The ones who remember the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003 did not predict a bright future for Turkey. How could they think of a good one? The only super power of the world had decided to occupy Iraq and demanded the help of Turkey. Turkey, striving for a recovery from one of the greatest economic crisis of its history with the help of the IMF, needed the support of the U.S. more than ever while feeling the forthcoming danger of the Iraq War. Here, in such an atmosphere, the U.S., which wanted the support of Turkey in the war, was furious and shocked as the 1 March Resolution was rejected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM).
The disaster scenarists were persistently claiming in their U.S.-based news analyses that Turkey would be having so many troublesome issues. The economy would get stuck, PKK terror would spread all around the country, Iraq would disintegrate, and Turkey would not have a role in the new Middle East. As a matter of fact, the first signals were on the way. The statements of Washington were not so encouraging. Turkey was neither a faithful ally nor a good fellow anymore.
The efforts of the U.S. to punish Turkey damaged the countries’ war on terror process, and reached its peak level with the incident of putting a sack over the heads of Special Forces soldiers of the Turkish Armed Forces.
All these developments showed that the new millennium would not bring good news for Turkey at all. Most people anticipated that Turkey would be excluded from the international system and would turn in on itself. However, none of these things happened. So what was the reason for this U-turn?
How did the country that was expected to be the biggest loser of the war become one of the biggest winners? The short and decisive answer to this question is that Turkey did not do things as others did. Turkey did not insert even a popgun in Iraq. It tried to reconcile the parties rather than supporting the conflict between them. It tried to show the importance of preserving civilian life to the groups that had too many reasons to kill. In this context, it tried to direct all its investments to the projects providing perpetuation. It showed a maximum effort to be sincere in its approaches on all groups by giving importance to the integration of Iraq.
Today, Turkey may be the only country that has achieved contact with almost all parties in Iraq. It has noticeably increased its economic and political influence in the region. As indicated in one of the articles of Newsweek Magazine “…it’s the Turks… who are now emerging as the war’s real winners. In economic terms Turkey is running neck and neck with Iran as Iraq’s biggest trading partner…”
Why Does the U.S. Need Turkey?
How the U.S. lost the war in Iraq is revealed in details in their reports. As emphasized in the reports, in the years following the occupation, the U.S. could not establish a new system to replace that which had been demolished. As a result, the U.S., which started the war as the only super power, realized that an adventure in the Middle East without Turkey would be a failure.
At this point, with its realization that it needs Turkey’s wisdom more than its military, the U.S. is now more willing to listen to Turkey than it was in the past. Since the short lived military achievements could not be transferred to achievements of the system in the following years, the U.S.’ need for Turkey further increased. Turkey’s occupation of an important position in the process of social and economic reconstruction, and in the improvement of the democratic institutions directed Washington towards Ankara.
To sum up, the reasons for Turkey’s emergence as the real winner of the war should be searched for in Ankara’s soft power as the synthesis of its historical depth, dynamic entrepreneurship, and reconciliatory culture. This soft power takes its roots from the foreign policy understanding based on the focus on preservation of civilian life and “common interests”. It is not even necessary to emphasize the need of the U.S. to cooperate with such an understanding.
Prof. Dr. Ihsan Bal
Director of USAK Center for Security Studies
Translated by Gamze Coskun
Edited by Kaitlin MacKenzie
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