Mustafa Kutlay Researcher, USAK printable version send your friend message to author add comment ()

Thursday, 21 May 2009

Turkey, after a long struggle, finally started membership talks with the European Union in October 2005. When the negotiations started, the level of optimism among the Turkish public was quite high. Even, the decision was welcomed as the “realization of a dream” by some pundits. In retrospect, it is obvious that October 3, 2005 was a milestone not for only Turkey, but also for the EU from strategic point of view. However, there is also one more aspect that we need to underline strongly in the current conjuncture: Having decided to kick-off accession negotiations with Turkey, the bloc explicitly declared to apply the same standards to Turkey with the other countries.      

The post-2005 developments, however, evolved into a different direction than the expectations and the optimistic atmosphere in Turkey started to dissipate gradually. Finally, Sarkozy’s latest inflammatory statements and German Chancellor’s backing caused distrust between parties to reach its climax. Sarkozy told German newspaper Bild am Sonntag that "we need a well-organized Europe [...] that means we cannot expand without borders. We shouldn't make any empty promises to Turkey"[1] In fact, there is nothing new what Sarkozy said. It is the timing of the statement that aroused the anger of the Turkish side.

Abdullah Gul, Turkish President, is the one who severely criticized the Franco-German statement against Turkey’s full membership bid. He reminded the French and German leaders that they were the EU member states which unanimously decided to kick-off the negotiations in 2005. He then questioned the ‘sincerity’ of the European leaders:  

"There has been a unanimous decision [by EU member states] to start negotiations with Turkey...Any discussion on this is tantamount to violating the decisions taken by the EU and would mean that the decision to start negotiations with Turkey was not sincere, that the heads of state took a decision that did not reflect their intentions."[2]

As it is mentioned above, the sincerity problem that Turkish President touched upon lies at the very heart of the current relations between Turkey and the Union. Turkish public opinion is quite skeptic about the EU and the public support which was almost 60 percent in 2005 dramatically declined to 42 percent in autumn 2008.   

One Europe or Many?

Yet, it is of vital importance at this point to underscore that Turks do not face with ‘single’ European Union. Or putting it another way, Franco-German rhetoric regarding Turkish membership does not cover the entire story. As the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt emphasized in a recent interview, “22 of the 27 EU member states implicitly and/or explicitly support Turkey’s membership bid.”[3]      

European Commission and the relevant staff, in this regard, is one of the most unambiguous supporters of Turkey. In a recent joint press conference with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn challenged the Franco-German rhetoric indirectly and stated similar arguments to the Turkish President. He argued that:

"The European Commission is committed to the EU accession process of Turkey ... on the basis of the negotiating framework that was adopted by unanimity by all [EU] member states and Turkey in October 2005."[4]

It is not difficult to bring further examples defying Mr. Sarkozy’s and Ms. Merkel’s declamatory enlargement claims. Yet, what is the important point here is that there is not one Europe and European Union. In fact, it is not surprising to see a divided Europe from two points of view. First of all, the EU has always diverges and splits into ‘sub-unions’ in almost every strategic issue. In this sense, it is somehow normal for the Turkish issue, a case of which has considerable strategic implications to create tensions within the community. The second one is about the history of the European integration. Contrary to the mainstream beliefs “the history of Europe is the history not only of its unifying ideas, but also of its divisions and frontiers, both internal and external.”[5]  

How Turkey Interprets the Events?

If one interprets the events from the above framework, there is almost nothing extraordinary. Albeit the sui generis nature of Turkey-EU relations, the ups and downs during the integration process is the characteristics of almost all enlargement waves, and bilateral relations gains importance throughout the negotiations. As a matter of fact, the decision-making elite in Turkish foreign policy know this side of the reality clearly. It is evident in one of Turkish Foreign Minister’s books written eight years ago:

 “As there has been no single West before Turkey, there will not be a single Europe. There is a strong European diplomacy tradition backed by strong national strategies that always has the potential to pave the way for internal conflicts and the clash of interests in Europe.  This situation requires [Turkey] to fine diplomacy tuning between the EU as a whole and bilateral relations conducted among members of the EU.” [6]

In summary, this is what Turkey’s interpretation of the current Franco-German rhetoric. It knows that there is no single Europe and there would not be in the foreseeable future. At the same time, it questions the strategic implications of Franco-German rhetoric and asks the costs of a divided Europe? Acrually, what may be the long-term costs of breaking pacta sunt servanda principle for the EU?

Mustafa Kutlay

USAK Center for EU Studies

mustafakutlay@gmail.com