Q. What is all this noise about uranium enrichment?

A. Simply put, the sort of uranium (U-235) that can be used for making fuel rods (or bombs) are found in extremely minute levels (0.72% of all natural uranium is U-235) in the earth’s crust. It is a cumbersome process to isolate useable uranium isotopes from other non-essential items, a hurdle that Iran has already overcome. At current levels, Iran produces uranium that is enriched enough to make fuel rods but not nearly enough to make a bomb that has the power of those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (25 kilotons, on average). (Of course, the yield of present-day thermonuclear weapons [5 to 10 megatons] makes Hiroshima and Nagasaki look like Disneyland, but let us not even go there.)

Coupled with Iran’s successful ballistic missile program (its intermediate-range missiles are estimated to have a range of 3,000 miles) and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s less-than-tactful remarks against Israel, it is understandable why uranium enrichment is the central question.

From December 2006 onward, in order to signal to the Iranians that they mean business, the five major powers with seats at the United Nations Security Council have passed several sanctions against Iran. Since then, the P5+1 have tied the lifting of sanctions to a complete halt of enrichment, a condition that Tehran finds humiliating and illegitimate.

Q. But dozens of countries produce nuclear power. And quite a few of them even have their own nuclear weapons. So, why is that these countries can have the bomb but not Iran?

A. This question is ironic because the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, guaranteeing its signatories’ access to peaceful nuclear technology, is celebrating its fortieth anniversary this year.

The NPT does several things: It asks nuclear weapon states to refrain from transferring weapons technology or actual weapons to non-nuclear weapon states (Art. I of the NPT) and it calls upon non-nuclear weapon states not to receive nuclear weapons from the possessors (Art. II).

Iran is a signatory to the NPT. But of the four countries in Iran’s geographic proximity with nuclear weapons, only Russia is a party to the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state. Israel, Pakistan, and India, on the other hand, refuse to give up their nukes and join the NPT. Unlike those countries, Iran has already pledged to the world that it would never have the bomb.

Q. Why is the Iranian government so keen on uranium enrichment?

A. As mentioned earlier, Iranian leaders insist that their nuclear aspirations are not belligerent. In fact, once inside the country, one can see that a self-sustaining nuclear energy program could have many uses for Iran. The oil-rich Middle Eastern nation, owing to old habits (Iranians use their motor vehicles like bicycles) and poor urban planning (Tehran, a city of over 12 million people, has a subway system that is inadequate for its needs), emits too much greenhouse gases. Since these gases are not one of the environmental dangers of nuclear power plants, it makes sense that Iran would like to obtain some of its energy from non-fossil sources.

On a similar point, as the price of crude oil increases, nuclear energy could actually become more profitable for Iran. The country could save more of its oil for export by increasing its reliance on nuclear energy. As oil prices are unlikely to go below the $100/barrel mark anytime soon, that could mean even better export earnings for Iran.

Finally, a strong nuclear industry lays the groundwork for making the bomb itself. Given the poor judgment that the Bush administration has exercised in Iran’s proximity and Israel’s failure to come to a final agreement with the Palestinians, thus giving Tehran a great opportunity to act as the champions of oppressed Muslims and causing U.S. and Israeli resentment, it is understandable why the Islamic Republic would like to keep its options open with regard to the bomb.

In fact, from a purely realistic observation of Iran’s history, it is a wonder why that country doesn’t already have the bomb. Iran was invaded three times in the twentieth century (Russia in 1911; Russia and Britain in 1941; and by Iraq in 1980) and there is a good reason why Iranian leaders use a threatening tone against their adversaries; they do not want to be attacked again. In other words, even if the Iranians are secretly working on the bomb, it is not because they want to attack others, but because they are fearful of the past.

Q. How could the expansion of UN sanctions affect Iran’s domestic affairs?

A. Iran is conducting negotiations with the World Trade Organization (WTO) for membership since 2005. Moreover, although Iran has a government-led economy, economic liberalization and the privatization of many state enterprises have expanded the number of foreign firms operating in the Islamic Republic. Foreign direct investments have similarly grown from $ 4.2 billion in 2005 to nearly $10 billion last year.

But since late 2006, the specter of further sanctions and the actual increase in financial sanctions (two of Iran’s major banks – Bank Melli and Bank Mellat – are now blacklisted in the European Union) is shaking investor and consumer confidence. The price spikes in crude oil have boosted petrodollars that the Iranian government receives, but that has left the country with an annual inflation rate of over 30% because of excessive public spending. At the moment, it is the Islamic Republic’s lower and middle classes that are deeply affected from the rapid inflation.

Looking at this picture, smart sanctions that limit Tehran’s access to international finance and high technology could hurt Iran. This option may seem feasible, and indeed, many Iranians and political leaders are not happy about their country’s isolation from the international community. This unease is probably what keeps Mr. Ahmedinejad from being more defiant against the world.

On another note, differences among the Iranian elite over the nuclear issue can cause domestic politics in the Islamic Republic to take interesting turns in the short run. Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, may be a possible contender in next year’s presidential elections. Mr. Larijani, who resigned his post last year over differences with Mr. Ahmedinejad’s entourage, is currently the speaker of the Iranian parliament. The political fortunes of Iranian moderates like Mr. Larijani may depend on how the international community handles Iran’s nuclear program.

Q. What is the worst solution to this problem?

A. In a nutshell, a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities with the hope to stop Tehran from acquiring the bomb would be the worst solution of all. Not only would an attack cause the already-high oil prices to skyrocket and the global economy to plummet like a rock, Iranians would realize that their greatest fears are coming to life once again and finish their bomb. The costs of such eventualities are too frightful to fathom.

Q. What is the best solution that could settle the current stand-off?

A. In an ideal world, Iran would completely halt uranium enrichment, accept unconditional inspection, satisfy the worries of the international community, have sanctions lifted, and regain legitimacy for its nuclear program. But as mentioned above, the Iranians perceive enrichment as a national right and, being a very proud people, they refuse to budge under duress, even when doing so serves their interest. A temporary halt is not scrapping the nuclear program, but that’s not where Tehran wants to go right now.

The second best solution, then, is the “freeze-freeze” option. Per this alternative, both parties put some sort of a “freeze” over what they are doing at the moment: Iranians keep their enrichment at current production levels while the P5+1 “freeze” their sanctions and do not take further measures against Iran. In the mean time, the parties sit down, start talking, and hopefully reach some sort of a solution.

In lieu of a conclusion: This is not the first time that the international community is dealing with a country that has the potential to acquire nuclear weapons. In the past, countries as disparate as South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Sweden (yes, the peaceful Scandinavians!) came close to developing the bomb. But in many of those cases, international pressure, domestic considerations, and the NPT regime itself saw that proliferation did not materialize.

At any rate, very few countries have obtained nuclear weapons outside the scope of the NPT. Some of those nations that crossed the nuclear threshold have been brought back to sanity. Just a few days ago, North Korea, which had detonated a nuclear device two years ago, decided to scrap its nuclear weapons program.

That fact proves that diplomacy still works and that there is no reason why the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program cannot be resolved peacefully.

9 July 2008

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Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia and a regular contributor to the Journal of Turkish Weekly.

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu