Thursday, 5 March 2009
Towards the March 29 local elections, one of the top questions on the agenda is who will win Diyarbakir and who will receive the votes of the citizens of Kurdish origin. In this process, the DTP’s propaganda, which aims to get the votes of Kurdish people and practices politics through the lens of ethnic identity, is built upon polarization. As the election date comes closer, this polarization and blocking strategy seems to be continued with a higher tone by the DTP politicians.
What is Identity Politics?
DTP supporters and others, even the ruling party, are convinced that the party focuses on ethnic nationalism and uses identity politics. However, the reality of this is extremely doubtful. Identity politics, first and foremost, may be defined as the recognition and acceptance of an existing identity, the promotion of its influence, building a respectable position in society, and restoring the group’s reputation. First of all, identity politics aim to form new areas of achievement by assessing these developments in favor of the Kurdish people.
Identity politics includes an effort to meet its constituents’ social demand by expanding the reach of politics based on verbal communication and reversing any incorrect perceptions of the identity. In this regard, identity politics, on the most basic level, is a conversion of social acceptances in the fields of language, religion, history, culture, and arts to fit the natural, normal, and internalized standards in that country. In the context of religion in Turkey, the Kurds do not have a polarizing but an integrating role, and not have a differentiating but a complementary role in the natural structure of the country. That is to say, a Turkish citizen in Izmir and a Turkish citizen in Diyarbakir do share the same ideas on this issue. The issue does not seem problematic or complicated in terms of historical references. However, considering the identity issue of Kurdish citizens in Turkey, the most controversial and inflammatory subject is language. When you talk with a Kurd, the issues related to the Kurdish language form the significant part of the demand list. Moreover, it could be said that the recognition of their cultural demands and regaining their reputation is based on the recognition and promotion of Kurdish. So, how does the DTP use identity politics in Turkey?
The DTP’s Perception of Identity Politics
Recently in Turkey, new regulations have taken place such as lifting barriers of Kurdish publications and broadcasting, opening Kurdish language centers, and allowing families to give Kurdish names to their children. The recent developments occurring in Turkey in favor of general rights and freedoms have undoubtedly made a positive impact on the issue of the Kurds’ identity requests. The latest such acquisition is a television station which broadcasts in Kurdish. Kurdish television broadcasting pleased the people in the region and according to IPSOS, a research company, data shows that Kurdish television broadcasting was welcomed by the 71% of the population. How should the DTP, accused of practicing identity politics, behave in this situation which the local people view as an achievement? Of course, they have to share this happiness with the people and should appreciate their achievement. A show of support by spending effort to enhance the content and quality of broadcasting and supporting similar issues is a further sign of goodwill.
However, the DTP’s attitude against towards these achievements took the shape of first discomposure, then anger, and then an effort to keep people away from this broadcasting. Yet, since the beginning of the Kurdish broadcasting, propaganda such as “this broadcasting is a part of an assimilation policy towards the Kurds and Turkey will try to deliver its political discourse in Kurdish through this TV channel” has become increasingly prevalent and has been well supported. According to the public opinion survey held by IPSOS in Diyarbakir, the positive view of the DTP supporters towards TRT-6 fell to 56%, while other voters’ positive view of the channel reached 90%. The interesting part of the issue is that the DTP has not expressed its discomfort for Kurdish broadcasting from Iran, Iraq, the US, and the UK. Moreover, the municipalities of the DTP continued to support terror advocate Roj TV which called local people to protest against the government on 26 March 2006.
A Sincerity Test of the DTP
Identity politics may get successful results by communicating through rhetoric, not violence. Introducing Kurdish broadcasting to people should have other meanings for DTP because they considered this a test of the government’s sincerity. Indeed, DTP Group Chairman Ahmet Turk tested this sincerity by speaking in Kurdish in the parliament during a live broadcast. However, the DTP’s attempts to “test” the Republic of Turkey and Turkey’s legislation somehow always happen when the situation has normalized.
As a parliamentarian, Mr. Turk should know more than anyone that if the law does not allow it, nothing can be done. If there is such a demand, the most important task of a parliamentarian is to attempt to remove the ban by proposing a bill. Parliamentarians, as elected officials, should act according to the rules and rhetoric of politics. They try to achieve their political projects by using the widest political maneuvering space as politics will permit. The language of politics and parliamentary responsibilities should not be manipulated with the language of terrorism and the irresponsibility of terrorists.
Identity politics demands respect of all other identities in the country. While Turkey expands the areas of freedom by taking into consideration all differences, decreases the terrorist detention period to four days, and launches hypercritical operations to separate innocent people from terrorists, the DTP and its supporters strongly criticize many security operations. However, the DTP’s silence regarding the death of 6 young students in PKK bombing attacks on 3 January 2008 is an important contradiction. A DTP parliamentarian who protested this attack was rebuked and taken to the curb. However, the DTP did not speak out against the PKK but tried to legitimate it, pronouncing Ocalan an important “Kurdish leader.”
The DTP states it is for Kurdish freedom, human rights, equality, restored reputation, and recognition of culture, yet these claims are undermined by its tacit acceptance of the PKK’s killing of innocent people. This contradictory approach might have been covered during the propaganda war in which the DTP raised clouds of dust, and is now becoming more and more visible in Turkey.
Identity Abuse of the DTP
Turkey’s liberalization, democratization, and development of a first-class state of law should be the priorities of one claiming to practice identity politics. However, it is seen that Turkey’s positive changes rattle the DTP and its supporters. The welcoming attitude toward DTP deputies – even the general chairman of Turkey’s most nationalist party Mr. Devlet Bahceli welcomed them and shook hands – was based on the hope that the DTP would not refuse their open hands and hearts. Nevertheless, it seems that all those hopes have been frustrated in the atmosphere of local elections. As a leopard cannot change its spots, DTP politicians who use children and women as a shield have chosen to feel powerful at a rate of broken windows, burned tires, and stoned police officers. They try to create tension in the country by saying, “They recognized our language, they recognized our identity, and now they will recognize our lands.”
It seems that the DTP and its supporters are trying to hide the truth by leading the Kurdish people into an emotional crisis, as they did for many years, during the election campaign. So, "what is truth?" The improved state-society and Turk-Kurd relations in Turkey trigger a more aggressive form of the DTP. The more communication channels grow in Turkey and the more powerful social, economic, and cultural integration becomes, the more irritated the DTP becomes. Each “achievement” offered by the democracy in Turkey exhausts the DTP’s patience. The DTP cannot applaud the parliament even once, focused on the directives of the Kandil Mountains. Even though there have been no civilian casualties during the cross-border operations, the DTP has created bloody hell. Yet it does not raise its voice against the terrorists who bomb streets in Diyarbakir or fire on the military service bus.
Yes, there are targets to be reached and this process should be completed in Turkey. Recognition of the Kurds’ demands and their self-identification as equals of the other citizens of the country is undoubtedly important. Turkey’s dream will be realized when all citizens in the country feel they are important and they are equal before the law. However, the DTP has made no contribution to this dream so far. Furthermore, the DTP acts against this by destroying, blocking, and underrating all positive developments. This is an illness and it has become more severe during the upcoming local elections. The best indication of the DTP’s grassroots support is the number of street demonstrations during the election process. If the DTP wins more votes, there will be fewer protests and reduced tension. On the contrary, if the DTP loses support, tension will increase, leading to more demonstrations. The party will try to influence the local people to vote according to their emotions and anger rather than according to rational judgment. Therefore, everyone who lives in Turkey needs to know that the DTP does not practice identity politics. What DTP uses is “identity abuse in the shadow of tension and anger.” That’s why every positive development for the citizens of Kurdish origin makes the DTP anxious and sad instead of happy.
Translated by Salih Dogan (JTW)
Edited by Kaitlin MacKenzie (JTW)
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