By Muzaffer Vatansever & Elma Jelovac, JTW

The Balkan region is very important for Turkish foreign policy in the context of ìzero problems with neighborsì strategy. Journal of Turkish Weekly conducted an exclusive interview with Plamen Ralchev, the founder and director of STRATCOM. During Mr. Ralchevís two-day visit to Ankara (27-28 December 2010), we asked about changes in relations between the two countries following the appointment of Ahmet Davutoðlu as Minister of Foreign Affairs besides position of Bulgaria towards Turkey and image of Turkey and Turkisness in Bulgaria.

Q: Within the context of new Turkish foreign policy based on the principle of ëízero problems with neighborsíí, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoðlu, has increased Turkeyís involvement in the Balkan region. He has started many initiatives regarding countries in the region. Is there a concrete impact of Davutoðluís policy in Bulgarian-Turkish relations?

A: Actually, it is difficult to trace such an impact on Bulgarian-Turkish relations for several reasons. First, Prof. Davutogluís policy and Turkish international activism are pretty much interpreted in Bulgaria in a neo-Ottomanist discourse. I even recall headlines in Bulgarian newspapers focusing on neo-Ottomanism. This diverts attention from the ìzero problemsî policy (by the way, this principle of Turkish foreign policy is very little known in Bulgaria) and emphasizes more the Turkish involvement in the Balkans (mainly Bosnia and Kosovo), which again is argued by some Bulgarian radicals to be a genuine Ottoman revival. Even some more radical and extreme nationalists in Bulgaria consider this as a threat and warning about Turkish attempts for restoring the Ottoman Empire. Of course, any such talk could be labeled as ìexaggerationî, but the fact is that we do lack well informed popular understanding of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish Balkan policy in Bulgaria. Second, if we are to seek any impact on Bulgarian-Turkish relations, we need to modernize the discourse or the ìmental matrixî first, especially in Bulgaria. From all my trips and experience in Turkey, I started to believe that Bulgaria is not an issue for Turkey. However, Turkey is a big issue for Bulgaria. There are still many people in Bulgaria, both within the elite and general public, who continue to think about Turkey in the security discourse of the past. Unless that mind-set is upgraded, Turkish foreign policy shifts will make little difference and will not be properly comprehended in Bulgaria.

I can conclude that there is acute sensitivity in Bulgaria towards neo-Ottomanist trends in Turkish foreign policy and this sensitivity has to be handled with due attention and care.


Q: What are the positions of Bulgarian political elite and public as well towards Turks, especially since GERB came to power in 2009 elections? What is the image of Turkey and Turkishness in Bulgaria in general?

A: In fact, the answers to this question depend on its clarification. It is important to clarify what you mean by ìTurksî and ìTurkishnessî. If you mean ìBulgarian Turksî both Bulgarian political elite and public are positive towards them in principle. If you mean ìTurksî in Turkey, the attitudes may vary from negative to positive, but majority would be neutral. GERB coming to power made no real difference in these attitudes. Actually, some of its messages have been misinterpreted as anti-Turkish. However, it is not the case at all. The target of these messages was DPS (MRF- Movement for Rights and Freedoms) ñ a Bulgarian political party, which through the years of transition after 1989 established itself as a crucial power-balancer in Bulgarian politics, and which is representative of Bulgarian Turksí vote. It is the only party which Bulgarian Turks vote for, not because they like it or support it, but because they believe they have no other alternative and because they fear that noone else can represent them or would care for them. Unofficially, Bulgarian Turks say ìwe donít like DPS, but we vote for it because itís ëoursíî. This is a vicious circle that helped DPS to turn into a ìcorporationî of a kind with no checks-and-balances. Whatever efforts have been made for another party to represent Bulgarian Turksí vote, they have all failed. So, much of GERBís rhethoric during and after 2009 election campaign was targeting DPS abuse of power, not Bulgarian Turks, nor Turks in general. Misunderstanding of this subtle political nuance made big nuisance.

Another important issue to be addressed is who is the bearer of Turkishness in Bulgaria is, or who represents Turkishness in Bulgaria. Actually, Bulgarian Turks are important bearer of Turkishness in Bulgaria and the way the Bulgarian public perceives Bulgarian Turkish minority has repercussions on the image of Turkey in Bulgaria. This transfer of image and representation is an interesting social, psychological and political phenomenon. Therefore, if Bulgarian public is somewhat upset about DPS/MRF party and this affects the image of Turkishness, Turkey has to pay wise and crucial attention to this fact.


Q: How do you evaluate the fact that nationalist parties such as ATAKA and VMRO are becoming so influential in Bulgarian politics? What is the reflection of this on Bulgarian-Turkish relations?

A: These parties attract the votes of discontent. By and large nationalist and radical right camps gather support from people who have lost substantially from their previous economic and social status during the period of transition to democracy and market economy (in 1990s). During this period an enormous redistribution of public wealth took place. Some benefited a lot from it and became rich, others lost their jobs and became structurally and indefinitely unemployed, especially in semi-urban and rural areas. Not to say that ATAKA appeals to ëtransition losersí as an electorate base, it pretty much draws support from people with such a profile. ATAKA perceived DPS and its leader Ahmed Dogan as a crucial player in the process of redistributing (and probably embezzling) public wealth in 1990s, and included such arguments and messages in their election rhetoric. They knew their voters would apprehend it and they actually did. Again, this political speaking should not be taken out of its internal political context, neither has it to be projected onto bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. These are completely different political spaces and have to be handled very carefully.


Q: How do you estimate the ëspy crisisí in Bulgaria that happened approximately fifteen days ago?

A: I would call it a ìspy scandalî rather than a ìspy crisisî. In fact, few people in Bulgaria pay attention to such sensational politics anymore. Things were different in 1990s. The public was much more attentive and sensitive to this issue. It is one of Bulgarian syndromes of transition. We did not take proper treatment and the disease became chronic and recurring.

This particular case is part of a bigger story related to the archives of the former Communist State Security Service (DS), which was the powerful arm of repression, intelligence and counter-intelligence of communist Bulgaria until the end of 1989. Bulgarian transition from communism to democracy was poisoned in the way that Bulgarian public even at present is not certain about the Truth. Many are still suspicious that the State Security Service from the past and its agents are not gone and are still there. This is partly true ñ many low-rank officers and officials were transferred and merged within post-communist security structures. Many others remained immune and intact. Many of the secret agents continued their lives and made career progress in 1990s. Others went into private business and profited from their contacts, networks, and information. The comprehensive problem, however, came from the misuse of secret files and classified information from the State Security archives. No complete solution was found, only piecemeal compromises, and these compromises resulted in power battles and misuse of classified or declassified information from the archives. If you have a political opponent, you can find quite easily something against him in old archives. Who controls the archives is another question without an answer. There is a nominal state body formally in charge, but doubts come from the fact that in early 1990s there might have been a kind of ësanitationí of the archives and some of the sensitive information might deliberately be missed. It could definitely serve for some power circles in Bulgaria at that time, and even now. The problem is that we never know how complete these files are, and whether the regularly declassified files are part of a routine process or part of an engineered ëpurgeí against some public figures. In the past, many names of State Security officers, agents and informers have been released to the public. Some of them were famous journalists, others were politicians, members of Parliament and government, civil servants, etc. It was only recently that people with diplomatic occupation among those lists became public. The public however is already bored with these games and these revelations hardly made real news.

Once becoming a NATO member, Bulgaria has to comply with a strict procedure for security clearance in order to get access to information. There is a full-fledged body responsible for granting this access, and it is trusted by NATO allies. This committee has refused granting security clearance to many Bulgarian officials (even top-ranking) when it has been proven they were related to ex-State Security Service. The change, however, is proceeding slowly, and some of the ëghostsí from the past will stay here for some more time.


Q: Do you think that ìspy crisisî or ìspy scandalî as you called it, could be regarded as a part of ìpower struggleî between Bulgarian President Parvanov and Prime Minister Borisov?

A: Power struggle? A kind of, maybe, but not a real one. From the outside it may seem like a ëpower struggleí, but in fact it is a matter of political selfishness and strategic short-sightedness. In a way, Prime Minister Borisov wants to confront with everything and everybody related to the status quo prior to 2009, and he further wants to design his own status quo, in which he will feel comfortable. On the other hand, President Parvanov knows his time will soon be over and Bulgaria will have a new President elected in less than a year, so he desperately needs his own new raison díÍtre. His ABC (ABV) Project is an effort pointing in this direction. It is doubtful however how successful it could be. President Parvanov in his turn is using the confrontation with Prime Minister Borisov in order to get more attention and claim his own important role. They have developed this type of interactions, and it is really more a ëpower gameí than a ëpower struggleí.