Friday, 9 October 2009
The Treaty of Lisbon has become an increasingly striking issue in the discussions since Ireland voted against the treaty last year in a referendum. It was the second time around for the question on Friday (October 2nd), when Ireland held a new referendum to which the Irish people said “yes” with a high percentage of the vote (67%). Last year’s vote against the treaty swept the supporters of the EU integration into a deep disappointment because Irish voters impeded the European constitutional process.
The Lisbon Treaty is an important turning point for the integration of the EU. As will be remembered, the EU Constitution, which was put forward as an ambitious target, had been rejected in the referenda of the Netherlands and France in 2005. Consequently, the questions regarding the legitimacy and identity of the EU came to the fore in different platforms, and a gap materialized between the institutional and political functioning of the Union. Therefore, the EU tried to overcome this ‘existential crisis’ during the last five years. The Treaty of Lisbon was the product of these efforts, mainly initiated by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. From a legal perspective, although the Lisbon Treaty is not a substitute for the EU Constitution and reveals the characteristics of periodic revision Treaty, it is of vital importance for the smooth functioning of European integration.
When it is considered in this context, the Irish referendum has a symbolic and practical significance. However, there is one important point to be underlined. With the Irish referendum, merely one of the prominent barriers before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was overcome. Further barriers still exist regarding the process. For instance, Czech President Vaclav Klaus, who is known for his counter stance to the idea of a federal Europe, constitutes another barrier. Nonetheless, the Irish referendum is important in terms of its consequences. This is because the referendum gives crucial clues.
The Global Financial Crisis and European Integration: Is it far too late to turn back?
The first lesson derived from the referendum is strongly related to the existing state of European integration. Up to now, Ireland was acting in accordance with the Union’s spirit. It tried to find the balance between its national interests and the basic principles of integration. In this regard, it supported the idea of an “ever closer Europe.” However, the Irish people backed the Lisbon Treaty the same as they did for the Nice Treaty in 2001. The 2009 referendum shows that Irish people did not want to carry the costs of exclusion from the EU. Since the integration of the EU has reached a significant level, “it is far too late to turn back.” When the destructive impacts of the recent financial crisis are taken into consideration, the cost of saying “no” to the EU has become a more expensive decision. In fact, it is very difficult to produce efficient solutions for reducing the impacts of the financial crisis on domestic economies by nation-states; therefore, they unwillingly accepted collective combat with the global financial crisis under the EU umbrella. In the case of the Irish referendum, in other words, the integration of the EU imposed itself on the member states. On the edge of a deep economic crisis, Iceland’s EU membership bid can be seen as an illuminating case in point.
In addition, the Irish referendum has created another significant consequence. Throughout the EU, the referendum has been sentenced to the poor management processes. There are still difficulties regarding informing the public and accessibility to clear and direct information on the EU legislation. As a result of this, there is room for policies that exploit the fears of the EU people. In the case of Ireland, the expression of European Commission President Barosso about giving wrong information to the public shows the validity of these concerns. It is a necessity to think on this poorly managed process by the European leaders. In order to successfully disseminate the accurate information among the people and to gain their support, it is of vital importance to initiate a public relations dialogue similar to technical regulations. In this regard, the value of the Irish referendum should not be underestimated and the process for the Czech Republic should be controlled through diplomatic channels.
What are the benefits of the Lisbon Treaty?
As mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty refers to a turning point in terms of EU integration. It has some symbolic meanings in addition to the EU’s existing troubled position on its institutional structure. For instance, the Lisbon Treaty helps provide a ‘single voice for Europe’ in the foreign policy area. Complaints of the failure to raise a single voice on foreign policy issues area well-known reality in the EU; each international problem carries the potential of turning into a domestic problem. In this regard, the Iraq War in 2003, the Georgia War in 2008 and the Israel-Palestinian War in 2009 are the exemplary cases. The EU presidency, which is included in the Lisbon Treaty, is an important step in that context. Besides, the EU can take a more efficient role in international affairs with a strengthened institutional structure and a Presidency. However, such a kind of Presidency needs to conduct works with a strong budget. It is not possible to overcome the problems in a global world with a small economic infrastructure. Moreover, if the new post will not have enough financial sources and will not be headed by a powerful leader, it would not contribute to the visibility of the EU. On the contrary, it will exacerbate the red tape in the EU bureaucracy.
It may be beneficial to underline another advantage of the Lisbon Treaty. With the Treaty, the third-pillar structure of the EU is to be transformed into one-pillar; thereby it is potentially possible to prevent the Americanization of the EU’s foreign policy, especially in terms of fundamental rights and freedoms. After 9/11, the EU tended to implement more radical policies. Whilst the member states increased their security measures, they did not improve the fundamental freedoms to balance these security measures. Additionally, the veto right of the members, which is derived from the third pillar, blocked the decision making process. With the one-pillar structure, a qualified majority voting system will be used; therefore the national veto would not be the prior determinant as a barrier in the process. Consequently, fundamental rights and freedoms would create the base for future positive expectations.
Conclusion: What is next after Lisbon?
In conclusion it can be said that the overwhelming support of the Irish people has eased the legal bottlenecks before the EU. Yet, it should not be interpreted as if it were the end of all problems. In fact, the EU has recently started to face its problems that it preferred to postpone after the 2005 referenda. Worse than that, the EU tries to address the existing “existential problems” amid the first global financial crisis of the 21st century. From this perspective, the Irish referendum should open doors for further ado, not for complacency. In order to make progress on the way opened by the Irish people, the European leaders should develop a courageous attitude. Probably, the first thing that should be done in this regard is to read the parameters of the Irish referendum correctly, and to understand why the Irish people said “yes.” If this cannot be achieved, every new referendum would contribute to the exacerbation of the legitimacy crisis in Europe. Obviously, such a situation would deteriorate the faith in the idea of European integration.
Translated by Muzaffer Vatansever, USAK Center for EU Studies
Edited by Kaitlin MacKenzie, JTW
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