-          What should be the primary targets of an American nuclear attack on the Soviet Union?

-          What types of events should the United States declare as grounds for nuclear retaliation?

-          Should U.S. response be of a flexible or massive character?

-          Do they envision or recommend a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union?

-          What should U.S. responsibilities be after the war is over?

As we discussed the doctrine, our students came up with contrasting answers: Some argued that the United States should not target cities (in order not to harm civilians) but only military installations. Others defended the opposite position. However, none of the students advocated a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and recommended a flexible response instead of “massive retaliation” (on this point, they ran against the historical fact because the Eisenhower administration was a vehement proponent of massive retaliation). The students looked more troubled once we reminded them that with the addition of hydrogen bombs into the arsenal, nuclear plans in the 1950s considered delivering 1,400 warheads to Soviet territory, with an estimated overall yield of 1,200 megatons (Hiroshima times 40,000, in other words). They knew, just as U.S. planners knew at the time, that a total yield of 1,200 megaton would mean the end of all life forms on the planet. Lesson learned: you cannot really fight a war with nuclear weapons; they are too deadly to be of any military worth.[1]

Even though we discussed the past, I am sure that many of my students thought about nuclear proliferation in our times. I know I lose sleep over these problems quite often. As an ascribing historian of the Cold War, I know what is at stake.

The issue of North Korean proliferation seems to be easing and that leaves us with the question of Iran’s nuclear program. The deadline set by UN Security Council Resolution 1737 of last December has passed and Iran has still not stopped enriching uranium.

In contrast to the North Koreans, the Iranians deny that their nuclear program is aimed to produce an atomic bomb. The claim that all they want is a complete fuel cycle that involves the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel for the reproduction of nuclear energy. According to former defense minister Ali Shamkhani, “a complete fuel cycle is vital for Iran” because “having an incomplete nuclear energy cycle means paying extra costs and being dependent on nuclear powers.”[2]

This is an understandable point. Skeptics argue that Iran’s interest in nuclear energy is ill-intended because it has enough oil and natural has to meet its energy needs. But it is becoming an “inconvenient truth” that fossil fuels are not doing a whole lot good for the environment. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, is more environment-friendly than oil and natural gas (if handled very carefully, of course). From that perspective, Iran’s nuclear program is a sensible investment.

What is not understandable, however, is the hard-line taken by Iranian leaders, especially President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Last week, Mr. Ahmadinejad rebuffed the calls from the international community for Iran to halt its enrichment of uranium so as to resume talks over its nuclear program. The Associated Press reported that Mr. Ahmadinejad compared his country’s nuclear program to “a train without breaks or a reverse gear,” prompting U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice to respond that all Iran needed was a “stop button.”[3]

Iranians have to demonstrate that their nuclear program does not have ulterior motives. As an engineer by profession, Mr. Ahmadinejad should know that in basic physics, every moving object eventually loses its motion either because of friction or collision. When the object in question is a train going downhill, a strong break prevents everybody inside and outside that train from a disaster.

Last November, Mr. Ahmadinejad declared that Iran had successfully completed a nuclear fuel cycle. So what is the problem? Why are Iranian leaders so intransigent in the face of growing international pressure on Iran’s nuclear program?

The answer might be Iran’s traditional skepticism of the outside world. Twentieth-century history has been marked by continuous interference in Iranian sovereignty first by Britain and Russia and then by the United States. When the Iranians look at the current issue, they see a repetition of the Russian occupation of 1911, the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941, and the CIA-sponsored overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953. It is almost a dictate of Iranian nationalism to stand up to this perceived encroachment on Iranian sovereignty,

Iran’s skepticism of the West is extremely well-taken. But as much as the feeling of defying the whole world may be a major boost of self-confidence (as a Turk, I know the felling is great), that attitude may be misleading. It should be borne in mind that Russia and China (both which are not on friendly terms with the United States these days) did not veto the Security Council resolution of last December. Unsatisfied with Iran’s unresponsiveness, many countries are coming to the fore to pressure Iran to come back to the negotiation table. Apparently, even India, which had remained quiet over Iran’s nuclear program, has decided to suspend any trade with Iran that might help that country’s nuclear program.[4]

From this picture, it is safe to conclude that the Iranian side should demonstrate some flexibility. Politics is the art of finding a middle ground. The Iranians will not lose too much by temporarily halting uranium enrichment – they have already accrued enough know-how to pick up from where they left off once they reach an understanding with the international community. It is a great opportunity to prove that they are a responsible member of the global community. But if Iran is not more forthcoming, the current crisis will get worse. Nobody wants that.

For its part, the West in general and the United States in particular should expressly guarantee to Iran that it will not be a target of attack. Over the past few weeks, American officials have been quite reluctant to state their position on the question of using force against Iran. If Iranians do not get any assurances on that point, they will be even more reluctant about halting uranium enrichment.

All statesmen should understand that their behavior will determine an important part of the twenty-first century. They should give us cause to be hopeful about our prospects. When we look back in history, there are pivotal moments that give us great discomfort and continue to haunt us to this day. Nuclear weapons are one of the prime examples of this phenomenon. Everybody knows how the nuclear arms race during the Cold War brought us more than once to the brink of total genocide. Let us not go there again; let us have university students discuss something other than nuclear doctrine in 2057.

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Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to the Journal of Turkish Weekly.

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu