Hasan Selim Ozertem USAK Center for Energy Security Studies printable version send your friend

Wednesday, 1 September 2010

Turkish foreign policy has been undergoing a process of transformation since the end of the Cold War. However, each transformation period comes with new crises and advantages that should be assessed carefully. Turkey has been trying tackle these challenges by pursuing a proactive foreign policy since the end of 1990s. In this respect, the zero-problem concept, introduced to Turkish foreign policy by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, has been effective in overcoming certain chronic problems with its neighbors and creating a better environment to stimulate regional partnerships. In the Caucasus, particularly good relations with Azerbaijan beginning in the 1990s have turned into a regional integration process, with Georgias enthusiastic participation in the 2000s. The South Caucasus has become a transit zone for trade, energy products, and transportation. However, compared to Turkeys cooperation with the Middle East, the dynamism in the Caucasus is limited. One of the main reasons is the exclusion of Armenia from the mega projects, those are conducted in the region. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is only one side of the coin. On the other side, the impasse in Turkish-Armenian relations also stands in the way of further cooperation opportunities, due to the complex characteristics of both countries internal and external policies.

Turkish-Armenian relations entered a new era with the football diplomacy visits of both countries leaders in 20082009. In this paper, the current state of relations between Turkey and Armenia will be examined in a critical manner to understand the continuing impasse. In this framework, the dynamics of Turkish politics will be scrutinized; this will then be compared to the picture in Armenia. It is argued that both sides need time to regain energy and move forward. Conjectural changes over this period can function as a catalyst for development in relations.

    Turkey in Transformation, but in an Unfavorable Environment

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey failed to grasp the structural changes taking place in the international arena. The problematic nature of NATO and the emergence of conflicts in the region forced Turkey to act in a reactive manner in its foreign policy. The creation of a new concept in Turkish diplomacy was put off until 2000s. Yet even this new approach, known as zero-problem diplomacy, has some shortcomings.

Turkish-Armenian relations are one of the main pillars of this approach. The issue is multidimensional, even affecting Turkeys policies in the West and the rest of the Caucasus. Moreover, Turkey has succeeded in overcoming or de-escalating its problems with all of its neighbors by pursuing economic, political, and cultural policiesexcept with Armenia. In this respect, domestic and international dynamics have played important role in the current position of Turkey and prevented a solution through normal means. As is known, Turkey and Armenia both signed protocols restoring relations in 10 October 2009, but since then both the Armenian and Turkish parliaments have failed to ratify them. Since then, the issue has remained high on the political agenda but has started to move down, particularly since the spring of 2010.

One of the main reasons for this delay in the political sphere has been the political and economic transformation process in Turkey. In domestic terms, politics hangs in an extremely sensitive balance. The high-profile Ergenekon case, which began in 2007 and has sought to uproot a deep state intent on destabilizing Turkey, has been a big blow to the status quo in the country. In addition to ongoing judicial process, tensions between the mechanisms of the bureaucracy and the political sphere peaked in 2010. This has undermined the efficacy of politicians to enact needed changes and led to administrative crises, particularly in the executive and judicial branches. As a result, the AKP [1]  government took a radical decision to propose serious amendments to the constitution to be able to overcome the legal shortcomings as well as enhance democratic and individual rights. These two issues, combined with a resurgence in the activity of the PKK terrorist organization, have dominated the political agenda in the country. With its hands as yet tied by power struggle of political parties and bureaucracy, it is difficult for the government to take a radical step toward a long-lasting solution with Armenia, in spite of its large majority in the parliament. Moreover, the prospect of general elections, to be held in 11 months, has put the government in a critical position. Support for the AKP has decreased recently; in this political environment, nobody wants to take further risks. Nationalism plays a role in this respect. The territorial dispute between Armenia and Turkic Azerbaijan over Karabakh is emotional and draws reactions particularly from those with nationalist and conservative tendencies.

While the domestic environment seems unfavorable, recent international dynamics play a mixed role in fostering reconciliation. The status quo in the Caucasus certainly changed as a result of the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008. In the wars aftermath, Turkey drafted a proposal for a Caucasian Cooperation and Stability Pact. Though it failed to bring together the countries in the region, the discussions did help to enhance Turkeys relations with Caucasian countries, one by one, via shuttle diplomacy. Among Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, a cooperation zone had existed even prior to the war. This became the platform for mega projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, which brought investment and interest to the region. Yet the inclusion of Armenia is clearly required for further cooperation in the region. In line with Turkeys zero-problem diplomacy, Turkey also searched for further cooperation options with Armenia. It was in this context that the football diplomacy started by Presidents Abdullah Gl and Serzh Sargsyan were a prelude to the October 2009 protocols in Zurich.

The role of the United States in the project of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement cannot be ignored. As is known, U.S. President Barack Obama explicitly declared during his election campaign that the events of 1915 [2]  should be recognized as genocide, to garner the support of the Armenian diaspora in the elections.[3]  Thus, especially just before the presidential speech on 24 April 2009, Turkey focused its efforts on making Obama avoid referring to genocide in his statement on the events of 1915. Though Obama did not explicitly used the word genocide, he sought common ground by using the word metz yeghern, which means the great catastrophe in Armenian. However, this did not affect Turkeys decision to sign the protocols in October 2009. During the ceremony in Zurich, both the U.S. secretary of state and the Russian foreign minister played crucial roles. However, the role of the Obama administration in creating the protocol should not be exaggerated. Obamas administration played the role of catalyst, not of founder, since secret negotiations had already started in Zurich between the two parties long before the election of Obama as president.

The process which began in Zurich, however, has come to a halt because of structural problems in the region. In this respect, relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan should be scrutinized carefully. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkish leaders Turgut zal and Sleyman Demirel and Azeri President Heydar Aliyev developed a relationship based on friendship and bilateral interests. Bonds between two nations have developed quickly thanks to cultural and economic cooperation based on education, media, and commerce. Azerbaijan became Turkeys main gate to Caucasus and Caspian, while Turkeys membership in NATO and accession membership in the EU made it the main gate for Azerbaijan to the West. However, Turkeys insistence on pursuing a zero-problem policy and Azerbaijani sensitivities during the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement revealed the fact that even though bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey are described as special, when it comes to national interest, Azerbaijan will act in line with realist motives.

Both Azerbaijans political elite and public opinion view the normalization process between Armenia and Turkey as a Turkish abandonment of Azerbaijan. In this respect, it is hard to ignore the rising voice in Bakus political sphere of the Russian lobby, which has attempted to turn Azerbaijans gaze toward Moscow in the countrys best interest. The process between Turkey and Armenia was used as a tool of manipulation, and Turkey had to resort to restating its stance, held since the 1990s, that any rapprochement rests on a solution to the Karabakh issue. Sour reactions could only be brought under control by public statements by the foreign minister, president, and prime minister of Turkey at different platforms. In particular, Turkish Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdogans statements in Azerbaijans parliament, which reiterated that Turkey would not approve the protocols without ending the Armenian occupation in Azerbaijans territory,[4]  was a critical point in Turkish diplomacy. This gave Turkey a small space to maneuver, but helped to mend the relations with Azerbaijan to a certain degree.

Nevertheless, all the efforts of Turkish authorities still seemed insufficient to regain the confidence of Azerbaijan. Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Memedyarov, who visited Turkey at the end of 2009 with the intent of signing a protocol that would abolish visas between two countries, left the country without signing the agreement.[5]

Perhaps Turkeys prerequisite of linking the normalization process to Karabakh issue should have been indicated before the start of negotiations, since the closure of the borders between Armenia and Turkey was itself a result of the occupation of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian forces. Nevertheless, due to the delicate nature of relations, which also caused some problems during the signing the protocols, this problem could not be put forward explicitly. Rather, in the protocols, there are indirect references to the conflict and the need for a solution within the framework of international law. The absence of an explicit reference to the issue could be perceived as a problem. However, Turkeys use of the Karabakh conflict as an excuse for not approving the protocols in parliament was indirectly criticized by international actors. Both American and Russian authorities stated openly and indirectly that normalization between Turkey and Armenia should not be linked to the peace process in Karabakh.[6]  Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that such declarations on the part of Russia and the United States actually help to solve of the problem, since they simply encourage Armenian recalcitrance rather than pushing them to reach a solution to the conflict, an open violation of international law.

Last but not least, the decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia [7]  caused some suspicions in Turkey regarding the Armenias sincerity, since it eviscerated the very essence of the protocols.[8]  Meanwhile, the Turkish government, which defends the protocols, had two strong arguments. One of them was that the 1915 events should be examined by a common history commission composed of members from both states. The second is that the border between Armenia and Turkey, which was drawn up by the Kars Treaty in 1921 and ratified by both countries, will be recognized by post-Soviet Armenia, which still makes references to Turkish territory as Western Armenia in its declaration of independence (Article 11).

    Armenia Stuck Between Diaspora and Nationalism

The turn in Armenian foreign policy toward a pro-peace stance was perceived positively both in Turkey and the international arena. Unlike his predecessor Robert Kocharyan, Armenias current President Sargsyan came together with his Azeri and Turkish counterparts in different venues despite domestic political pressure, especially after Georgian-Russian War. However, regarding the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, domestic barriers similar to those of Turkey give the Armenian government very little leverage. While dialogue with Turkey was harshly criticized, especially by opposition parties in the country, the reaction of the Armenian diaspora was even stronger. Sargsyans meetings with intellectuals in Armenia or in the Diaspora were anything but positive for the presidents political career. Yet, both Turkish and Armenian governments are continuing to take steps that would break political and social taboos.

Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers have left behind one of the main obstacles on the way to the long lasting solution on 10 October 2009, when the protocols released on 31 August were signed both by Turkish and Armenian ministers in spite of a last-minute crisis that emerged in Zurich. Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandyan, implicitly referring to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, wanted to emphasize the principle of starting relations unconditionally. However, his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu wanted to underline the importance of a solution to all regional problems in the South Caucasus, also an indirect reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. The presence of these issues in the texts of the ministers speeches caused the ceremonys start to be delayed, but Turkeys proposition to cancel ministerial speeches after the ceremony helped to overcome this problem. Although the political will of the Minsk Group members, particularly Russia and the United States, proved to be sufficient in terms of overcoming this problem,  their attitudes later regarding the process have been less than constructive, as noted above.

In Armenia, some obstacles to reaching a long-lasting solution in the Caucasus began to emerge after the protocols were signed. One of the main questions for Armenia is the will of the Turkish parliament to ratify the protocols quickly. Armenian politicians have suggested that the Turkish parliament ratify the protocols first.  In fact, they started to impose deadlines, particularly before 24 April 2010. As suggested above, the Turkish government continued to emphasize the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and underline that these two processes are not independent from one another. This discussion was followed by three important developments. The decision of Constitutional Court of Armenia was followed by a government bill, ratified by parliament, that would make it easier for Armenia to annul its normalization agreements with Turkey,[9]  and finally by a suspension of the protocols.[10]

One of the main factors behind this step was the reaction of the diaspora to the protocols.  During his five-stop tour of major diaspora Armenian communities in France, the United States,and the Middle East, Sargsyan faced harsh criticism.[11]  With its strong financial support of the country and its political power, the diaspora is a significant factor in Armenian politics. Moreover, in Armenia itself, the hardliner Dashnaktsutyun Party threatened the government with regime change and pushed for the presidents resignation.[12]  Remembering the fate of former President Levon Ter-Petrossian, who was forced to resign under similar circumstances, it becomes harder to ignore these kinds of comments from opposition parties. Actually, the ruling Republican Party is in power only with the support of the coalition party, and it is hard to presume whether other members of parliament are going to vote in favor of the sensitive protocols. Additionally, the government lost the support of the Dashnaks in April 2009. Bearing in mind the fact that the Republican Party stays in power with the coalition and 64 seats out of 131 is belong to the Republican Party. This also brings new political risks for the president.

Last but not least, the global financial crisis in the country has made it difficult for the government to force through unpopular policies. The countrys economy contracted by 14.4 percent in 2009, and the expectations are not optimistic for 2010.[13]  Moreover, when Turkey explicitly linked the normalization process to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Sargsyan also chose the non-risky way and began to pursue an aggressive stance regarding the protocols. In other words, he again had to play the nationalist card to court the public support.

    Conclusion

Structural problems between Turkey and Armenia persist: the border issue, the events of 1915, and the Karabakh issue. The problematic relation itself is multidimensional and, when it is combined with international and domestic dynamics of these two states and the region, it becomes even more complicated. Additionally, a democracy deficit in both Armenia and Azerbaijan presents a political ground fertile for political exploitation of Karabakh issue by playing on nationalistic tendencies.

The political will shown for starting diplomatic relations and opening the border between two countries, which began with the conjectural changes in the region and domestic policies of both countries in 2008, has come to a standstill due to rapidly changing international and domestic political agenda in both countries. Nevertheless, we might find some hope for future prospects in the fact that the process of reconciliation has not been abrogated, but merely suspended. Conjectural changes, which helped the process to start, can again help to take the process further. The peace efforts of Russia and the Minsk Group in the conflict over Karabakh have a capacity to directly affect the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. A road map that would be accepted by Azerbaijan and Armenia and aftermath start of a normalization process would open a new phase in the Caucasus that would turn into a region-wide integration project. For this, the international community must pressure these countries to come up with a long-lasting solution. Under current circumstances, peace in the Caucasus stands on delicate ground.

Thus, the process in the Southern Caucasus should be carried out simultaneously both in Karabakh and Turkish-Armenian relations. Otherwise, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations would be limited and would carry the potential to bring new political risks for both countries governments. In the future the two countries should strive to keep the channels of dialogue open, but not in an aggressive manner. In this context, the power balance between Armenia and Turkey is not equal. Demands dictated by third parties are causing new reflexes in Turkey that are not in line with a solution. Turkey, unlike Armenia, is more ready to assess the process objectively, and demands from Turkey should likewise be rational. Territorial claims or compensation demands from Turkey by Armenians in Armenia or the diaspora simply affect the process of rebuilding relations negatively and pave the way to stronger taboos in Turkey.[14]

Instead, the relations between the two nations should be enhanced via cultural organizations, which would help politicians to overcome the public resistance. In this regard, Turkish-Greek relations represent a good model. The normalization process which began after the 1999 earthquake near Istanbul turned into a political success. The friendly dialogue among politicians and increasing interaction between the two nations helped the relations to develop. Yet again, the predominance of the Armenian diaspora in Armenian politics would influence these efforts.

Finally, outside players in the region and the international community have shown their intention to act pragmatically in the region. However, to solve the problems facing the South Caucasus, there is also need for rationalism among the Caucasian nations themselves. Rational policies should be pursued based on mutual interests as well as respect for international law and the sovereignty of each nation.

Hasan Selim Ozertem
USAK - Center for Eurasian Studies

To cite this article: Hasan Selim zertem, The Impasse in Turkish - Armenian Relations, Armenia 2010; Previous Activities Future Prospects, University of Tehran, Tehran, 4 August 2010.


End notes

[1] Justice and Development Party