When embarking on a course of action, every prudent political actor should first define legitimate and acceptable success. Every move should begin by having a realistic objective. Decision-makers ought to consider whether success is achievable with the tools at hand. Next, planners need to evaluate whether the strategy is designed to realize the objective. If the plan involves military action, how would the army on the field adapt to changing conditions (the fog of war effect)? It is also important for civilian rulers and military strategists to be in tune with each other. More importantly, can society be persuaded to support military action? Similarly, are other countries supportive of military action; is there a chance to build a coalition? Coming full circle, policy-makers need to reflect on how they will bring military operations to an end.
Policy-makers in Ankara are pondering these issues when thinking about a possible operation in Northern Iraq. Given the gravity of the situation and the factors at hand, a military operation in Northern Iraq can get Turkey bogged down in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time.
Although Turkey voices concern over the status of Kirkuk and the coming referendum, its only concern is the attacks staged by the terrorist organization PKK from Northern Iraq. Anger toward Iraqi Kurds, who are perceived to be harboring the PKK, is building with every funeral procession for a fallen Turkish soldier.
The ultimate paradox of the Kurdish regional government and the central government in Baghdad is that a terrorist group is launching attacks from their territory against another sovereign state. A good deal of the time, we hear that the reason why the regional and central governments in Iraq cannot move against the PKK is that they could not exert complete control over PKK’s base in Mt. Kandil. Iraqis’ claim to sovereignty is challenged not by Turkey, but by a terrorist group which spreads nothing but chaos into Southeastern Turkey and Northern Iraq.
Looking at the bigger picture, the cautious observer is tempted to warn decision-makers in Ankara, Erbil, and Baghdad about the consequences of a Turkish operation into Northern Iraq. In the 1990s, Turkey conducted two massive operations and nearly a dozen smaller ones into Northern Iraq. It was not until a great opportunity presented itself when PKK’s Stalin-wannabe leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 that Turkey was able to remarkably halt the terrorist group.
More importantly, during the operations in the 1990s, Turkey was supported by the peshmerga units of Messrs. Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani. Although this cooperation had a mixed record of succes then, Iraqis – Kurdish and Arab – are overtly warning Turkey that its troops are not welcome today.
The Turkish side should be receptive to the fact that Iraq is in a very bad situation right now. We are essentially talking about a government that cannot guarantee the physical safety of its parliament building. Compare that to the situation in Ankara, where only two honor guards protect the spacious park in front of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. One can see that Iraq has more existential problems than Turkey. At the moment, by helping the economic reconstruction of Iraq, Turkey presents itself as a small but respectful solution to Iraq’s problems. But if Turkey decides to conduct a military operation into Iraq, it will choose to become part of the problem.
The Iraqi side, however, is not without its responsibilities. Iraqi administrators in Erbil and Baghdad ought to see that Turkish people are becoming fed up with violence. The PKK is poisoning Turkey’s relations with Iraq in general and the Iraqi Kurds in particular. Although a full-scale operation by peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army is not conceivable at this stage, honest gestures such as denying the PKK financial and logistical opportunities in Northern Iraq can convince Turkish leaders that their Kurdish counterparts mean business. That can ease tensions significantly. A failure to do that can turn events for the worst.
On another note, leaders on both sides need to refrain from making extravagant remarks to the press. “Oh God! That men should put an enemy in their mouths to steal away their brains” warns William Shakespeare in Othello. In an age where sensational news is the only thing that sells, responsible officials have to be more careful with what they say. An accumulation of unwise could lead to very nasty outcomes (which would mean more business for the press). There is not a single sensible reason why Turks and Iraqis should fight each other and a lot of good ones why they should not.
Everyone who is concerned about the prospects of more bloodshed in Iraq should remember the following: Last June, retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters advocated the redrawing of borders in the Middle East with blood. In his article “Blood Borders,” Mr. Peters argued that the Middle East would look much better if new borders would be drawn by blood (his article was subtitled “How a Better Middle East Would Look”).[i]
Those craving for a good fight should bear in mind that whatever new borders or bold strokes they may want to achieve, all of that is going to happen at the expense of their own blood.
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Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to the Journal of Turkish Weekly.
E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu
16 April 2007
