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Arzu Celalifer Ekinci
USAK Center for Energy Studies |
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Tuesday, 11 December 2007
In the latest weeks there was a rise of tension in the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran’s resistant attitude against suspension of its uranium enrichment activities was the major reason of this tension. As the Bush Administration is so insistent on that issue, they are pushing for the third resolution to be approved in the Security Council (UNSC). But there are some obstacles blocking this aim. First, the final IAEA report which concluded the absence of a current military nuclear program in Iran and second, the resistance of two veto holder members of UNSC, Russia and China. That’s why Bush Administration had increased its efforts in demonizing the Islamic Regime and trying to convince the international public opinion about an Iranian threat. President Bush’s speeches were about the urgent initiatives and measures to be taken against Iran and preventing a possible third world war. Even the IAEA report conclusions were not enough for the US. At that point there were many similarities among the recent Iraqi crisis and current ongoing Iranian crisis. Ignored IAEA reports and tough US declarations make the world public opinion think about a déjà vu scenario.
However a new Nuclear Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Report on Iran had shaken the world agenda. This national intelligence report concludes with “high confidence” that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in fall 2003. This new version of NIE report is clearly in contradiction with the previous 2005 NIE Report -saying "with high confidence" that Iran was "determined" to build nuclear weapons- and also President Bush’s statements on Iran.
While the report has eased the tension in the international community, it also brought a lot of questions and critics. We can talk about a significant crisis of confidence and mistrust both inside and outside of the US.
According to a former CIA officer, the mentioned report was ready to be published last year but it has been delayed as it had included dissenting views. Another former CIA Officer Philip Geraldi confirmed this and added that intelligence analysts have had to review and rewrite their findings three times, because of pressure from the White House. Because the White House was looking for some evidence to support its Iran policy and did not accept intelligence report including dissenting views. But as per Geraldi, despite of all pressure coming form the White House, some analysts refused to put the conclusion that are not supported by evidence.
The National Intelligence Office informed President Bush in August 2007 that Iran may have halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 but yet there are some details and data to be evaluated before the final conclusion. Despite of this information President Bush has continued to inflame the crisis by his warmongering statements. President Bush tried to reflect Iran as an imminent threat by suggesting in October that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead to “World War III”. That is why after the release of 2007 NIE Report which reveals the facts about the Iranian nuclear program, the US public opinion and especially the democrats have criticized and interrogated their President. But a noteworthy majority was relieved by the report since the intelligence office did not make the same mistake as they did in Iraq and they prevented another possible war front.
The Context of the Report
The 2007 NIE Report concludes that the Iranian nuclear weapons program had been halted in fall 2003 and had not restarted from that date forward. In brief, the mentioned report differently from the intelligence report being prepared before the Iraq war is in parallel with the IAEA’s latest report that confirms the non-existence of a military nuclear program in Iran.
To understand the reasons of hot debates about the latest NIE Report, it is better to review the context of the report in brief. The main judgments in the report are listed below:
It assess with high confidence that Iran’s nuclear weapons program has halted in fall 2003 and had not initiated as of mid-2007. The report confirms that Iran does not have a current nuclear weapons program but Iran’s intention to develop nuclear weapons is unknown.
It says that Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than US has been judging since 2005.
Report assess that the program probably was halted in response to international pressure.
Report judges with moderate confidence that Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. And the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. All intelligence agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
It judges with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015. But at the same time states that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
The Report assess that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure and this indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. But it also states that it is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
The Report says that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons.
The Position of US Administration on Report
Immediately after the release of the report, President Bush’s national security advisor Stephen Hadley made a press conference. He tried to show the positive aspects of the report by saying that it contains positive news rather than reflecting intelligence mistakes. Hadley said that the report supported the US concerns about the Iran’s nuclear program. According to the Hadley, Iran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program in response to international pressure proves the success of Bush Administration’s Iran policy.
Hadley appended that NIE Report offers ground for hope that the problem can be solved by diplomatic means and without use of force, as the administration has been trying to do. But he could not give a satisfactory answer that why President Bush had continued to make harsh announcement on Iran even after being informed about the latest report’s findings in August 2007.
Democrats attacked Bush for ignoring the new intelligence on October 17 when he raised the prospect in a speech of "World War III" if Iran acquired the knowledge to make nuclear weapons. It can be easily said that the report frustrated the hawks and strengthened the Democrat’s position in the US.
Iran’s Reaction
Iranian government considered the report as a victory on one hand and as a political trap on the other hand. There were two different views about the report. The first bloc welcomed the US decision to “correct” its claim that Iran has an active nuclear weapons program. But the second bloc said that it is a smart trick prepared for Iran. The group that thinks the report is a strategic trick to checkmate Iran in that nuclear game claims that Iran did not have any activity to be halted in 2003. And through these reports they try to create an image that Iran had a nuclear weapons program but it has been halted in response to international pressure. So if Iran accepts this report it will accept this claim as well.
International Reactions to the NIE Report
It should be underlined that the latest NIE Report drew mixed reactions of 5+1 members and Israel. For sure the most excessive reaction came from Israel. Defence Minister Ehud Baraq expressed skepticism about the NIE’s judgments suggesting that Iran has "probably since revived" its weapons efforts. Strategic Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman said the Iranians had succeeded in hiding much of their nuclear progress from the Americans and that the regime of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would have to be targeted with sanctions even if he was not pursuing nuclear weapons.
European Union kept it previous position on Iran and said that despite of the latest NIE Report they still expect Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and until Iran resists to this demand the negotiations for a third UNSC resolution will continue. Official statements from the EU-3 called for maintaining international pressure on Iran, pointing to the positive effects of the sanctions to date. But the situation is a little bit complex. Since the UNSC and the EU agreed on imposing sanctions on Iran because they thought that Iran had a weapon program. But after the US report the consensus ground about strengthened sanctions has broken. At least many EU members agree that they have more time for diplomacy and negotiations.
Veto holder members of UNSC China and Russia gained a much stronger hand after report and hereafter they can be persistent about their objection on sanctions to be applied on Iran comfortably. The Chinese authorities’ statements saying the situation has changed and the Council members will have to review their decisionson one hand, and the Russian authorities’ statements saying that Iran had never have a nuclear weapons program and there is not evidence supporting this claim on the other hand give idea about these two countries positions.
Other countries share the view that the report is similar to what IAEA report has been saying and this confirms that Iran’s nuclear dossier should return to IAEA.
Conclusion
It can be said that the Bush Administration is being subjected to lots of criticisms both inside and outside of the US. Its public opinion still interrogate the fact that why their President continued to inflame the crisis even after being informed by intelligence office. The Bush Administration lost credit due to that fact and world public opinion remembered the Iraq disaster once again.
The most significant feature of the report is its parallel position with the latest IAEA report which shows that the US Intelligence Office has taken lessons from Iraq war and did not want to repeat the same mistake.
Since the report concludes that there is not a current nuclear weapons program in Iran, the Bush Administration has lost its ground for a possible military attack on Iranian nuclear sites. They were insistent on the fact that Iran is pursuing a military nuclear program since 2005 but the latest NIE report invalidated this argument.
On the other hand US still have some reasons to increase its pressure on Iran. According to the report the nuclear weapons program has been halted in fall 2003. So that Iran will be asked to give the details and clarifications about its program before fall 2003. And Bush Administration will try to focus on that point to draw the attention of the world public opinion to another side.
Consequently the imminent and urgent Iranian threat idea has been delayed by the report but still the past nuclear activities of Iran are a matter of concern for the Western world. Actually identifying the fact that whether Iran had a nuclear weapons program before 2003 is possible. Currently there is an ongoing work plan among IAEA and Iran about the unclear and vague aspects of the past and current nuclear program of Iran. Henceforward Iran needs to be more cooperative and transparent to complete this work plan process being held by IAEA. After this stage, asking Iran to provide objective guarantees about its future nuclear program is also possible. But it is important to remind that all these could be achieved through the diplomatic ways. And for this diplomatic process two main sides of the crisis (US and Iran) have to sit on the same table and initiate the dialogue on that issue. If the US really aims to control the Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the proper way is not isolating Iran but engaging Iran with the international community. As the NIE report emphasized, the Iranian nuclear crisis could be solved by a combination of incentives and obligations through diplomacy.
Since there is not an imminent Iranian threat, so there is not a reason for US to insist on its precondition for negotiations any more. Although the Bush Administration has tried to ignore the political crisis occurred after the report, their subsequent position on Iran is not clear yet. Public opinion criticisms on one hand, democrats pressures for a dialogue with Iran on the other hand. It seems that the possible dialogue process among US and Iran will initiate in the next administration period. But it will be better for Bush Administration to take this step in their period at least as a mark of goodwill and an attempt to compensate the political confidence crisis in their country.
International Strategic Research Organization
Middle East Studies Centre
celalifer@yahoo.com
Gareth Porter, ‘Politics – US: Cheney Tried to Stiffle Dissent in Iran NIE’, IPS News, 8 November 2007
Ed Henry, ‘Bush Told in August that Iran Nuke program may be Suspended’, CNN, 5 December 2007
Excerpts taken from: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007
Mark Mazzetti, ‘US Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work’, The New York Times, 3 December 2007
‘’Great discovery’ led to change in Iran nuclear assessment: Bush’, AFP, 4 December 2007
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گزارش سازمانهای جاسوسی آمریکا دستاوردی برای دیپلماسی هستهای ایران است, Mehr News, 4 December 2007
‘Iran welcomes US nuke report’, Associated Press, 4 December 2007
‘یک فریب بزرگ اطلاعاتی و امنیتی است NIE گزارش’ , Mehr News, 10 December 2007,
گزارش جامعه اطلاعاتی آمریکا یک دام استراتژیک است, Mehr News, 4 December 2007
Gil Hoffman – Yaakov Katz – Herb Keinon, ‘Unkonwn when Iran will have Nukes’, Jerusalem Post, 4 December 2007
James G. Neuger and Alan Crawford, ‘Iran Report Won’t Stop UN Sanctions Talks, EU Says’, Bloomberg, 4 December 2007
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