Kaitlin MacKenzie JTW Columnist printable version send your friend

Thursday, 12 November 2009

Throughout his presidential campaign and in the months since he took office, President Obama has reiterated his view of Afghanistan as “the good war” that required the U.S.’ attention and support. Contrasting this situation with “the bad war” in Iraq, Obama has sought to scale up U.S. and international involvement, arguing that the war in Afghanistan is necessary. Yet, with so much at stake, there has been little explanation of exactly why and how this is necessary; Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed. This is because the decision has little to do with the specifics of the war itself; it is largely about domestic U.S. politics.

When embroiled in a conflict, dissent and skepticism often arise, but the voices of opposition heard today are calling in ever more strident tones for an answer to the most obvious questions: When will this end? Why are we there? When phrasing the question of what the United States is doing in Afghanistan, there are several possibilities: nation (re-)building, rooting out terrorists, and pursuing geopolitical interests. Without passing judgment on the relative importance of either of the first two options, the focus of this question of purpose can produce extremely varied responses from the American public. A Quinnipiac poll released in early October found a disparity in American public support when the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is stated as nation building or as fighting terrorism: “Voters 2 - 1 are willing to risk American troops to fight terrorism in Afghanistan, but they oppose 52 - 39 percent having U.S. troops ‘fight and possibly die’ to build a stable democracy there. And they expect 62 - 22 percent that this nation-building effort will fail.”[i]

As we can see from this poll, nation building receives very little support from the American public. They are much more willing to risk troops to “fight terrorism” – but what exactly does this entail? If the U.S. successfully rids Afghanistan of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, a difficult task in and of itself, it is left with a country with little physical or social infrastructure, a corrupt government, and a population distrustful of the U.S. In such a situation, the Afghani government by itself would have a hard time preventing terrorist groups from returning, thus obligating the U.S. to shift from a “terrorist-fighting” mentality to one of nation building, which could pose a problem both of American public support and of the means to carry out such an operation. The U.S. military is not trained in such endeavors, and the civil service lacks the human capacity. Furthermore, attempting to clear Afghanistan of Al Qaeda when the terrorist organization is setting up in Pakistan, Indonesia, Somalia, and Western cities seems to miss the point: after all, the 9/11 attack was planned in Hamburg – not in Kabul. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan actually undermines its attempts to prevent further terrorist attacks, for it provides easy propaganda material for terrorist organizations to use to recruit new members.

International support for the war is also dropping, and the U.S.’ partners are loath to continue their role in the war. In a weak and reluctant contribution to the U.S.-led war effort, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced on October 14 that Britain would add 500 more troops to the British contingent, if and only if other European nations also agree to send more troops, which Brown most surely knows is improbable. With each month more deadly than the last, for U.S. and international troops alike, one can hardly blame governments, citizens, and observers from demanding answers to these questions and results from the war effort.[ii]

Another facet of the opposition to the war centers on economic issues. With the American economy in the doldrums due to the recent global economic crisis, and expensive domestic issues at hand, the country can ill afford a war whose cost is now estimated to be over $400 billion dollars.[iii] When its economy is continuing to lose ground to its competitors who better weathered and bounced back from the crisis, how much longer will Washington continue to subsidize such an expensive conflict that has no clear end in sight?

Moreover, the decision whether to send more troops and further commit the U.S. to this conflict signifies a great deal more than appears on the surface: this choice, many have claimed, is but a proxy for the larger question of the future of the U.S. Changing course on Afghanistan is an acknowledgment that the U.S. cannot continue its current path. To ramp up, or continue, its engagement in Afghanistan is to concede that perpetual war has become its de facto policy, though it seems clear that war is neither a rational nor feasible solution to the problems facing the United States. A decision to scale back U.S. involvement abroad and reign in the refractory and unwieldy powers of the national security state, assuming these feats can be accomplished, could help to reset the balance between the executive and legislative branches.

These arguments notwithstanding, there are important points to be considered in support of the United States involvement in Afghanistan. First, the plight of the Afghani people must be remembered. Washington has made promises, and even if the U.S. presence is often resented, one ought to be mindful of the repercussions for the Afghani people should the U.S. fail to rid them of the Taliban. Second, a lack of progress in or withdrawal from Afghanistan could signal the overexpansion of the U.S. military to countries such as China, whose rise is carefully watched by Washington. Surely, the White House would rather not project an image of decline to its competitors.

Although these are valid points, it remains to be seen if they will prevail. The troops in Afghanistan are fighting on two different fronts: one against the Taliban and another against Al Qaeda. The original stated intent eight years ago was to root out Al Qaeda; now, though, with the terrorist group fortifying its position elsewhere, the fight has now turned to the Taliban. But, this endeavor has also failed. Discrimination of women remains, corruption runs rampant, civilian casualties are mounting, and the Taliban continues to garner support. Also, a paradigm shift is needed on behalf of the U.S. military command. The Afghan insurgency is localized: a group fighting in one valley often has little or no connection with an insurgent group in the neighboring valley. The multitudinous groups fighting the coalition forces across Afghanistan have few ideological ties to the Taliban but take its money to fight the foreign forces and maintain their own local power bases. The insurgency is not as nationalistic as has been claimed.

In light of the abovementioned reasons, an escalation of the war in Afghanistan seems but a never-ending battle, in which victory, however defined, would offer little to counterbalance the lives, resources, and time that would be sacrificed by the U.S. and its partners.

Note: This article was firstly published in Hurriyet Daily News on 11 November 2009.