Shortly after the announcement of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory with 62 percent of the total votes, opposition candidates refused to accept the results they claimed were rigged and demanded an annulment of the election. Immediately after, a huge crowd of people participated in mass demonstrations to protest the results of elections claimed to be fraudulent. The silent demonstration organized by the supporters of defeated presidential challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi was the biggest since the 1979 Revolution. People took to the streets to question where their votes were. On the other hand Iranians around the world have participated in organized demonstrations in front of Iranian Embassies to express their solidarity with the people on the streets and the opposition. But it can be said that rather than being a violent anti-government demonstration demanding a regime change, these were well-organized and conscious outpourings that shows the level of political maturity.
This political maturity and conscious approach of the people led Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei to call for a formal review of the results despite his unhappiness with the situation. Nevertheless, at the end of the random re-counting of 10 percent of the votes, Ahmadinejad was again declared the winner, and the Guardian Council announced his definite victory. Following this, Iran’s defeated presidential challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, who submitted a letter detailing the irregularities before and during the election process, called the new government illegitimate; he has stood firm on his demand for the election results to be annulled.
Mr. Mousavi, with his conservative background and his commitment to the values of the Islamic Revolution, has an advantage of being able to address both conservatives and reformists. It is known that many conservatives in power, who are in the line with founding leader Imam Khomeini, respect and support him. He also has supporters among Revolutionary Guards, traditional religious people and upper clergy. And Mousavi, with this multi-dimension profile, says that Ahmadinejad’s government is illegitimate since he does not have the real votes and support of the people.
On the other hand, Ahmadinejad, in spite of having a noteworthy electoral body (15-18 million people) from the beginning, has also been targeted by criticism from both the conservative and reformist wings. People were not so happy with his government because of the double-digit inflation and unemployment rates, limitations on personal freedoms and social life and also the negative outcomes of his strict and aggressive foreign policies. That’s why it was estimated that his chance of victory would be much higher if the turnout were not so high. But with the 85% turnout larger than expected, the announcement that Ahmadinejad had won 62 % was quite divisive. When we compare the current picture with the 2005 presidential elections Ahmadinejad seems to have received 13 million more votes, including silent votes, all of the previous term’s centrist votes and a remarkable percentage of reformist votes. This is why the legitimacy and reliability of the election are being questioned.
At that point an important question has emerged: To what cost does Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei support President Ahmadinejad? The opposition’s flexibility toward foreign countries regarding political, security and international issues is seen as a threat to the structure of regime by the key elements of the regime, and that may be one of the most important reasons why they try to prevent the reformists from coming to power. On the other hand Ahmadinejad’s uncompromising stance both inside and outside the country may be seen as the best tool to maintain the consistency of the regime and the high costs of supporting Ahmadinejad could be afforded for the sake of that goal.
This is why that many people think that there may have been some interference in the election to prevent a possible victory of the opposition. Nevertheless, apart from manipulating the votes, taking sides and supporting a specific candidate can be considered a major irregularity in itself. Both the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, who has the final word on elections, supported Ahmadinejad indirectly, which drew negative reactions from many bureaucrats and members of the clergy alike. It seems that this time the efforts to weaken the opposition seem to have caused structural damages in the regime.
On the other hand, the government’s strategy of using other countries as a scapegoat for internal upheaval has likely been weakened due to Obama’s recent strategy of non-intervention. Although the government still tries to associate some internal attempts with the U.S., this time the scapegoat policy did not work as expected. The government has tried to portray the opposition and Mousavi as traitors, but this strategy has become more difficult. It seems that the non-intervention policy of the U.S. has created the appropriate ground for people to have the chance to settle their internal issues and has weakened the most important strategy of the government.
Finally, the 2009 elections will be remembered as a turning point in the post-1979 Iranian political system, because the major conflicts in the regime and cracks in the clerical establishment became apparent for the first time. For example while ultra conservatives such as Mr. Shariatmadari, who is an advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, has accused Mr. Mousavi of being an agent of the U.S. and has asked for his trial, the Assembly of Qom Seminary Scholars and Researchers issued a statement saying that the Guardian Council - which upheld the disputed re-election of hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - no longer had the “right to judge in this case as some of its members have lost their impartial image in the eyes of the public”.
Anyhow, despite all the controversial points and ongoing debates about the legitimacy of the results, the 2009 presidential elections can be considered the most democratic elections ever held in the country. Concrete democratic improvements were seen during both the pre-election and post-election periods. Candidates’ campaigns, supporters’ activities and televised debates for the first time ever can be counted among those improvements. And finally, when the results failed to reflect the expected outcome, people were on the streets to protest and show their dissatisfaction.
Consequently, although the Iranian political system is dominated by conservative Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the president has a limited authority, the recent elections in Iran could be considered an improvement. It is not easy to make predictions about the future, but it can be said that a serious fissure has been created between the government that claims victory and those who believe that organized fraud occurred and are calling for change by protesting the situation. The main issue is the regime’s need for change. Both conservatives and reformists are aware of this fact, but the main problem is how and with which tools this change is going to be realized. In brief, this picture can be summarized as the problem of the evolution of the revolution, not a conflict between reformists and conservatives. And this process has been initiated in such a way that every forceful attempt to repress it will strengthen this movement’s will and the demand for change will show itself in other ways.
Note: This article was firstly published in Hurriyet Daily News on 13 July 2009.
