Journal of Turkish Weekly conducted an exclusive interview with Rabee Al-Hafidh, Secretary General and Head of Arab Turkish Relations Unit, Forum of Muslim Thinkers. Here is the full-text of interview.

Q: How do you evaluate the recent developments in the Middle East and do you think there will be a domino effect with regard to the other countries in the region?

A: These uprisings do not come as a surprise. They are natural consequence to decade of injustice, underdevelopment, and poverty which turned these societies into a powder keg. Arab countries are rich in natural resources, talented population, qualifications, the patience of the masses has been running thin for a quite some time, today it snapped.

The element of suspicion not surprise, to some, maybe in the sequence and the way these uprising have been conducted. The motives of ordinary disadvantaged people taking to the streets to vent their anger can in no way be in question. What can be is the networking tools i.e. social media utilized extensively in the conduct of the events, which turn the revolting societies into a big uncontrollable social space easily accessed and intellectually fed from outside.

So far, North Africa has been the scene of full scale developments; yet there was little worry about the national integrity of the countries involved, for they are mono religion, mono sect and nearly mono race societies. It is far too early to judge which directions the emerging societies will take. The Arab world is vast area of trouble waters which will tempt many regional and global fishers.

In Al-Mashreq Al-Arabi (Arap Orta Doðu) the scene is different; itís a mosaic sometimes fragile geopolitical scene. The uprising in Bahrain is not something new; it always comes with a flavor of sectarianism and an external inspiration. If a full scale scenario were to happen on this scene the consequences will be far reaching and their impact will be off the charts.

However, peopleís demands in Al-Mashreq Al-Arabi are about reforms, real ones, in the system rather than a regime change. With the exception of the some liberals and shiat minority in Saudi Arabia, the general public (technocrats, religious leaders, and business communities) are well aware of what consequences a regime collapse can bring about in the absence of an immediate alternative. They believe in sitting down with the regime around table in search of a working formula which safeguards the national integrity.

Without a clear American-Iranian regional deal, the regimes (GCC members) are expected to escape the unrest and survive for some time. Yemen is outside this analysis.

An opinion poll in the Arab street would show sizeable divisions in Arab opinion about the outgoing regimes for all sorts of reasons. It would, however, show less division about two regimes upon which little tears will be shed; the Libyan and the Syrian, the first having wasted its national wealth and put its people under the line of poverty, while the latter, in addition to the economic corruption, is the cornerstone in the regional sectarian set up. The absence of the two regimes, in the eyes of the Arabs, can only make life better for the Arabs and the region at large.

Q: Do you expect such social movements in Iraq as well?

A: Iraq is under dual occupation American and Iranian. The Iranians are physically and effectively on the ground, Iraqis can listen to their intelligence radio communications in Persian language in Bagdad and southern cities. It is difficult to imagine the collapse of a regime which enjoys the support of two occupying powers, as equally as imagining the fall of Erich Honecker regime in East Germany with the Red army outside its premises. In addition, the shiat masses remain under the influence of the religious institutes (Hawzat) and loyal to the regime. Despite seven years of cry about lack of public services, security, jobs and a life not worth living, it was these very masses who, under direct orders from religious leaders and sectarian calculations, voted this government back in office. Shiat religious institutes maintain a firm grip on their masses.

Having said that, a new phenomena is emerging from street protests organized and attended by the full spectrum of the Iraqi society (races, religions, sects and political parties) and slogans with clear national flavor for the first time since 9th April 2003 (the fall of Baghdad). Iraqis from all back grounds and all walks of life are protesting poverty, corruption, release of prisoners and lack of basic rights. Shiat religious institutes are harshly criticized and discredited on the streets by their traditional masses chanting slogans like ìwhere are our institutes, why are they abandoning us, why are they silentî.

There is little to rush to about in this phenomenon which can be called micro fissures in the wall of the shiat religious institutes, yet, this is how, historically, a minority cycle draws to an end; minority masses wake up to the reality of slogans coined by their leaders in opposition time. Actions speak louder.

One thing can realistically bring about a change in Iraq; an upset in the regional system which occupying Iran relies on in running of the regional sectarian scene i.e. the minority sectarian regime in Syria. Any change in Syria brings instability to the Iraqi regime, and makes the answer to this question a definite yes. Iraq will again be bordered from the west by an Arab regime which is, to say the least, a non sectarian. The small components of the regional sectarian system will collapse too in a domino effect; Hizbullah, Houthies in Yemen and the Iranian backed Bahraini opposition. Syria in its present form is a necessity for the Iranian regional project; she is its cornerstone in the Arab world, without it this project will be unviable.

Q: How do you assess the approaches of the Western countries, i.e. the U.S. and EU, towards the developments in the region?

A: People in the Arab streets are neither pleased nor have confidence in the US and EU. To them, there is a lot of hypocrisy in the policy of abandoning dictators in the last minute following years of endorsement, support and intelligence co-ordinations

Q: How do you see the developing relations between Turkey and Arab countries?

A: The developments in the relations between Turkey and the Arab world over the last few years are encouraging. It is the natural thing. Yes, there have been political borders between there countries but there were none between the people. Many think that opening the border is a first step to Arabs states eventually copying Turkeyís model. This vision is not totally untrue, but it is a one of hyper optimism. No one in Europe is copying Germany, but Germany has undoubtedly put her stamp on the EU. There is a lot to be benefited from the Turkish model given the sociological similarities between the two nations, a shared historical background and geographical proximity. What happened over a decade still lies within the border of emotions, hopes and optimism. Arabs and Turks need to sit down and compose a regional concept for themselves and found a working formula. Arabs and Turks (the people) both wish for closer relationships, more integration and more advanced cooperation but there is not a working formula for that on the ground. The Europeans have found for themselves a regional concept despite the fact that they have far less in common. I am not hinting at something like the EU, but the Arabs and Turks can arrive at their own formula which serves them as a block in this part of the world.

Q: In which terms do you think cooperation can be established between Arab countries and Turkey?

A: This is a good question. Realistically speaking, Turks and Arabs can come far closer than they are now. There are lot which should be done and can be done on social grounds and civic society values. This is what the region acutely misses today and searches for. What the people in the Arab world want is not necessarily the EU have, what they want is stable and safe societies. Arab countries, like Turkey, are mozaik societies comprise several races, religions, sects. Only multiculturalism culture and multiculturalism mind set can work here. Multiculturalism is not a foreign product to be exported to the region with demonstration manual. It is a formula originally engineered in this region, made of its values.

Ironically the EU multiculturalism, on whose membership Turkey is very keen, is built on Ottoman multiculturalism. If you visit the Swedish Parliament, they will tell you ìthe system we have in this country was brought from Istanbul by our king Charles XII where he was exiled in 1714 for seven years. He was impressed by the social multicultural system of the Ottoman and decided that Sweden needs it.

Multiculturalism is vast territory which Turks and Arabs can work on. This can take place not solely at governmentís levels, but intellectual, and civic societiesí level, because this is where it will be implemented and bear fruits. Turkish and Arab civic societies can go to a great length towards that goal, governments can then benefit from what they achieve. This is a virgin territory where Turks and Arabs should work jointly for the regional formula which everyone in the region demand and wait for. This will bring more reassurance to the minorities in the region, historically they always lived and maintained their identity and way of life under the umbrella of Arab ñ Turk coordination. This is where the focus need to be.

Q: Do you believe Turkey is utilizing effectively its soft power tools, especially in terms of economy and social life, with regard to the Arabian countries?

A: What characterizes Turkish policy, unlike her regional rivals, is the dependence on cards which the political climate makes available; rather than creating her own. Of course, Turkey, restricted by its values, cannot do what her rivals do. Turkey is a disciplined society who descends from a disciplined historical and social background. Turkey cannot change her personality, yet she needs cards of own cards. What Turkey has been doing is impressive and encouraging but is not enough. A part from the Arabic speaking Turkish channel, Arabs can see little of the novel success Turkey has actually achieved. One area where Turkey needs to make new tool is the civic society, this is where her asset lies, and this is where the influence is, and this is her regional upper edge is. This where Turkey can turn its assets into regional ownership, which is a key in modern regional engineering.

Turkey, in this context, does not necessarily mean the government. There are things which cannot be achieved in governmentís spheres, or perhaps more accurately, can only be achieved outside these spheres. Turkey has to find ways of creating her own cards. The civic society is one area where Turkey is strong. Turkish civic society heritage goes back in history not for years but for centuries. This civic society (NGOs) has existed on this land for centuries; it goes back to the time when the Turks first arrived from central Asia. They were faced with a real need of finding a system of survival in an unwelcome environment. The system was born primitive, and then gradually evolved into todayís modern organizations. This is where the strength of Turkey lies, and this where new regional cards can be created. In this territory, Turkey is a regional leader without rival.

Q: Do you believe that a change in the government in Turkey, for example from AKP to the social democrats etc, can influence Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern countries and Arabic countries negatively?

A: This policy has a great deal to do with the present government. What is bringing the region back to Turkey has to do with what Turkey has been doing in the region over the recent years, also, it has to do with some faces and characters. This government enjoys the region confidence. The region derives confidence from its roots. There is a great deal which the Arab man places in the character of leader. The regional changes the current Turkish foreign brought about policy are to stay. They may require another term of this government before they can stand alone. This government is like a green house for plant which demands a certain temperature and degree of a sun light in its early days. No other government can maintain what has been achieved so far. Unlike the EU, the region cannot yet afford a phase of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy which comes in the wake of long years of the green house phase of Kohl and Mitterrand.

Q: Then, do you believe that this is not a structural change in Turkish foreign policy but mostly a conjectural one?

A: This government did not tell its people what they should do with the region; it rather showed them what they can do with the entire heritage in their possession. The difference between the two scenarios is huge. This is contrary to what the German government wanted to do in Europe against the grain of the popular desire. Hence, this government did not in fact restructure the vision of its people towards the region, it is the Turkish people who rediscovered themselves and carried this government to power. Attempts of such restructuring took place under previous governments which put the Turkish people under all sorts of effect to direct it away from their natural regional depth. The other point, letís not forget that the AKP was not carried to power by conservative votes alone; it had become a national phenomenon which a reassuring sign of a regionalism maturity among wider sectors in the Turkish society.

Turks are steadily confident that conservative color of this government reflects their interests; at least this is how Turkey looks to its viewer from outside. This is not to say that the current Turkish regional policy is past the danger zone or that is it immune to threats, it is still in a transitional period. A later than sooner change of government will have less impact.

Q: How do you perceive the recent developments in Turkish-Israeli relations especially the deterioration due to the Mavi Marmara incident and the effects of this failing relationship on the region?

A: Naturally speaking the farther Turkey is from Israel the closer she is to her Arab neighbors. One day Prime Minister Erdogan said ìcutting relations with a country is not like shutting down a shopî. This takes us back to confidence and faith, people in the region watch with unease the ongoing relation between Turkey and Israel, but they look at it as something todayís Turkey has inherited from a previous era which the Turkish people never desired. There is a important comparison here between a declared yet undesired ties with Israel, with a denied but a desired one i.e. the cases of Turkey and Iran.

Developments like denying Israeli fighters using Turkish air space, Davos clash and the Mavi Marmara incident bring Turkey closer to the region. Deterioration in Turkeyís relations with Israel naturally earns Turkey extra confidence in the region. This confidence has a high price tag; Israel reactivation of its channels with terrorist and sectarian minority groups in and around Turkey.

The region priority is to see more integration with neighboring Turkey. The region wants to see a regional player truly fulfilling its post, calming worries about threatened sovereignties, a one they trust and shares history with it.