Thursday, 18 June 2009
Barack Obama’s highly anticipated speech in Cairo drew the attention of millions around the world, and though, as he stated himself, “change cannot happen overnight…no single speech can eradicate years of mistrust,” events since then lead one to ponder how much Obama can really do to bring about change.
Obama first addressed the tenuous relationship between the west and Islam during his trip to Turkey in April, although it was but briefly mentioned, for the impetus of his speech lay in addressing the foundering relations between Turkey and the U.S. that had fallen into disrepair during the Bush years. Despite its narrower, Turkey-centric, focus, the relationship between Islam and the west was nonetheless discussed.
The Cairo speech, while highlighting many of the same principles/ utilizing similar rhetoric as his speech in Ankara, had a much different focus. His audience included not only those in the U.S. and Egypt, or even in the Middle East, but was also closely watched throughout Europe and in many countries with significant Muslim populations. Obama’s rather difficult task was to please several audiences with very different, if not opposite, goals: Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and, of course, Americans, who had perhaps the strongest reaction to his speech.
While expectations were certainly high for his Ankara speech, the bar was set (by his own doing) even higher for the trip to Cairo. And, though both speeches were well received, both in their respective countries and abroad in general, the possibility for failure remains much higher for the Cairo speech due to its loftier goals, larger audience, and dependence on other parties for its success. But, unsurprisingly, the speech built upon many of the talking points in which he (and his administration) are well versed, having refined them over the campaign trail and beginning months of his presidency. In this manner, Obamaism came to Egypt.
Obama has repeatedly stated the need for greater understanding of and respect for the Muslim world, taking care to highlight the issue during his presidential campaign and throughout these first few months of his presidency; even his first interview as president was given to Al-Arabiya, an Arab satellite station. He briefly mentioned the issue during his speech in Ankara, addressing the tenuous relationship between Islam and the west, although the impetus of the speech lay in addressing the foundering relations between Turkey and the U.S. that had fallen into such disrepair during the Bush years. Perhaps this brief mention served to set the stage for his trip to Cairo, a field assessment and icebreaker of sorts. Yet despite his warm welcome in Turkey and his high popularity across the Middle East, support for the U.S. significantly lags behind his personal popularity, a product in large part of the previous administration. On top of this, paying a visit there, let along giving an ambitious speech, can be quite a difficult act for any American president due to the number of highly sensitive issues and opposing ideologies at play – one must strike a delicate balance to avoid fracturing the already fragile situation, while also keeping in mind the demands of one’s domestic audience, a powerful force that scrutinizes every minutiae of the president’s actions abroad. Indeed, his trip to the Middle East, a politically charged situation, was subjected to the highest scrutiny by the American media, some in hopes of finding evidence of an anti-American bias. Overall, though, his words were well received by the U.S. domestic media and Arab media alike. With so many interests to please, the bar was set quite high, but he addressed the situation in his customary earnest and sincere manner, emphasizing commonalities and making frequent references to history and religion. Such an attitude is a sea change from his predecessor, whose “with us or against us” mentality quickly wore thin the patience of many worldwide. It is interesting to note the differences in the way Bush, on his last trip to the region, and Obama, on his first, were received: Bush was targeted by a shoe-throwing Iraqi journalist, while Obama received a standing ovation.
The speech itself was eloquent and clear, and Obama did not shy from addressing many pressing issues, touching on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, democracy, extremism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, women’s rights, and religious freedom. In the entire 55-minute speech, he did not use the word “terrorism” once – also a notable and clearly intentional departure from his predecessor. Obama aims to create a more open atmosphere for discussion in which real change can occur – he urged governments to listen to their people and to each other, a request some deem naïve, saying they will “wait and see,” but many are hopeful his efforts will pay off.
How does this play into Obama’s larger foreign policy?
With many following the actions and words of the U.S. president, who has now made several forays into the international arena and has addressed a myriad of highly important issues, perhaps it is time to delve into what the principles of the Obama Doctrine will be, or if there will be an Obama doctrine. A president’s doctrine, a way of referring to his style regarding foreign policy actions and decisions, tends to be labeled after the fact. In the past, a president’s doctrine has tended to become rather dogmatic with time and the president often falls into a doctrine-defined rut – for a clear example of this we must look back no farther than the last president. As Obama has so far shown an aversion to maintaining the status quo for the sake of continuity, perhaps the only Obama Doctrine will be that there is no Obama Doctrine, only Obama himself. In his foreign policy decisions, he has followed a relatively uniform pattern, a trait that lends itself to this pursuit, and the most important things they have in common are his insistence on knowledge and understanding of each situation’s particularities, especially the underlying history, and his willingness to change his position. When addressing foreign audiences, he makes frequent references to the history between their country and his, for instance Ottoman Sultan Abdulmecid’s gift of a marble plaque for the Washington Monument, or Morocco being the first nation to officially recognize the new United States of America. He also tends to employ foreign phrases or culturally relevant quotations to forge a bond with the audience – to charm them and make them feel he is personally interested in them and their situation.
Obama’s charm and popularity are key to the success of his foreign policy agenda. His view of the world is reminiscent of Clinton’s: that America should address international issues by listening to and working with other countries, including through the UN, and that while American leadership is fine, intervention is something to be avoided at all costs – wars of choice are no longer an option. In order to accomplish his many lofty goals, Obama must persuade other leaders and nations to join him, to work together to overcome the often vast distances between their points of view to reach a conclusion acceptable to all. This is no easy task. He relies heavily on soft power to make his appeal, using his charm in hopes of persuading others to join together. While the use of soft power is nothing new in foreign affairs, Obama seems to be relying on it much more heavily than his predecessors did, which begs the question: what if he fails? Indeed, putting nearly all of his eggs in one basket could result in disastrous consequences. However, with a generally positive reaction to his latest speeches, one hopes that Obama will succeed. Already, he has taken a much stronger position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it seems likely that the Netanyahu administration will listen. Also, Hezbollah’s loss in Lebanon bodes well for Obama. Such a succession of events, I think, would only serve to bolster Obama’s credibility and give him even greater leverage to pursue his policies.
Kaitlin MacKenzie is a researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization’s (USAK) U.S. Studies desk.
Note: This article was firstly published in Hurriyet Daily News on 15 June 2009.
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