The political economy of Turkey-EU relations has always been an exciting subject for the students of world politics. Given that Turkey is a secular country whose population is overwhelmingly composed of Muslims, i.e. represents the ‘other’ of the Europeans throughout the history, her membership prospects create anxieties for the people not only from the EU Member States, but also from Turkey.
As we know from the prior crises conditions, the turbulent times are invaluable opportunities for the extremists to exacerbate the existing anxieties within the society and to reflect the externalities of the crises on the shoulders of the ‘others’. In this way, it becomes possible for the politicians to sweep the existing problems under the carpet, at least for the time being. When the current stalemate in Turkey-EU relations is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the same process is prevalent for the same case at stake. Yet, who benefits and who loses from the existing conditions: Turkey, the EU, or specific groups on both sides at the expense of many others?
Does Turkey Benefit?
In the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the Heads of States or Governments of the EU Member States kicked off a historical process by declaring Turkey a formal candidate country. After then, the period between 2002 and 2006, turned out to be the ‘golden age’ in terms of Turkey-EU relations. Over this period, the Turkish political economy transformed significantly. In the economic realm, the relations between the state and businessmen have started to be institutionalized, and the policy-making processes have evolved into the ‘rule-based’ market economy from the friendship-based crony capitalism. Even though the state-business relations are already fragile, it is obvious that the EU process has underpinned Turkey to turn out to be a more ‘trading state’. In the political realm, Turkey has experienced a democratization wave in the sense that the law of associations has been amended, the human rights violations and torture and ill-treatment have been reduced dramatically, and the freedom of expression has gained ground in different segments of the society. Finally, in the foreign policy realm, the visibility of Turkey has increased, which in turn paved the way for it to play an influential stabilizer role in the unstable Middle East and Caucasus regions.
Trying to explain all the above developments which took place in Turkey between 2002 and 2006 by just relying on the transformative role of the EU would be a stark exaggeration, but it would be another mistake to reduce the EU’s anchor role to a factor “inter alia”.
However, after 2005, a new phase in the relations has begun, and in a surprising way to many observers, Turkey-EU relations shifted onto a completely different track. The political motivation of both sides melted down and ‘ignorance’ turned out to be the currency of Turkey-EU relations. As a result, the negotiations plunged into the de facto stalemate.
One question comes to the minds at this point: If the “anchor” role of the EU was so beneficial for Turkey and a chance for the EU to face its biases on the way to becoming a global power, what has caused the parties to lose their ambitions? More specifically, how is it possible for one to explain the current stagnation?
Explaining the Current Stalemate: Who Gets What?
The current situation regarding the Turkey-EU relations can be explained in terms of Turkey’s and EU’s perspectives simultaneously.
From Turkey’s point of view, three developments come to the fore. First of all, the AKP government does not have legitimacy concerns today as it did at the initial phases of its election.
Secondly, the dazzling developments regarding the domestic political agenda after the July 22 elections have pushed the government to invest all its energy into the domestic politics. The closure case against it, in particular, forced the AKP government to set everything else aside.
Finally, the EU’s ‘sincerity’ and ‘objectivity’ started to be widely questioned among different segments of the society. As known, the EU froze the negotiations on eight chapters, and decided not to close the others until the Cyprus Question has been solved. Moreover, the bans on Northern Cyprus were not lifted even though the EU gave unequivocal promises in the wake of the Annan Referendum. Although the EU acted as the main responsible actor throughout the Europeanization process of the Cyprus Problem by opening the membership door to the Greek Cypriots, its attitudes toward Turkey as if it were the major obstacle to the solution dissatisfied the Turkish side. The normative power of the EU, inevitably, was put into question in Turkey.
From the EU’s point of view, two developments have dominated the political agenda. The first was the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaty crisis, respectively. Since the ambiguities regarding the future of the EU increased, the EU faced existential interrogations in the sense that the questions like “what is Europe” and “who are the Europeans” occupied the political discussions in the EU. The second development was the dissatisfaction that emerged from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements at the public level. Since the EU integration seems to reach the limits of an elite-driven project, public concerns are of more importance for the EU policy-makers than in the past. Not surprisingly, Turkey becomes the scapegoat in these discussions and long-term benefits of a possible membership are overlooked during this process. As a result, the EU preferred to cool down its relations with Turkey in order to calm down the European citizens.
What next?
At the beginning of 2009, it is obvious that Turkey-EU relations are in a dismal position, and the existing tug-of-war between parties creates a no -win situation. Yet, there are signs from the Turkish side to revitalize the process, partially thanks to the global financial crisis. As the economic turmoil deepens, the Turkish government understands the “anchor” role of the EU more clearly. In the same vein, the business associations like TUSIAD, TOBB, etc. increased their voices in favor of the membership process again. The AKP government also started to give unequivocal messages regarding the reform process. In this regard, the appointment of new EU chief negotiator, Egemen Bagis, and Prime Minister’s visit to Brussels after four years is noteworthy to mention.
In summary, Turkish government seems to revitalize the membership process thanks to developments in the domestic political environment and the global financial crisis. Now, the ball is in the EU’s court. It is up to the European decision-makers to appreciate the recent initiatives of Turkey. Yet, what is obvious is that neither Turkey, nor the EU wins in the long-run, if the current stalemate plunges into a deadline in the following months.
mkutlay@usak.org.tr
