Barin Kayaoglu JTW Columnist printable version send your friend message to author add comment ()

Friday, 17 April 2009

President Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey last week, his first to a Muslim nation since becoming Chief Executive on January 20, was a significant success. During his two-day visit to Ankara and Istanbul, Obama did and said all the right things. His most crucial statement came in response to the question of whether he was sending a message to the world by concluding his European trip in Turkey. His answer was, in plain and simple Turkish, “evet” (yes). “Turkey is a critical ally,” Obama said, “Turkey is an important part of Europe.” Therefore, “Turkey and the United States must stand together – and work together – to overcome the challenges of our time.” Obama also brought back old memories of U.S.-Turkish relations: “Turkish troops have served by our side from Korea to Kosovo to Kabul.”

To be sure, not all that the American president said was music to every Turkish ear. During the press conference with his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gül, Obama was reminded of his campaign promise to recognize the events of 1915 and the fate of Ottoman Armenians as genocide. The American president’s adroit response (that he stood by his statements, but Turks and Armenians are the ones who could resolve this issue) and his reference to the problematic episodes of U.S. history (slavery and the extermination of the Natives) was not welcomed by those on the Turkish political right.

Overall, however, Obama’s visit – less than three months into his presidency – has been well-received in Turkey. As opposed to the Bush administration, which carried out policies detrimental to Turkish interests and fueled anti-Americanism, Obama passed his first Turkish test.

The next test is approaching fast: On April 24 (the day that Armenians claim their genocide began), immense pressure will be brought on Obama. To be sure, Armenians’ hope to get Western powers – in this instance, the United States – to talk over Turkish heads is just as counterproductive today as it was a century ago. Therefore, as president, Obama will probably extricate himself by reiterating the statement he made in Turkey (“my views are on record and I have not changed my views [but] what I want to do is not focus on my views right now and focus on the views of the Turkish and the Armenian people”) and advise Armenian Americans and the Armenian Diaspora to sit down and talk things through with Turkey and Azerbaijan (Armenia’s occupation of twenty percent of Azeri territory bedevils Armenian-Turkish relations even more than the question of whether 1915 was a genocide or not).

A more critical test will be to secure Turkish cooperation in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. With the Bush administration’s successive blunders, Turkey, until recently, had followed a more independent course in all three countries. Ankara refused to deal with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq and threatened unilateral military operation into the area; further improved its relations with Iran; and objected to U.S. pressure to increase its military presence in Afghanistan.

To be sure, Turkey has been readjusting its Iraq policy some time. In fact, both President Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have paid state visits to Iraq since last summer. Meanwhile, as the Iraqi government does more to restrict the terrorist group PKK’s ability to stage attacks against Turkish forces and civilians, Ankara becomes more lenient toward the KRG. That change in attitude is now allowing Ankara to become involved in Iraq more constructively. For its part, by paying closer attention to Turkish concerns over the PKK, the Obama administration can pass that Turkish test as well.

Beyond Iraq, Turkey can use Obama’s presidency as an opportunity to underline its critical importance in the region. Ankara should help Washington with “talking Turkish” to Tehran. The Obama administration has already declared its willingness to negotiate directly with the Islamic Republic. This position very much reflects what Turkey has done with Iran since the late 1990s: trade and talk. By buying Iranian natural gas and negotiating the elimination of PKK terrorists from Iranian territory, Ankara has been able to resolve many of its disagreements with Tehran.

In this respect, if Washington addresses Iran’s security concerns – mostly emanating from the two American wars in its neighborhood – and supports projects to transport Iranian oil and natural gas to Europe through Turkey, it could achieve multiple objectives at once: Once Iran has more markets for its hydrocarbon and does not feel threatened by the United States, it will cooperate much more effectively in Iraq and Afghanistan and will be more open about its nuclear program (also rendering a pre-emptive strike by Israel useless). For Ankara, that mean removing Iran as a potential flashpoint and avoiding a third regional war in less than ten years.

With respect to Afghanistan and NATO, it is unlikely that Turkey shall commit more forces, something that Washington has been pushing for a while. Arguably, Turkey could have taken the initiative in the Central Asian nation by sending, say, 10,000 troops in exchange for Washington’s withdrawal of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s candidacy as the next Secretary-General of NATO. Regardless of one’s position on the Danish cartoon crisis, it is almost certain that the Taliban and Al Qaeda will use Rasmussen to undermine NATO efforts in Afghanistan.

But Rasmussen is clearly taking over on August 1. The good news is that Turkey has apparently secured one of the Deputy Secretariats-General as well as several senior military commands within the Alliance. On top of these, Turkey needs to do the smart thing and complement these gains with an increase in its civilian presence in Afghanistan. Even a symbolic increase in Turkish military posture will be an even more brilliant stroke. Turkish engineers and troops have been a welcome sight for Afghan people since the toppling of the Taliban in 2001. It is reported, for example, that some NATO countries that have troops in Afghanistan are putting small Turkish flags on the shoulders of their soldiers in order to protect them during patrols and convoy escorts. By assuming a commanding position in Afghanistan, Turkey can demonstrate to the United States and European Turcophobes its undeniable significance in one of the world’s most troublesome spots.

Given the negative reaction from French president Nicolas Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel to President Obama’s express endorsement of Turkey’s EU bid last week, it is unlikely that Turkey will be able to join the EU. On the other hand, Turkey can use the Obama opportunity to increase its posture in the areas to its south and east by playing a more constructive role. If Turkey accelerates its domestic economic and political reforms and set a better example to the Muslim world that democracy, secularism, and Islam can co-exist; if Turkey and the United States work more closely in Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan; and if Ankara can resolve its problems with Armenia and mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there will be no reason to worry about the likes of Sarkozy and Merkel.

Last week’s visit created a new momentum in Turkish-American relations. It must be used effectively. If Obama takes his Turkish tests seriously and if Ankara makes good use of the Obama opportunity, the future of U.S. relations with the Muslim world and Turkey can improve remarkably. “Evet, yapabiliriz!”