Guner Ozkan JTW Columnist printable version send your friend message to author add comment ()

Friday, 23 October 2009

Guner Ozkan*

Azerbaijani Part of the Puzzle

The current state of her borders and one party rule in Azerbaijan was set by a delicate balance pursued by Haidar Aliyev, and later his son, Ilham Aliyev, in their relationship with their near and far abroad.  Thus, any damage or change in this balance reflects directly in the territorial and political stability/instability for Azerbaijan.  Her reaction to the signature of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation Protocols should be read in line with the abovementioned fear of Baku. 

All along Aliyev government has expressed that the exclusion of NK issue in the Protocols, in terms of ending the Armenian occupation in and around the region, was against the Azerbaijani national interests.  If these Protocols are put into effect word by word, it is true to say that they damage long standing Azerbaijani strategy of pushing Yerevan for compromise on the NK issue through strangling Armenia with a blockade in the directions of both Turkey and Azerbaijan.  In the fear of being left alone in its strategy, Aliyev has now been trying to use its energy card by seeking more natural gas trade with Russia in order to pressurize Turkey and the EU on the NABUCCO project.  This initiation of Azerbaijan is still in its initial state and may be further nurtured if Turkish government’s verbal promise of the inclusion of the NK issue and freeing the occupied Azerbaijani lands produces a fruitless result.  Wait and see is the best policy of Azerbaijan as she has already declared.  Azerbaijan will act accordingly while watching closely in the debate on the Protocols in the Turkish Parliament, trying to influence Turkish public and deputies, and struggling to repel likely external pressures on herself for more compromise in resolving the NK dispute.       

Then, the question of how much closer Azerbaijan and Armenian are to resolve the NK problem is of great importance for the applicability of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols. 

After the recent meeting between Aliyev and Sargsyan in Moldova at the CIS summit over the NK dispute, the two sides said that their talks were productive and have come much closer to resolve the problem, a kind of statement that has been made for years.  Yet, it is well known that central point over the dispute is what is going to be the final status of the NK region.  Numbers of options are still on the table, but a referendum on the status of the region is the one mentioned most by many observers.  Withdrawal of Armenian forces from 6 of 7 occupied territories of Lachin, Kelbajar, Agdam, Gabrail, Fizuli, Khubadly and Zangilan is said to have been accepted by the Armenian government.  Lachin, the region that separates NK and Armenia with a tiny land corridor, is believed to be still on the negotiating table about its status, size and security.  When the occupation of those 6 regions ends, Azerbaijani Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are planned to go back to their towns and cities, which may, of course, take a lengthy time period as all areas of the returnees must be first cleaned up from land mines.  

So, if that is the point where the sides are on the resolution of the NK issue, the problem is then still revolved around whether first Armenia will withdraw from 6 of the occupied Azerbaijani territories and the final status of the region will be decided later, and vice versa.   Therefore, whatever is said about the resolution of the NK issue, Azerbaijan and Armenia are still far away from reaching a solid peace deal. 

The US and the EU in the Debate

One must accept the fact that, different from any other powers involved in the NK debate individually or organizational levels, the US and big states in the EU have only interested in the resolution of the problem other than that of which conflicting side will benefit how much from the outcome.  Until the recent war in Georgia, the US and other western states’ policies on the resolution of the NK problem had been in that line of constructive non-involvement.  

Of course, vigorous application of 4 UN security Council Resolutions of 822, 853, 874 and 884 taken in 1993 urging the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories and respect for internationally recognized borders was not sought by neither the US governments nor powerful EU members like France and the UK throughout all those years.  Nor did they seem to have much concerned about nearly 800 thousands of Azerbaijanis expelled by the Armenian forces from the occupied regions (the total number of displaced Azerbaijanis are around 1 million when the expulsion of all Azerbaijanis living in Armenia during the NK war is added to that figure.)

The Western support for the Turkish-Armenian Protocols should be, therefore, interpreted in line with its urge for any kind of solution that fits well in its interests.  When asked what motivates the West to resolve the NK dispute, several objectives can be given: 1- giving more option to Armenia for its reaching out outside world, 2- breaking Russia’s dominance in the South Caucasus and Armenia in particular, 3- more effective containment of Iran through integrating Armenia and Azerbaijan into the western economic and political structures, 4- opening up more option for reaching the Caspian energy resources and pipelines towards the western direction to diversify Europe’s energy import (mainly natural gas) options, 5- providing sense of a more secure South Caucasus to minimize threats against the existing energy lines such as BTC, 6- easing up psychological barrier between the West and Russia intensified with the war in Georgia.  For the West, the benefits of a more stable South Caucasus with a peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan are not, of course, only limited to those above, many other benefits also exist, just like helping state building in the region and fighting against drug trafficking and terrorism.  

The reason why the US and the EU support possible reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia revolving around the alleged Armenian Genocide is because such a new cordial relationship is expected to accelerate the resolution of the NK dispute and then to help realize the western political and economic expectations along the line from the Black Sea region to the Caspian/ Central Asia.  The US and the EU should be aware that if there is no solution on the NK problem, possible reconciliation on the alleged Armenian Genocide issue between Ankara and Yerevan will not bring any benefit for both the West and Turkey.   In other words, winning Armenia by the West and Turkey means nothing for providing more economic, political and territorial security in the South Caucasus and beyond if Azerbaijan is lost.  Therefore, although Armenian side is vehemently oppose to any talks about resolving the NK issue in the context of the Protocols, unresolved state of the region will surely deprive Yerevan of many economic and political gains.  If put it simply, opening up Armenia towards the West via Turkey will remain short if that is not supported by another opening in her East, Azerbaijan.  As stated previously, for and foremost prerequisite is that both Armenia and Azerbaijan needs to resolve their differences over the NK region as early as possible in order to give a chance for the Protocols to be successful, and for that reason, they must be ready for facing more diplomatic pressures from the US and the EU.   

Russia’s Equation 

Russia, too, has had manifold objectives in the warm up of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia reflected with the signed Protocols. 

First of all, Russia believes that no matter what happens in the realization of the Protocols and how much closer Turkey and Armenia manage to come, she knows well that Yerevan will always be in need of Moscow’s backing.  Entire history of Armenia-Russia proves this fact, and no matter what happens in between Ankara and Yerevan, Moscow is sure of having remained as her ‘elder brother’ in the South Caucasus.  In fact, Armenia’s resistance to talk about the NK issue with Turkey and in the context of the Protocols has always been based on her strong strategic alliance with Russia.  Both Moscow and Yerevan know that while Russia is on the Armenian side, which is evident when one thinks of the presence of Russian military base in Armenia and of her borders and airspace protected by Russian forces, Armenia can easily resist any sort of Azerbaijani, Turkish and outside pressures, and continue to avoid any threat to use of force to liberate NK region from her occupation.  Strong base of this alliance was already openly, as seen all the time, illustrated by Sargsyan’s travel to Moscow first to meet the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev before to see the football match between Turkish and Armenian national teams in Turkey.  To the public, what they talked is clear, but in close doors it is a matter of guess, possibly the common strategic stance in the fate of the Protocols with Turkey and their regional and international impact.   

Second, Russia has now seen that Turkey has a number of problems with her Western allies, as has Russia with the US and various countries in the EU, and has been in search of various diverse strategic partnerships along her near and far abroad.  For Russia, if she allows or contributes to the removal of the enmity between Turkey and Armenia, she could really win Ankara’s trust that could then pave the way for more strategic and economic cooperation between the two countries.  After all, it is clear for Russia and many others that Turkey’s peace with Armenia will not alone be sufficient enough to take Ankara to the full membership of the EU or to make her the most important strategic partner of the US, the power that Moscow strongly believes it has been infringing Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus and other areas.  Turkey has already been pursuing a sort of foreign policy towards South Caucasus, the Black Sea region, Iran and the Middle East that they are much more complementary with those of the Russia’s than those of the US’s. 

Third, as some also observe, a long time ally of Armenia has suffered deeply from the war in Georgia and world financial crisis.  As an unpredictable Georgia is a reality in the region, Armenia may continue to bear more hardship in economic nature in addition to her already suffering from global economic crisis, all of which can further aggravate political stability in the country.  A friendly Turkey to Russia could then help boost Russia’s presence in Armenia rather than weakening her position there.  Even Russia and Turkey can cooperate in various economic projects in Armenia as they are doing bilaterally.  A prosperous Armenia, no matter how small she might be, can provide more security for Russian investment in the country and increase Armenian demands for goods from Russia.  So, it might be thought that an economically and politically stable Armenia is in the interests of both Russia and Turkey.  

Fourth, it is often stated that resolving the NK dispute and rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey are against Russia’s ongoing policy of controlling new energy lines from the Caspian region.  But, this kind of thinking was the prominent view in the 1990s until the decisions to build the BTC pipeline.  Russia, indeed, used the NK issue and some other issues like PKK problem in Turkey in the process of the discussions to decide whether it was wise to build the BTC during that period.  Yet, she failed to prevent it from realization despite the fact that the South Caucasus was a treacherous region posing threat to security of the energy lines. Even if Russia now wanted to use the NK issue to discredit the NABUCCO line, this would not be a serious obstacle for those partners who will decide to build it.  More than that, it is now much more difficult to trick Yerevan to go a war with Azerbaijan as such a move would be disastrous for Armenia.  This is not because Azerbaijan could come out as victorious side from such a war, but it would devastate Armenia’s already bankrupted economic and political structures. 

Turkey is no longer thinking that energy development and pipelines in the Caspian region is a game of zero sum game, but precious instruments for regional cooperation and problem solving tools.  She has especially intensified the relevance of this way of thinking in the South Caucasus region since the latest war in Georgia.  Turkey is now the biggest trade partner of Russia with over 38 billion dollars of annual trade volume, of which 75 % is made up of Russian gas export to Turkey.  Prospect of the economic cooperation and warm political cooperation between the two countries are much more strengthened with recent agreements on building nuclear power plant in Turkey by Russia, Turkish permission of the passage of South Stream pipeline via Turkey’s coastal waters, Russia’s backing of Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline and easing off custom restriction on Turkish goods coming to Russia.  While having such levels of cooperation between Turkey and Russia, one should ask himself the simple question of  what is best over the NK dispute; resolving it or keeping it as it is.   

In the final analysis, possible reconciliation between the two arch enemies, Armenia and Turkey, has never been so close.  Previously, interests of regional and international actors were so much conflicted that each side had fiercely fought to promote its own interests at the expense of other(s).  This is no way to suggest that all interested actors in the picture frame in Zurich have overlapping interests, but now the interests of the any one side can no way be considered as unacceptable for any other party as it was before.  External actors of Russia, the US and the EU can gain substantial political and economic benefits if they continue supporting Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. But again, any peace between Turkey and Armenia can neither be a real breakthrough nor produce much desired gains for them all if Azerbaijan is not satisfied in the resolution of the NK conflict.  Now, the prospect of resolving all the differences between Turkey and Armenia is in the hand of Ankara and Yerevan with a fairly strong external backing.  Whether they focus on bickering and clashing over the pains of their ancestors or on possible bright future of their children remains to be seen in the discussions and application of the matters put in the Protocols.  Let’s hope they choose the second option.  

*Dr. GUNER OZKAN is an expert on the Caucasus Region at the Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organisation (ISRO) and a Lecturer at Mugla University