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[JTW Analysis] The Libya Crisis and Challenges to China’s Non-Interference Principle |
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Monday, 13 June 2011By Christopher R. Hughes, LSE
The evacuation of 32,000 Chinese nationals from Libya and the despatch of a Chinese naval frigate to the Mediterranean during the uprisings that swept the Arab world in the spring of 2011 are among recent events that have focused international attention on the question of whether it is possible for China to maintain its long-standing principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.
The non-interference principle made sense when it was adopted in solidarity with the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s and Chinese assets were spread thinly around the world. However, China now has the world’s second largest economy and interests in just about every part of the globe. A principle that once distinguished China’s policy towards the developing world from Western colonialism has come to look increasingly like an excuse to free-ride when other states have to address political instability in trouble-spots from Myanmar to Zimbabwe.
Colonel Gaddafi must have been disappointed, therefore, when China joined other members of the United Nations Security Council on 26 February to impose an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo against his regime. It also supported the issuing of a Security Council statement that cited the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Most significant was China’s abstention when Resolution 1973 imposed the no-fly zone and authorized all measures necessary to protect civilians.
Beijing’s stated reason for going along with these measures is that they conform with the wishes of the Arab League and the African Union. Yet its position also reflects a growing clamour inside China for more to be done to both protect the country’s overseas interests and enhance its reputation as a force for international stability.
This movement can be seen in academic analyses of China’s relations with the Arab world before the Libya crisis erupted. This point attempts to construct a “New model partnership” with the Arab world that is linked to Hu Jintao’s doctrine of a “Harmonious World”. According to Yu Jianhua, head of the Euro-Asia Research Institute at the Shanghai Chinese Academy of Social Science, this involves the formation of a shared strategic outlook through initiatives like the High Level Strategic Dialogue Memorandum of Understanding issued by China and the Gulf Cooperation Council in June 2010.
Highly significant for the fate of the non-interference principle is Yu’s observation that China is behaving more like a responsible great power as it becomes active in “hot spot diplomacy”. Examples include helping the Israel-Palestine Middle East Peace Process by advising the two sides to work harder to resolve their differences through negotiations; working with Turkey and Brazil to develop the trilateral Teheran agreement on processing Iran’s nuclear fuel outside the country and reducing tension by softening US demands for tightening sanctions; helping with the reconstruction of Afghanistan; and support for the Sudan peace process and a political solution to the Darfur problem.
It is in this context that the Libya crisis has sparked some surprisingly open domestic criticism of Beijing’s tendency to sit on the fence. An article in the CCP-organ, Global Times, thus warns of the dangers of antagonising the Gaddafi regime for failing to vote against Resolution 1973, and angering the Libyan rebels by withholding help and recognition for the Transitional National Council in Benghazi. Such a stance is likely to damage the country’s reputation in the eyes of an Arab public that is already growing suspicious that their countries are only good for dumping inferior Chinese goods and extracting oil. A better policy would be to build on precedents for promoting mediation that China has already established, such as opening a diplomatic office in Pristina when Kosovo declared independence, contacting the Lebanese Hezbollah when it clashed with Israel in 2006, and opening a consulate general in Southern Sudan in 2008. Such measures have left Beijing enjoying good relations with the new governments in these places.
Although this kind of argument is still relatively new, even supporters of the non-interference principle point out that China lacks the power to influence events, rather than appealing to normative principles. China may still be a long way from joining the kind of joint-military action launched against the Gadaffi regime, yet its presence on the ground, willingness to accept international intervention against an authoritarian regime and domestic debates all show how a growing international presence is forcing the realisation that a foreign policy devised for a developing state in the 1950s is not fit for the purposes of a global power.
*Prof. Chris Hughes is a professor at LSE, International Relations Department. |
Monday, 13 June 2011
Prof. Chris Hughes
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