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Arzu Celalifer Ekinci
USAK Center for Energy Studies |
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Thursday, 4 March 2010
Nowadays almost the same titles are taking place in world news headlines: "IAEA report reflects concerns about military aspect of Iran’s nuclear program", "United States works on crippling sanctions toward Iran", "Iran rejected western backed IAEA plan", "Tehran’s offer is not acceptable" and the list goes on
Before analyzing the current issues about the ongoing crisis it would be better to have a birds-eye view of the recent events. For the first time ever, on 1 October 2009, there was a light of hope for the long lasting Iranian nuclear crisis. A swap formula was submitted by the IAEA and the Iranian government was warm to that opinion. Iran accepted the swap model, in which it would transfer its low enriched uranium to Russia and France and receive the nuclear fuel in return. Thereby the agency’s plan would have effectively deprived Iran of nuclear material for up to a year while Iran’s fuel was enriched in Russia and then converted into fuel rods in France.
But shortly after facing harsh criticisms from both reformists and conservatives inside the country, the Ahmadinejad Government stepped back, especially about the location of swap. Iran insisted that the swap could be done only on Iranian territory. Actually Ahmadinejad government’s positive response to the swap formula in Geneva was challenged due to two important reasons. It was challenged by reformists because they did not want the Ahmadinejad government to gain anything regarding the relations with the West or solutions to the nuclear crisis that could strengthen its hand in the domestic policies. It was challenged by conservatives because they do not trust the West and see the plan as a trap. Actually, despite the abovementioned reason, the reformist wings did share the same mistrust problem too. The general consensus was that realization of this formula would be a betrayal to the national interests of Iran and the critical question was "how could the government throw away the many years’ success of Iranian scientists and endanger Iranian nuclear activities when they were not sure that the Western countries would deliver the nuclear fuel in return?"
However, after this step back, former IAEA Director Mohammad El-Baradei, who relied on the good relations between Iran and Turkey, came up with the offer to store the uranium in Turkey. Turkey accepted the idea, and Turkey and Iran began to negotiate. We knew that the Iranian officials were not so supportive of the inclusion of Turkey at the beginning. They didn’t oppose it but they weren’t so in favor of the idea. Anyway while negotiations were continuing between Turkey and Iran, a harsh IAEA Resolution troubled the waters again. The timing of the IAEA’s resolution was not good due to the fact that the negotiations were ongoing, and this resolution just exacerbated the crisis. The Iranian government then declared its decision to build 10 more centrifuges. Fortunately, Iran later proposed another idea that the swaps could be made in parts instead of all at once. This was in response to the critics of the original swap plan, who argued that the West would not give Iran nuclear fuel in return for handing over its enriched uranium. Consequently Iran’s proposal in response to the IAEA’s proposal was: we can do it in parts through Turkey, Japan, Brazil, and Kish Island off of Iran (a free trade zone). Iran stated that it would wait until the end of January for a response. Otherwise, it would pursue its own activities.
However the Iranian proposal was rejected by the West and discussions and attempts regarding harder sanctions started again. Later on Iran asked the IAEA to provide fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which produces radioisotopes for cancer patients. It was accepted but the potential suppliers gave one condition. Despite receiving the money they also wanted to receive the material that had been produced in Iran. This means that the West is still pressuring Iran to accept the West-backed IAEA deal which requires Iran to send most of its low enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for conversion into the more refined fuel required by the Tehran research reactor to produce medical isotopes. This was the latest situation that encouraged Iran to process its low enriched uranium to 20% high-level enrichment. This intention was formally announced in a letter to the IAEA and declared by President Ahmadinejad as good news to the Iranian people at the 31st Anniversary of the Islamic Revolution ceremony. This was also another step for escalation.
There was another alternative offer submitted by the US when Iran said that it needs 120 kg of 20% enriched uranium to fuel the TRR, which produces medical isotopes for cancer patients and is running out of fuel. They offered to provide the radioisotopes needed for the TRR. The details of the offer are not clear, but it is known that idea was rejected by Iran. Iran’s argument is that the radioisotopes usually have a short half-life because of their radioactive nature. Therefore, they have to produce it in Iran in order to distribute them in a country with a large area and the isotopes must be given to different hospitals before they are dead . But fortunately Iran still leaves the door open to negotiations and according to their official statements the swap formula is still on the table.
The most recent development is the latest IAEA Report on the Iranian nuclear program, which was more assertive in highlighting the agency’s complaints about Iran’s nuclear program and less willing to acknowledge instances of its cooperation. While this report speaks about allegations and reiterates the necessity of more cooperation regarding finding answers to these allegations, those statements of possibilities were again illustrated as factual conclusions by the media. But it is necessary to emphasize that this report is the first to be issued since the Agency’s new chief has been in office, and its language actually reflects an increasing suspicion at the IAEA about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program. The most striking part of the report was the Agency’s emphasis on clarifying its concerns about the described activities that seem to have continued beyond 2004 . It is obvious that the language of the report annoyed Iran and Iranian officials harshly criticized the IAEA and its new chief as being biased. It was written in a hardliner Iranian newspaper that "The new director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency keeps away from a clear statement on Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities in order to keep the members of the U.N. Security Council happy."
To sum up, we still have this famous October Offer which is being passed successively on the table. The Western side wants Iran to accept the October offer as it was, but the Iranian side wants some modifications in order to guarantee their fuel supply. Tehran insists that its concerns on receiving guarantees for the return of its LEU should be heeded. The US, which first floated the proposal, refuses to consider Iran’s demand. But at least both sides insist that the doors for negotiations are open.
The most recent Iranian officials’ statements clearly show that they are ready to accept the proposal but they want to clear up some points about the form of the swap. For example, last week Iranian President Ahmadinejad said in one of his televised speeches that "We have no problem sending our enriched uranium abroad". Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki stated, "We agreed on the swap of the low-enriched uranium for the 20 percent enriched uranium. Because of that, we began and still are running and holding negotiations and talks with different parties. And, if we have some points regarding the form of the swap and agreed on the form of the swap, the issue of swap is possible to be carried out." But it can be seen that West is skeptic about Iran’s seriousness.
Consequently it can be said that we have a good formula to solve this crisis in hand but due to a mutual problem of mistrust this formula cannot be effectuated. It is understandable that the Western bloc is skeptic about Iran and its intentions for the ongoing nuclear program. But it should also be taken into consideration that if they want to curb the process and ask Iran not to process its uranium to a high level needed for fuel, they have to provide fuel supply guarantees. Especially while Iran has bitter experiences regarding this issue, how could Iran be expected to hand over all its uranium without any guarantees? There should be some mutually accepted things in order to satisfy both sides and remove the barriers of mistrust. Iran’s position can be better acknowledged through Iranian Permanent Representative to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh’s statement, "We accepted and agreed to send the required material for the fuel outside. The only thing is, because of the past confidence deficit, we insisted on the modality which will give the guarantee that we will receive the fuel at the end of the day, and this was the best logical, technically-sound proposal that Iran made during that negotiation. Simultaneous exchange of LEU (low-enriched uranium) produced in Iran with the fuel which will be going to be produced outside. In spite of the fact that inside Iran there are many legitimate, in fact, criticisms or expectations that what is the justification for that rather than giving money and taking the fuel, we are requested to give the fuel, I mean the material, but we informed that as a matter of principle we want to show our full cooperation, therefore we are still ready and therefore our proposal was still on the table".
Thus the first thing that needs to be solved is this trust problem. Neither side trusts each other for many different reasons. But it is obvious that some steps need to be taken in order to find an exit. And by wasting time with ifs’ and buts’ the existent swap formula may face the problem of being outmoded and we will have this crisis on the agenda again in the following years even more problematic than today.
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[1] Interview with Representative to IAEA, Iran Review, 9 February 2010
[2] IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the Director General, 18 February 2010
