But the same article prescribes the following: “If a two-thirds majority of the total number of members cannot be obtained in the first two ballots…a third ballot shall be held and the candidate who receives the absolute majority of votes of the total number of members shall be elected President of the Republic.” By the fourth ballot, if parliament could still not elect a president, then general elections would be called.

Yesterday, the Constitutional Court interpreted the two-thirds clause in Article 102 as the number necessary for a quorum (i.e. number of deputies needed for convening).

There is no point in criticizing that decision, although I believe that it was a colossal mistake. However, a few points are in order before moving on.

Article 153 of the Turkish Constitution expressly states that “decisions of annulment cannot be made public without a written statement of reasons.” The Constitutional Court has violated that principle by declaring its decision without giving its detailed legal opinion. Right now, we know what the decision is but we do not know the Court’s exact reasoning. That might cause other problems in the current elections later on.

Moreover, the esteemed justices have missed a key point about the Constitution. Until the coup d’etat of September 12, 1980, the Turkish parliament was not able to elect a president. By the 103^rd (yes, 103^rd!) ballot, which was cast a few days before the coup, deputies could not agree on a president because the previous constitution required a two-thirds majority for the election. President Fahri Korutürk had stepped down from the presidency earlier that year and the speaker of the parliament served as acting president for who-knows-how-many-months.

The framers of the current constitution aimed at giving Turkey an easier time when electing a president. That was the reason why they came up with the four-round election system in parliament; to make sure that the country would not be left without a president. The Constitutional Court’s “two-thirds majority as quorum” ruling is likely to cause a lot of deadlocks in the future.

Alas, “alea jacta est.” The die is cast. From now on, everybody needs to focus on how to avoid a political crisis. Politics is the art of compromise. Turkish people should call on all leaders that they have to come up with a name other than Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, who was nominated by his party last week.

Mr. Gül’s background as an academic and international banker and his vast experience in statecraft would have made him an excellent president. By shunning Mr. Gül and causing the Constitutional Court to come up with this decision, the opposition has cost Turkey a golden opportunity to normalize its politics. Let us hope that we shall not regret that judgment.

In order to make use of the current conundrum, it is appropriate to mention why the Turkish presidency matters and how the duties of the president could be revised in order to make it less problematic in the future.

Turkey is a parliamentary democracy. However, it borders on a semi-presidential system like that in France. Article 104 gives the president wide duties and powers - he/she can appoint high court judges; university rectors, ambassadors, the chief of general staff, and undersecretaries of cabinet ministries without parliamentary approval. The president also has extensive veto powers over legislative bills.

On the executive side, some of the president’s powers are as follows: He/she can appoint the prime minister and accept his/her resignation. The president can preside over the council of ministers; can decide to mobilize the armed forces in times of emergency; and is authorized to declare martial law or a state of emergency.

First of all, the president’s powers could be limited to appointing judges to high courts and the chief of general staff only. Although the president should retain symbolic powers as the commander-in-chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, administratively, those powers should be assigned to the minister of national defense (at the moment, the chief of general staff answers to the prime minister).

As for the president’s legislative veto powers, per the principle of checks and balances and separation of powers, it is better to retain them.

What about the crux of the issue? Popular elections. The Turkish word for president, “cumhurbaşkanı,” literally means “chief of the people.” So, why not have the people elect their chief? In a two-round election where a given candidate would get at least 50 percent plus one vote would reflect popular will on the highest echelon of power. That alternative is much more appealing than the fanfare we are witnessing right now.

On another note, bringing the president’s lengthy seven-year term to a single six-year term like in Mexico would mean that any person who sits in office will not have to “politick” in order to get re-elected. One of the current proposals is to extend the president’s tenure to two five-year terms. In order to avoid political bargaining, a shorter single term would be much better. The Turkish president, after all, needs to be aloof from day-to-day politics. Article 104 of the Constitution asserts that “the President of the Republic is the Head of State. In this capacity, he or she shall represent the Republic of Turkey and the unity of the Turkish Nation; he or she shall ensure the implementation of the Constitution, and the regular and harmonious functioning of the organs of state.”

Secularism in Turkey cannot be assured without proper democracy. That was the vision that Atatürk and his friend and successor İsmet İnönü had for Turkey. With yesterday’s decision, Turkey has stepped back from the dream. But things can be turned around. Turkey has the historic opportunity to reform a contentious and problematic aspect of its political system. Limiting some of the excessive powers of the presidency will strengthen Turkey. That is exactly what needs to be done right now.

2 May 2007

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Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to the Journal of Turkish Weekly.

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu