In the past few weeks, consensus has emerged among sensible observers that a military operation into Northern Iraq would not be useful for Turkey. (USAK’s Northern Iraq Report, for one thing, has helped the debates.) Even the Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt conceded two days ago that an operation would not “root out” the PKK from Northern Iraq but merely “strike a blow.”[1]

If a military operation is not the solution, then what are the alternatives to military strike for Turkey? Let us engage in a “tour d’horizon” to answer that question.

Short-term solutions

For Turkey to triumph over terrorism with minimum loss and maximum gain, a combination of short and long-term solutions is in order. The first thing to do is to ask Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Gen. Büyükanıt to make more responsible statements. Right now, these two officials look like they are not engaged in a concerted effort to protect Turkey from the PKK. In fact, they appear as if they are fighting each other rather than the PKK. Effective decision-making can only come about when decision-makers work together rather than against each other.

Once high-ranking officials act more responsibility, it will be easier for them to realize that Turkey has more to gain by talking to Iraq’s Kurdish leaders. Extravagant statements directed against the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds – which is Iraq’s internal affair to begin with – are causing Ankara to lose a viable dialogue channel. Only through such a channel could sincere Turkish concerns about the PKK be communicated to Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.

Once that line of contact is established, the following should be impressed on Iraqi Kurds: Turkey is not using the PKK as a pretext to destroy Iraqi Kurds. To substantiate that, Turkish leaders should make it clear that they would respect the outcome of the coming Kirkuk referendum so long as it is done in a fair, transparent, and democratic way. Turkey should disentangle Iraqi Kurds’ autonomy from the PKK for its own good.

Iraqi Kurds, for their part, should also do the same. By tying their political fate to the PKK, Iraqi Kurds are jeopardizing their own gains. They are reluctant to move against the PKK at the moment because they do not want to lose one of their trump cards that could fight back in the event of a Turkish military operation. That might make sense. However, Iraqi Kurds’ fraternization with the PKK is exacerbating a situation that is not necessarily improving for either Turkey or Iraqi Kurds. Thus, Iraqi Kurds must understand that though Turkey will not benefit from moving against the PKK’s camps in Northern Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government has more to lose from such an eventuality.

Long-term solutions

Despite the PKK’s claims that it is fighting for Kurdish rights, that is not the case. Turkey was on a shining path of reform that began alleviating the lot of Turkish Kurds from 2000 until 2005. That year, the PKK recommenced its attacks and things began to worsen for the people of southeast Turkey once again. Coupled with the European Union’s excessive demands on Turkey at the onset of the accession negotiations in 2005 (that Turkey should accept the tragedies during World War I as a genocide of the Armenian people and that Turkey recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as the Republic of Cyprus – unrealistic expectations at the moment), the Turkish government’s zeal for reform has melted away.

Rekindling that zeal is precisely the solution to Turkey’s predicament. More positive results will come about by granting greater rights and liberties to Turkish Kurds. Together with economic measures, such as the completion of the GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi – Southeastern Anatolia Project) that aims to harness the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for the benefit of the people in the southeast, greater social and political opportunities will pull the rug under the PKK’s feet.

The last solution relates to combating the PKK. Turkey needs to set up a multi-agency counter-terrorism task force comprising professionals from the MİT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı – National Intelligence Organization), the Police Department, and the military. Through this new agency, Turkey will gain a more effective mechanism which will directly fight the PKK.

This last point is not meant to disparage the immense endeavor and sacrifice of the Turkish military in its struggle against the PKK. However, the need for a specialized security force is more imminent than ever. In fact, that point has been raised by several retired military officers in the recent past.

Take retired general Osman Pamukoğlu. In concluding his memoirs a few years ago, Gen. Pamukoğlu – who was the former commander of the Hakkari Commando Brigade and is no stranger to the PKK’s terrorism – states the following: “In fighting the PKK, a total of 20,000 troops, including hand-picked officers and NCOs, would be more than enough. We shall train them for four to six months. In the following 14 months, we shall clear the mountains, valleys, and forests by working in four groups of 5,000 men. We do not need anything [i.e. additional hardware] besides helicopters and mountain howitzers.”[2] Although this memorandum’s specific recommendation with regards to enforcement is slightly different than that of Gen. Pamukoğlu, the gist of the arguments are the same – only a fully professional force can effectively curb the PKK.

Many observers have been criticizing the United States for mishandling its war on terror for the past six years. The Bush administration is doing a poor job in fighting terrorism. However, there is no point in criticizing the United States for its sole reliance on coercion in fighting terrorism and sparing Turkey from criticism for the same mistake. As this memorandum argues, there are myriad options in front of Turkey that have to augment a military solution. Taking advantage of them would deal the finishing blow to the PKK.

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Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to the Journal of Turkish Weekly.

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu