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Kamer Kasim
Kamer Kasim |
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Wednesday, 28 July 2010
Recent events have spurred discussions on whether Turkey has changed its foreign-policy axis. While mere change is as unavoidable in foreign policy as in all fields, the point of contention is a potential dramatic change of axis. This kind of radical change in foreign policy is both difficult and very exceptional, caused by monumental changes within a country or the international system. For example, Iran, a regional ally of the United States before the 1979 Islamic revolution, has since become a country the United States has tried to isolate. Even though Poland was a member of Warsaw Pact, it became a member of the European Union and NATO in the post-Cold War era and has turned into one of the keenest supporters of U.S. policies. While the change seen in Iran can be explained by the toppling of a regime, the Polish case is not as simple, since it emerged along with a dramatic change in the international system.
After the end of Cold War era, commentators believed the disappearance of the Soviet threat would reduce Turkey’s strategic importance in the eyes of the Western alliance. Without a clear role for Turkey, discussions about the countrys foreign relations and position in the world intensified after 1991. Samuel P. Huntington famously noted in his essay on the Clash of Civilizations that Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. Such comments on the impact of the post-Cold War international system on Turkey turned out to be premature. It has since became obvious that the new international system would not be immune from conflicts, and regional conflicts in particular arose frequently and often threatened the international system. The emergence of Turkey as a regional power in the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans enabled the continuation of close relationship between Turkey and both the European Union and the United States. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the close alliance between Turkey and the United States continued in the form of cooperation in Afghanistan. Close relations have continued despite tensions that arose in the wake of the Turkish parliaments March 2003 rejection of the United States request for military transit through Turkey to Iraq. The United States even continued its support for Turkeys membership in the European Union.
Recent developments, however, have caused some to question whether Turkish foreign policy has withdrawn from the Western axis: the lifting of visa restrictions and increased friendliness with some Middle Eastern countries, energy cooperation with Russia, Ankaras relations with Hamas (not recognized by either the United States or the European Union), the incidents surrounding the Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid flotilla, and Turkeys opposition to the fourth round of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council, among others.
Turkeys rapprochement with certain Middle Eastern countries and the lifting of entry visa requirements are generally results of an already-established policy of close relations with its neighbors. Here, cries of change of axis are simply wrong; one can argue for a change of axis in Turkish foreign policy only if Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East has changed to be out of line with Western policy. Meanwhile, if European countries voice suspicions about economic linkages and energy cooperation with Russia, this would indicate a double standardseveral EU countries, particularly Germany, maintain strong energy cooperation with Russia. Again, this is not a change of axis away from the Western line. (Nevertheless, in my previous articles, I have indicated the negative side of the Turkey’s over-dependence on Russian natural gas and trade imbalances between Turkey and Russia.)
Turkeys close relations with Hamas on the Israeli-Palestinian conflictat the very least the way it has avoided criticizing Hamaswere seen as a change in foreign policy by the West. Yet this should also not be seen as a change of axis, since Turkey has carried out this policy in line with its view that the establishment of a single Palestinian Administration that includes Hamas is a necessary element of a solution to the problem. On the other hand, if these policies arouse suspicion in certain countries, Turkey has to take steps to remove these suspicions and treat both administrations in Palestine equally.
There is now a general consensus in international public opinion surrounding the May 2010 attempts to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and Israels disproportionate use of force in the incident. Here, the question should be to what extent the support the Turkish government supports such measures, as well as the extent to which Turkish policy coincides with other states policies and attitudes. While the Gaza blockade stands in the international spotlight, there are many other places around the world where people suffer. If some individuals or NGOs try to bring aid to those places, ignoring the sensitivities and warnings of other countries, then some degree of chaos and break-ups in relations among states can obviously be expected.
The other subject in the axis discussion is Turkeys vote of opposition in the UN Security Council against the decision to take further sanctions against Iran. This has to be seen in a different framework. While Turkeys attitude in the case of Gaza enjoys the general support of international public opinion, its vote against Iranian sanctions received no such support. On the contrary, several countries from a wide variety of geographies have supported these sanctions for different reasons. Turkey is relatively alone in downplaying the threat of Irans nuclear program. As seen in the policies of several countries as well as writings and contacts by academicians and ambassadors, many perceive Irans nuclear program as a threat and support the sanctions as a non-military option. Moreover, Arab countries perceive Iran as a threat and find current sanctions insufficient. Arab countries even argued that the final decision on sanctions was in fact watered down from its original version.
Turkey and Brazil had worked together to sign an agreement with Iran on its nuclear activities. Nevertheless, this agreement has not terminated Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts. Hence, many countries including the United States fear that this is not a preventive agreement that has the power to stop Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that the agreement stipulates that Iran give 1,200 kg of uranium enriched by 3.5 percent to Turkey in return (one year later) for 120 kg of uranium enriched by 20 percent. The misunderstanding between the United States and Turkey arises from the fear that if Iran continues to enrich uranium, it will buy time and delay the sanctions. These fears were based on the Iranian refusal to stop uranium enrichment activities in line with UN Security Council decisions taken since 2006; Irans statements about the continuation of enrichment, made just after the Turko-Brazilian agreement, did not help Turkey.
Unlike the other examples given here, Turkeys opposition to the UN Security Council decision does represent a division between Turkish policy and that of its allies. However, such sanctions were supported not only by Turkeys allies, but also by Russia, China, Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria and Uganda as well, in addition to non-Security-Council members. In the final analysis, the division between these countries is not a matter of goals but of methods. A suspension of Irans nuclear program by using non-military methods is in the best interest of Turkey, and nuclear proliferation is not beneficial to any country. Every country, whether a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or not, have important responsibilities in this case.
It is obvious that Turkeys opposition vote at the UN Security Council arose from its timing and the particular circumstances of the agreement. The United States, in turn, must also recognize this. Turkey, for its part, should pay attention to the consequences of such stances, particularly as it plays the role of international negotiator and facilitator. None of this means that a Turkey aligned with the West allies cannot or should not differ from its allies’ foreign policy from time to time. Situations will continue to arise in which Turkey will think differently than its allies and stand its ground when required. However, these subjects should be those that are directly related to Turkeys interests (the Cyprus problem or the Armenian issue, for instance). For Turkey, it was unfortunate to be seen opposing its allies at a time when several countries are suspicious about the aim of Irans nuclear program. Yet neither this disagreement over policy, nor any of the other events singled out here in the discussion of contemporary Turkish foreign policy, should give rise to concerns over a Turkish change of axis.
Prof. Dr. Kamer KASIM
USAK Vice-President
