Friday, 23 October 2009
Guner Ozkan*
The Turkish-Armenian Protocols, concurrently announced by Turkey and Armenia on 31 August on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of relations, were signed on October 10 in Zurich by the foreign ministers of the respective countries. Few days later, on October 14, the Presidents of two countries, Abdullah Gül of Turkey and Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia, watched their national football teams in Bursa in Turkey in the World Cup group qualification game. Unfortunately, there was not a man of the match on the pitch (the best player in a game chosen by viewers for his outstanding performance) as both teams had already lost their chances for going to South Africa next summer. There were, indeed, not one but two best players of the game, this time not on the pitch but among the spectators; they were Gül and Sargsyan. Inside and outside the stadium all eyes were on the two of them. How did they look one another? How did they shake each other’s hands? Did they talk? Did they make any jokes? These were the evaluation criteria for choosing the man of the match, and, ‘according to votes’, they performed very successfully.
But, when the time soon comes to talk over the hard topics, just like the agreed Protocols and disagreed NK issue, this serenity on the faces will likely be replaced with moody feelings, accusations and quarrels. Such acts of mutual disfavour between Turkey and Armenia seem to be evident. As a matter of fact, a last minute squabble over what the parties would say after the signature of the Protocols entails that discussions, legalizations and applications of these documents will face great challenges in and between Turkey and Armenia. Nevertheless, there are a lot at hand to be optimistic for the success of the Protocols and removal of the NK problem from the agendas of the states involved one way or another. For instance, just looking at the picture frame of the signing ceremony in Zurich signifies how important the international dimension of the Protocols is. Certainly, there are a lot of pros and cons of the reconciliation effort of Turkey and Armenia for all major actors. Thus, in order to test the prospect for the new Turkish-Armenian rapprochement attempt, one needs to look at who understands what and who wants what from these Protocols.
Armenia’s Expectations
Armenian government’s expectations from the Protocols are mainly based on economic reasons. Armenia has been suffering greatly from being a landlocked country leaving it to the mercy of limited economic and financial opportunities offered by Russia and Iran. At the time of global economic crisis, Armenian economy is predicted to shrink up to 15 per cent by the end of 2009. There are already 60 to 70 thousands Armenians from Armenia and Georgia currently living in Turkey as migrant workers and indirect trade level between the two countries is around $270 million.
Though not known who will benefit how much, and whether the Armenian economy will be able to compete with the Turkish goods, are open to debate when the borders are opened, Yerevan government has no longer wanted to be isolated from regional energy and transportation corridors in the direction of East to West. Last war between Georgia and Russia has further hardened the economic situation in the country, and Armenian government has no longer wanted to be too much dependent on unpredictable and volatile political and military risks along its northern border between Tbilisi and Moscow. It is also mainly the economic problem of the country that Armenia has faced a serious demography problem as the people leave their home to abroad for seeking jobs.
On the issue of alleged Armenian Genocide issue, Sargsyan government appears to leave the effort of its international recognition to the Armenian Diaspora. On the other hand, at the same time, Yerevan government thinks that it can defend the ‘Genocide’ claims in the proposed sub-commission on history to be established after diplomatic relation and border opening are accomplished. Perhaps, for soothing Diaspora’s protest against Armenian government’s acceptance to sign the Protocols or pointing out his real intention, Sargsyan expressed during his recent visits to Diaspora communities that he would never allow the dilution of the reality of the ‘Armenian Genocide’ by accepting the re-examination of the facts of ‘the Genocide’ in the sub-commission in the Protocols.
As he should be found accountable about what he is saying rather than what he has in his mind, it can be said that, as he reiterated to the Armenian Diaspora, Sargsyan only sees the sub-commission on history as a platform “to discuss the steps necessary for the removal of the consequences of the Genocide”…and “educate the Turkish public about the Armenian Genocide”. So, Sargsyan’s view on the alleged Armenian Genocide regarding the Protocols is that he will not give up his efforts for further international recognition of ‘the Genocide’, and even ask Turkey to recognize it and to pay compensation. Also, Sargsyan has seen the sub-commission to be set up as an opportunity to reveal all the details of ‘the Armenian Genocide’ for the wider Turkish public.
The other problem is Nagorno-Karabakh, what Armenians call it ‘Artsakh’ so as to emphasize that it historically belongs to the Armenian people. As known, Armenian government separates opening up the relationship with Turkey from the NK issue and strongly objects Turkish view on the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Obviously, as well as the alleged Armenian Genocide, the NK problem seems to be the most challenging issue to force Yerevan in the discussions in Armenia and later on with Turkey.
What Turkey Wants
Obviously, Turkey has fed up with ‘the Armenian Genocide’ issue being put in front of her every year on the 24th of April. Ankara, as anyone else, knows well that Sub-Commission on History in the Protocols will not stop Diaspora Armenians’ effort to seek recognition of ‘Genocide’ at the US Congress and many other international platforms alongside those which have already done so. Then, what is the objective of Turkey to discuss the ‘Genocide’ issue in the expected history commission if she is not going to get the desired aim of the drop of it from the agendas of various important country’s legislative organs and platforms?
Turkey seems to get two objectives to be realized by doing that: first, she can now say to any government, legislative organs abroad and authority dealing with ‘the Genocide’ issue that her counterpart on this matter is the Armenian government and working with Yerevan in tandem to reach a judgment. Also, discussing the issue with Yerevan will ease the pressure the American governments feel from Armenian Diaspora on the mentioning of the word of ‘Genocide’ each year on the 24th of April. Obama and his successors may now tell to the Armenian Diaspora that they had great progress on the issue and the parties were discussing ‘the Genocide’ matter.
Some governments in the EU may also be told by Turkey that ‘the Genocide’ is being discussed with the Armenian government and wait the findings of the history commission. Whether the US government and some EU states will satisfy with Turkey’s responses cannot be said now, at least for those pro-Turkey governments can use the progress as a reason for not pressurizing Ankara in the EU accession process.
Turkey also hopes that the Protocols help resolve the NK dispute. The Turkish government insists that without ending the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, the border with the latter will not be opened. Although the Protocols do not include any reference to the NK problem, Turkey has its own condition. This can be all along seen in the speeches of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu since the Protocols were announced to the public. How this impasse will be overcome by the sides is a big question waiting an answer.
If both Armenia and Turkey stick on their arguments on the NK issue in weeks ahead, both sides may not be able to move on from the point where they are now in the implementation of the Protocols. If this is the likely scenario, then both Turkey and Armenia will use their diplomatic muscles abroad to exert pressure against one another or directly face the same pressure from the same centres, which are of great interests in the Caucasus and Caspian region. This then means either to go back to the same point of pre-Protocols situation or to give up some of the conditions both sides have insisted on the NK problem.
*Dr. GUNER OZKAN is an expert on the Caucasus Region at the Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organisation (ISRO) and a Lecturer at Mugla University
Prospect for Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement: A New Beginning or a Dead End? (2/2)
