For over twenty years, the terrorist group PKK has claimed the lives of Turkish soldiers and Turkish civilians – most were of Kurdish origins – in Turkey.

PKK-instigated violence has recommenced in the past two years. Last month, a suicide bomber detonated himself in a crowded avenue in the Turkish capital Ankara, killing six and wounding over a hundred people. Various attacks against civilians and security forces have continued since. With each attack, Turkish officials are voicing the likelihood of a military intervention in Northern Iraq.

After the First Gulf War ended in 1991, Iraqi Kurds began to enjoy some degree of autonomy in Northern Iraq. Following the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Kurdish Autonomous Government virtually became the sole authority in the area. The downside to the new arrangement has been that the Iraqi Kurds do not have the means and will to confront terrorist organizations in their borders for fear of destabilizing their hard-won autonomy.

Accordingly, lack of order on the borderlands of Northern Iraq has bestowed the PKK with the infrastructure necessary to carry its existence.

Turkish officials believe that they can put an end to that. At the moment, Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt sounds like he is the man for the job. On June 1, Mr. Büyükanıt said that all he needed for an operation was a political directive to end the PKK’s presence in Northern Iraq. Immediately after that statement, the Turkish military tightened its security measures and began carrying out operations against the PKK in the Turkish provinces bordering Iraq.

A military strike against the PKK may bring some relief. In fact, the Turkish military has impressive force-multipliers to carry out such an operation. Among the tangible factors boosting Turkey’s capabilities are large-scale airlift, precision artillery, and effective coordination between air contingents and ground forces. The intangible factors, which are constantly confirmed by Turkey’s NATO allies, are also a source of pride to Turkish people: the soldiers’ perfect discipline, never-ending courage, and stoic durability in the face of insurmountable odds.

A military solution, however, may not be the answer to Turkey’s problems. In the 1990s, Turkey conducted three massive operations and nearly a dozen smaller ones into Northern Iraq. These actions yielded very little success. In fact, only after PKK’s Stalin-wannabe leader Abdullah Öcalan got caught in 1999 was Turkey able to halt the terrorist group.

Right now, the Kurdish Regional Government is not too cooperative with Turkish authorities, although they have some good reasons for doing that. Strong words from the Turkish side give the Iraqi Kurds much worry. That is the reason why they are reluctant to move against the PKK. Iraqi Kurds are probably using the PKK as a trump card against Turkey.

Iraqi Kurds also believe that the Turkish government might be using the PKK as an issue to discard the upcoming referendum on Kirkuk which is scheduled for November 2007. The referendum will decide the fate of the oil-rich province – whether it will remain a part of federal Iraq or become part of the Kurdish Regional Government.

Iraqi Kurds’ motives are understandable. However, they make little sense to Turkish people. Scores of Turks are dying everyday. It is becoming a re-run of the horror of the 1990s. It is very hard to expect Turkish people to react like nothing is happening at this time. Iraqi Kurds should be aware of the fact that Turkish are running out of patience. They should do something to help them out.

As for Turkish decision-makers, they should be more cool-headed than the common folks. Right now, those in positions of responsibility in Ankara discuss the military option so openly that they might have to act in the end – even if it will not serve their country’s best interests.

The military solution is one which is worse than the problem it addresses. A military operation against the PKK camps in Northern Iraq can bring Iraqi Kurds to the side of the PKK. That scenario will unavoidably pit Turks and Kurds against each other, which is the last thing the Middle East needs right now. Moreover, a Turkish operation will inflame the only part of Iraq that is relatively stable. Turkey’s American allies, who are bogged down in other parts of Iraq, will certainly not take that kindly. Talking about the Americans, the U.S. military’s current predicament in Iraq demonstrates the limits of military solutions in that country. (Last week was the fortieth anniversary of Israel’s “victory” in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Israel’s inability to attain meaningful peace with its Arab neighbors for forty years speaks volumes about the ultimate viability of “total victories”).

The solution against the PKK and its racist agenda is simply not military. Turkey should think of other ways in dealing with its current problem. Invoking Clausewitz’s rule might help: What purpose will a military operation serve? What is the meaning of a military operation if Turkey is only going to strengthen its enemy’s resolve? Most importantly, what good is a military operation that creates more enemies than it destroys? One has to bear these questions in mind before reaching swift conclusions.

+++

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to the Journal of Turkish Weekly.

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu