Friday, 23 January 2009
Recent Israeli attacks on Gaza caused more than a thousand civilian casualties. At least 1,300 Palestinians have been killed and 5000 injured since the beginning of the attacks. Israel’s disproportionate use of force and its attacks on civilians had been condemned and led to many protests all around the world. It was probably the first time that the world public opinion reacted in such a large scale at the same time.
There are various opinions about why Israel chose such a roadmap. While a noteworthy majority explains this by the oncoming elections in Israel, others claim that the main reason behind those attacks was inciting Iran and endangering the possible dialogue process between the U.S and Iran by drawing Iran in that conflict. Another group defends the idea that the key player behind this conflict was Iran and Iran would be the only beneficiary of that conflict in any case. Thus the Iranian stance toward the conflict has become important.
When we examine the Iranian stance on the issue we can see that contrary to many expectations and estimations Iran did not take a certain attitude that would escalate the conflict. In fact Iran’s foreign policy is based on pragmatic principles, and in this matter as well Iran demonstrated a pragmatic approach. Definitely it criticized the war with strong rhetoric, and condemned Israel both in official and religious platforms. There were also many protests organized by students. Moreover Iran accused the Arab countries for staying silent. But regardless of these measures Iran denied the claims that it had provided weapons and equipments to Hamas and declared that they gave only spiritual support to Hamas and the Palestinian people. The clearest example of Iran’s pragmatic policy on that issue was the rejection of demand submitted by approximately 70,000 volunteer students to go to the conflict area
[1].
Actually we can say that Iran was waiting for the new U.S President’s term to begin. As president-elect Obama’s slogan was ‘dialogue without precondition’ with the Iranian Government, it was the best choice to stay calm and not endanger a process about which they know nothing. That is why the Iranian Government preferred to pursue a pragmatic ‘wait and see’ policy. Contrary to anticipations, rather than supporting Hamas or triggering Hezbollah to open a northern front in that conflict, Iran limited its stance by condemning the war, criticizing the Arab countries, refreshing its anti-Israel expressions, sending humanitarian aid to the region, and submitting proposals for a possible solution of the crisis in political manner.
Since the Iranian nuclear crisis and national security have priority and is more important than militarily supporting Hamas against Israel, it can be said that Iran’s support to Hamas has just been limited by these political and diplomatic efforts. On the other hand the rising negative sentiments against Israel in global scale already serve Iranian policies. That is why in such a scenario Iran would prefer to sit back and follow the developments without any involvement.
In parallel with this policy Iran criticized the Arab countries and urged them to cut their ties with Israel. But, on the other hand Iran criticized the UN Security Council resolution as ‘late and weak’ and also described the Security Council as a tool for western countries to realize their targets
[2].
As it can be remembered, the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1860 (2009) on Gaza called for an immediate, durable, and fully respected ceasefire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza; emphasized the importance of the safety and well-being of all civilians; condemned all violence and hostilities directed against civilians and all acts of terrorism; called upon Member States to intensify efforts to provide arrangements and guarantees in Gaza in order to sustain a durable ceasefire; stressed the need to ensure a sustained and regular flow of goods and people through the Gaza crossings; called for the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance, including of food, fuel, and medical treatment. It also encouraged tangible steps towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation including the support of mediation efforts of Egypt and the League of Arab States as expressed in the 26 November 2008 resolution
[3].
A group of Iranian experts said that while the resolution seems good at first glance, it also has a dangerous side. According to that group, the resolution gave Israel room to maneuver in order to continue its attacks and call for cease-fire whenever it wants. They also shared the view that main reason behind the opposition of Hamas and other Palestinian groups to the resolution was the absence of the name of the Hamas, which means they do not recognize it officially. This group of experts claimed that the soul of this resolution is the same as the western countries’ plan, which tries to bring back the Fatah to Gaza
[4].
One of the major samples for Iran’s diplomatic and political initiatives was the submitted 14- point proposal on the Gaza conflict. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani who attended to the Islamic Inter-Parliamentary Union (IIPU) in Istanbul, put forward this proposal and received strong support from the Islamic states attending the meeting. The context of the proposal is listed below
[5]:
1. Immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza
2. Ending the blockade on Gaza and re-opening all border crossings
3. Forming a fact-finding committee to identify the Israel Government’s crimes against Gaza in order to bring the war criminals to justice
4. Condemning Israel for resorting to force against civilian people and using unconventional weapons in Gaza’s populated areas
5. Condemning Israel’s air, ground, and sea attacks
6. Asking for immediate termination of military operation against Gaza people
7. Providing humanitarian aid such as food, fuel, and medicine and transferring those aids to Gaza people
8. Dispatching an IIPU committee to the region to direct the relief operations
9. Urging the United Nations and relief organizations such as the Red Cross to send humanitarian aid and transfer the wounded from Gaza
10. Holding the Zionist regime responsible for the loss of human lives and the destruction in the Gaza Strip
11. Imposing a legal obligation on the Israeli Government to pay reparations to the victims.
12. Urging all IIPU members to break off their parliamentary relations with Tel Aviv.
13. Making a call on international community to pressure Israel to release the Palestinian prisoners, including the Palestinian National Assembly speaker and other Palestinian lawmakers
14. Asking the director general to transfer the financial aids collected by the IIPU member states’ parliaments to Gaza people
Consequently we can talk about two different schools of thought about Iran’s Israel policy. The first one defends the idea that both Iran and Israel are pursuing the goal of regional hegemony in the Middle East, and the nature of enmity between them is a strategic race covered by ideological garb. The second group defends the idea that anti-Semitism and antagonism towards Israel is one the main principles of 1979 Revolution, so that Iran does not use the Palestine card just for gaining the support of region’s countries and people. Without entering into a debate on which school of thought’s argument is more likely, it is better to remember that one of the major goals of Iranian foreign policy is gaining regional hegemony. That’s why using a long-term problem like Palestine-Israel conflict in parallel with this policy is not a distant choice.
But as mentioned above, in the current circumstances Iran will not renounce its pragmatic policies and endanger a possible dialogue route with the U.S. On the other hand Iran benefits when enmity towards Israel is at highest level and currently rising anti-Israel sentiments are already serving Iran’s goals. That is why Iran needs not take any extra initiative. It is highly likely that it will prefer to continue its political and diplomatic efforts and sitting aside to monitor “the days of Israel’s power loss” in its own terms.
International Strategic Research Organization
Middle East Studies Centre
celalifer@yahoo.com
[1] Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Iran Says Much, Does Little on Gaza’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 January 2009
[2] ‘??? ???? ??? ?? ????? ????? ???/ ?????????? ?????? ????? ?? ?????? ???’, Mehr News, 10 January 2009
[3] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1860 (2009), 8 January 2009
[4] ‘??????? 1860 ? ??? ????? ?? ?? ?? ??????? ???? ????? ???’, Mehr News, 11 January 2009
[5] ‘Islamic States Back Iran’s 14 Point Proposal on Gaza’, Tehran Times, 15 January 2009
Turkey's Role as a Mediator or Facilitator
