the country. And we had seen this kind of ball game in 2009 during Bakiyev’s presidency, not to mention the already apparent discrepancy between statements by Otunbayeva and Atambayev on the Manas lease. Thus, last month, Otunbayeva gave the green light to the Kyrgyz representative in the United Nations to comment positively on the subject of the base lease after 2014 for the New York-based news agency Bloomberg. Just about a week ago, in an interview with The New York Times, Otunbayeva also stressed concern over future development in the region after the withdrawal of the Western coalition troops from Afghanistan. What's your take on this?
A: Relations are increasingly strained between Islamabad and the U.S., and growing problems with the supply of NATO troops in Afghanistan from Pakistan are giving more importance to the Northern Distribution Network and the American air base in Manas. Kyrgyzstan has enormous strategic importance to Russia and the United States, where both states have deployed military forces since 9/11. Thus, the country has received a unique opportunity to promote its national interests and set up a durable national security system. But instead, Kyrgyz leaders have substituted the country's foreign policy with a risky “bases policy.” They are continuing to use a foreign military presence and contestation between big powers for their personal gain, which very often does not coincide with true national interests. This is the tragedy of the “bases policy” of Kyrgyzstan’s elite.
Putin whipped up a coup in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 to punish Bakiyev, whom he treated as a traitor, and gave power to his Kyrgyz cronies. Owing to fatal mistakes by Kyrgyz leaders, Kyrgyzstan has paid in blood and devastation. Today, the Kyrgyz leadership is ready to play Russia’s strongman game in Central Asia. Public opinion in Kyrgyzstan on relations with Russia is responsive to manipulation by local pro-Kremlin elites. The Manas fuel contract has been given to a Kyrgyz-Russian joint venture, controlled by the Russian state-owned company Gazprom. The red carpet is rolling out for more Russian military forces on a pro bono basis. The Kyrgyz energy sector is being dominated by Russian Gazprom and electric power holding company RAO UES. The country is hastily entering into the Russian-led Customs Union, believing that Russian border guards will protect Kyrgyz borders. However, Russian-Kyrgyz relations are still fickle.
The Kyrgyz elites have to understand that Moscow today needs Kyrgyzstan only for two reasons: the American military base and as a foothold against a fractious Uzbekistan. If the American base closes and Uzbeks get closer to Moscow, Kyrgyzstan will not matter for Russia. At best, in this situation, Russia will consider Kyrgyzstan its distant province in Central Asia. When the American base shuts down, obviously Kyrgyzstan will become insignificant for the U.S. If Washington moves its military installations to one of the neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan will find itself in a difficult position, even being the ally of Moscow.
Bishkek’s gestures toward Washington are indicators of fear regarding the American exit from Afghanistan, and the hopes of receiving more money. In the summer of 2010, during the bloody Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic conflict, many in Kyrgyzstan unambiguously realized that the Russian-led CSTO is a shallow security construct. And it is obvious that the U.S. will exit Afghanistan leaving behind the Taliban, a highly skilled revisionist Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, and be unprepared for new security challenges dividing Central Asia. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan's economy is floundering badly and will not survive without Western donors. That’s why the Kyrgyz authority is looking toward America too.
The New Great Game is being intensified. Russia and China are pushing the Americans out of the region. Russian agreements with the U.S. on Central Asia and Afghanistan are murky and unreliable. Russia's strategic goals in the region are: 1) to protect itself from radical Islam and terrorism with the help of the Americans and 2) to maximize the vulnerability of the U.S. Moscow is intolerant of the American military infrastructure in Central Asia. Behind every Kyrgyz decision to close the U.S. airbase in Manas is the Kremlin. Russia supports the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) while blackmailing Washington. Russia’s recent attempt to link the NDN to the planned European missile defense system is the best evidence of this. Putin will not go far to provoke a rupture with Washington but will do everything to establish hegemony in Central Asia, leaving the U.S. with few viable options. The U.S. wants to secure its operations in Afghanistan with all its Central Asian partners. But, today the uncertainty of the American strategy in Central Asia and the mercurial nature of the local regimes make this partnership shaky.
Q: Moscow's actions in Kyrgyzstan are yet to be analyzed and interpreted after Vladimir Putin's involvement in the April 2010 coup in Bishkek. What's not comprehended is Russia's destructive policy in the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kremlin's meddling in Kyrgyzstan was observed by regional and Western intelligence services with particular interest from Uzbekistan's SNB (State Security Service). Later in 2010, the president of Uzbekistan had made a few attempts to bring the world's attention to the bloodshed that took place in southern Kyrgyzstan which left hundreds of Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks dead, thousands injured on both sides and over two thousand mostly ethnic Uzbek properties destroyed in the cities of Osh and Jalalabad. Russia's government on the sidelines also plays on Kyrgyzstan's projected "Afghanization" that seems to disturb the Kremlin's leadership, whether it's genuine or otherwise we have yet to find out. But why do you think Moscow deliberately joined hands with the Kyrgyz opposition after the 2009 presidential elections, which created instability in the country, whereas Russia supposedly has been concerned about a future negative scenario in Central Asia?
A: Your question is about three dimensions: Russia’s role in Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Central Asia, Medvedev’s idea of the “Afghanzation” of Kyrgyzstan and the Kremlin’s tools of influence in the region.
Russia wants hegemony in Central Asia. But it is not simply a free lunch. Today, Central Asian states are not objects for manipulation by great powers. On the contrary, they are now players in the game. Relations between the states in the region are extremely anarchic and increasingly conflict ridden. The weak states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are maintaining a Russian military presence with the idea that it will help contain Uzbekistan and protect them from terrorism and extremism. The rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan keeps the region divided. Centrifugal forces in Central Asia are powerfully escalating the further fragmentation of the region into a relatively wealthy Kazakhstan and a poor, fractious southern flank. Eventually, it is uncertain how the Customs and Eurasian Union could make positive changes, taking into account that all previous unions in the CIS have been half functional at best.
China continues to resist Russian dominance, and the U.S., European Union and Turkey try to prevent Russia's neo-imperial policy in Central Asia. Thus, Moscow's dominance in Central Asia is not imminent due to many players and intertwined interests.
In this complicated situation, the Kremlin wants to have governments that are predictable and completely loyal to Russia in power in Central Asia. Putin has taken an odious dual position on Kyrgyzstan. He helped the Kyrgyz opposition overthrow Bakiyev, but also often speaks of the events in Kyrgyzstan with contempt. Recently, while commenting on the protests of Russian opposition groups after the elections for the State Duma, Putin once again referenced to Kyrgyzstan in a negative manner. The question is, does Russia have a perspective strategy in Central Asia? I have serious doubts on that. It is time for Russia to think of how it will play a positive role in the region as a smart benevolent power. The pressure on migrant workers from Central Asia, manipulations with fuel deliveries to the region, or instigating contradictions between the states will not tie countries to Russia’s interests in the long term. It is against the security interests of Russia itself. A true integrator cannot act in this manner. It is the sign of despair and decline as a great power.
The stagnation or Medvedev's definition of “Afghanization” in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan likely will continue. Central Asia is in the middle of a security crisis. Internally, all states have failed to effectively resolve conflicts over borders and enclaves, water and energy, trade and transportation. Uzbekistan is a fragile state, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are on the brink of failure. Hyper nationalism is on the rise in Central Asia. It is a disquieting fact. The majority of the region's young population is unemployed with no or low income, not sobered by their tragic history and prone to radicalism. It is a fertile ground for any kind of extremism. Lamentably, there have been no forces to keep hyper nationalism at bay. Therefore, my argument is that the prospect of a major crisis, even a local war in the region, is likely to increase. My realist conclusion rests on the argument that the continuing internal decay under corrupt authoritarian regimes in combination with emerging powerful external threats created a security dilemma and dangerous conflicts within and between the states.
Q: As we have witnessed a sudden warm-up in the relations between Tashkent and Washington, there is still a question mark on Uzbekistan's role after U.S.-NATO troop reduction in Afghanistan in 2014. According to Western press, the U.S. government's bid on Uzbekistan as a reliable partner with the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) is reflected in the increase of the amount of goods moving through Uzbekistan since Washington's displeasure with Pakistan became a matter of concern. Reportedly, Pentagon moves 50% of its shipments (non-lethal) through the territory of Uzbekistan. Your thoughts on this?
A: Uzbekistan's position in American foreign policy is on the way up. U.S. military aid to Uzbekistan is increased. There are several serious reasons for that. First, the Americans need Uzbeks to sustain the NDN, to provide a safe exit for coalition troops in 2014 and in the long term, to secure Washington's interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Uzbekistan is connected with Eurasian railways and its rail network has the most developed infrastructure in the region with access to Afghanistan. Second, American military operations in Afghanistan have made it possible to clamp down on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—the archenemy the Uzbek regime. This potent militant group is bent on overthrowing the Uzbek government and creating an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. Third, it is the strategic significance of Uzbekistan. It is the only country in Central Asia with the ability to preclude Russian hegemony. Furthermore, the Uzbeks have the potential to play a decisive role on the side of the U.S. against Iran and a resurgent Taliban. Both states can achieve a level of genuine strategic partnership, if the U.S. will turn a blind eye toward the repressive Uzbek regime, at least for a while if the Uzbeks get assurances of full and long-lasting support from the U.S. If Tashkent moves once and for all toward the U.S., Central Asia will change fundamentally.
Kazakhstan, as the most pro-Western country in the CIS, would intensify contacts with the U.S. as a safe haven from rising Russian nationalism and to deter the dangerous militarization of Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is the country in Central Asia with a significant increase in financial aid from Washington. Turkmenistan would get closer to China and the U.S. to secure its diversified pipeline policy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are likely to remain between Russia and China. Thus, the new American-Uzbek alliance could change the balance of power in Central Asia, with a huge impact on the rest of Eurasia. But the real question is how far the U.S. is ready to go with the dictators of Central Asia against its core ideology. |
Thursday, 15 December 2011
Ryskeldi Satke
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